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Koon,AI Cm '.\TY DISTRICT COCRT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR28-18-15354
§

State of Idaho
Plaintiff,
vs.
Cody Leigh Hansen
Defendant.

§
§
§
§
§

Location: Kootenai County District Court
Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.
Filed on: 09/17/2018
Appear by: 10/05/2018
Case Number History;
Appellate Case Number: 46805-2019

C--\SE: l:\FOR\IATIO'.\

Citation
Offense
Jurisdiction: State
1. Controlled Substance-Possession With
Intent to Manufacture or Deliver

Statute Deg

Date

1372732

09/15/2018

FEL

Case Type: Criminal

(a)( I)

(A)-P/1
TCN: ID2800109925
MIS
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA-USE OR !SP3780000062 1372734A
POSSESS WITH INTENT TO USE

09/15/2018

(I)

DATE

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CR28-18-15354
Kootenai County District Court
10/13/2018
Meyer, Cynthia K.C.

PARTY INFORMATIO~

State

State of Idaho

Defendant

Hansen, Cody Leigh

Lead Attorneys
McHugh, Bernard William
208-446-l 800(W)

Onosko, Benjamin Martin
Retained
208-446-l 72l(W)
[\T\TS

DATE

&

ORDERS OF TIU: Cot.RT

09/17/2018

Video Arraignment (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Stow, James D.)

09/17/2018

New Case - Criminal
Judge .Hitchell

09/17/2018

'm Initiating Document - New Case Filed
cite •ISP 3 780000062

09/17/2018

'IJ Criminal Complaint
Judge Stow

09/17/2018

'II Affidavit of Probable Cause

09/17/2018

-

09/1712018

II Court Minutes

Probable Cause Order
Judge Stow

I ·;deo Arraignment
Judge Stow
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR28-18-15354
09/17/2018

09/17/2018

Arraignment
Judge Stow

111 Order to Consolidate
Judge Stmr

09/17/2018

'II Order Appointing Public Defender
Judge Stow

09/17/2018
09/18/2018

Bond Set

'II Notice of Hearing
prelims

09/19/2018

'IJ Response to Request for Discover:
Plaintiffs

09/19/2018

ti Request for Discovery
Plaintiffs

09/20/2018

'IJ Notice of Appearance
Request for Timely Preliminary Hearing .\lotion/or Bond Reduction and .\'otice o,_(Hearing

09/20/2018

II Demand for Jury Trial
and Plea of Not Guilty

09/20/2018
09/24/2018

111 Request for Discover:
Plea (Judicial Officer: Clerk, Magistrate Court)
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA-USE OR POSSESS

wrn I INTENT TO USE

Not Guilty
TCN:

09/24/2018

'II Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
Plaintiffs I st

09/24/2018

WResponse to Request for Discovery
Defendant's

09/27/2018
09/27/2018

Preliminary Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Mcfadden. Patrick R.)

'II Court Minutes
PHSC - McFadden

09/28/2018

09/28/2018

Preliminary Hearing (1 :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Clerk. Magistrate Court)
I tVitness

II Court Minutes
for Preliminary Jlearing- l'anl·a!in

09/28/2018

11 Conditions of Bail or Release

10/01/2018

111 Notice of Hearing
prelims
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR28-18-15354
10/03/2018

'ffl Indictment
Superseding Indictment

10/03/2018

'fflMotion
Jfotion to Unseal for Purposes of Defense Only

10/03/2018

'II order
Order to l/nsealfor Purposes of Defense Only- Wayman

10/04/2018

\I Motion for Disqualification of Judge
Mitchell

10/04/2018

'II Motion
to Make Available Record ofGJ Proceedings

10/05/2018

'ti Order for Disqualification of Judge
Mitchell hy Anne Taylor

10/09/2018

,rJ Supplemental Response to Request for Discover)
Plaint1j(s 2nd

10/09/2018

11 Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
Plaintiffs RE: Expert 1-Vitness

10/11/2018

CANCELED Preliminary Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Van Valin. Timothy L)
r'acated

10/12/2018

CANCELED Preliminary Hearing ( 1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: CaldwclL Robert)
Vacated

10/13/2018

'II Notice
of Reassignment

10/17/2018

'ti order
to Make Available Record of CJ Proceedings - Meyer

10/18/2018

'II Motion
for an Extension to File Pretrial .\lotions

10/18/2018

11 Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
Plaintiffs 3rd

10/22/2018

10/22/2018

1lorder
for an £r:tension of Time to File Pretrial .\,lotions - .\feyer

'II Notice of Hearing
Motion for Bond Reduction/OR

10/22/2018

'II Motion for Bond Reduction
OR

10/22/2018

'Ill Amended Indictment
Superseding

10/29/2018

11 Arraignment- District Court (1:30 PM)

(Judicial Officer: Meyer. Cynthia K.C .)
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR28-18-15354
10/29/2018

10/29/2018

Motion for Bond Reduction ( I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Me~er. Cynthia K.C.)
Onosko

'II Court Minutes
J0,29 /8 ArraiKnment and Bond Hearing- .Heyer: court reporter Diane Bolan
1

10/29/2018

Plea (Judicial Officer: Meyer. Cynthia K.C.)
1. Controlled Suhstance-Possession With Intent to Manufacture or Deliver
Not Guilty
TCN: 1D2800109925

11/26/2018

ffl Pre-trial Conference (9:00 AM)

11/26/2018

1,1 Reporter's Notice ofTranscript(s) Lodged

(Judicial Officer: Meyer. Cynthia K.C.)

Grand Jury Reporter Diane Bolan Pages 56
11/26/2018

iiiJ Transcript Filed
Grand Jury

11/26/2018

ffl Court Minutes
Pretrial Conference - .\feyer: court reporter Diane Bolan

11/28/2018

'I; Supplemental Request for Discovcl")
Defendant's

12/03/2018

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer. Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
2 days

12/04/2018

ffl Motion to Suppress

12/05/2018

'ffl Notice of Hearing
.Holian to Suppress

12/10/2018

ffl Brief Filed
in Support of A4otion to Suppress

12/13/2018

ffl Supplemental Response to Request for Discover)
Plaint{ffs ./-th

12/14/2018

'ffl Motion
to Set Aside Indictment

12/14/2018

II Affidavit
of Benjamin Onosko

12/26/2018

'II Motion to Continue

01/02/2019

'II Order to Continue
Motion to Suppress - Meyer

01/11/2019

CASCELED Motion to Suppress ( I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer. Cynthia K.C.)
1·acated
Onosko-2 hours
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR28-18-15354
01/15/2019

'I.I Memorandum
in Opposition to Alotion to Suppress

01/16/2019

01/16/2019

Motion to Suppress (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer. C) nthia K.C.)
Onosko-2 hours

'II Court Minutes
Motion to Suppress - Afeyer; court reporter Diane Bolan

01/22/2019

11 Brief Filed
- Reply (w. attached cd's Erh A Er:h HJ

01/22/2019

ffl Brief Filed
Reply

01/24/2019

'Ill C4SCELED

Pre-trial Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Me1 er. Cynthia K.C.)

r'acated

01/25/2019

ffl Notice of Hearing
Motion to Dismiss

01/31/2019

~ Memorandum
Decision and Order on Defendant's }lotion to Suppress - .\feyer

02/04/2019

CA.\'CELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer. Cynthia K.C.)

Vacated
2 days

02/15/2019

CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)

Vacated
Onosko -15 min-dismiss indictment

02/21/2019

'II Pre-trial Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer. Cynthia K.C.)

02/21/2019

ffl Notice of Appeal

02/21/2019

ffl Court Minutes
PTC - .Heyer: court reporter .\'O.\E

02/22/2019

'Ill CANCELED

Motion to Dismiss ( I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer. Cynthia K.C.)

Vacated
Onosko -15 min-dismiss indictment

02/27/2019

'ffl Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Clerks Record and Reporters Transcr1jJt Due Date Set

03/04/2019

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer. Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated

2days
03/05/2019
03/05/2019

Status Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer. Cynthia K.C.)

'II Court Minutes
03/05/19 Status Conference

03/19/2019

'ti Reporter's Notice ofTranscript(s) Lodged
Appeal Reporter Diane Bolan Pages 126
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR28-18-15354
0311912019

IJ Transcript Filed
Appeal

03/2012019

Case Summary
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[)ORIGINAL
BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way/P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816-9000
Telephone Number: (208) 446-1800
Email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR28-18-

JS35 I/

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Agency Case: 18ISP2201

CODY LEIGH HANSEN

Defendant.

, appeared personally before me, and being first
duly sworn on oath, that the above named defendant did commit the crime(s) of: POSSESSION

WITH INTENT TO DELIVER A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Felony, Idaho Code
§37-2732(a)(l)(A), committed as follows:
That the Defendant, CODY LEIGH HANSEN, on or about the 15th day of September,
2018, in Kootenai County, Idaho, did knowingly and unlawfully possess Methamphetamine, a
Schedule II controlled substance, with the intent to deliver the aforementioned controlled
substance, all of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case made

.

Page 1 of 2

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

rr;J;JJi
Page 8

and provided and against the peace and dignity of the people of the State of Idaho. Said
complainant therefore prays for proceedings according to law.
DATED this

Ur-

. ,½
/7
71ayof~<~

,20$.

~#2
OM

AN

({ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

20

lo.

Page 2 of 2

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
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ISP3780000062
IDAHO STATE POLICE
ID UNIFORM CITATION
In the court designated below the undersigned certifies that he/she has
just and reasonable grounds to believe that on: 09/15/2018 06:25 AM
DR#: 2018-18-2201
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 1st JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF ID, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
KOOTENAI
STATE OF ID

vs.

IViolator
Last Name:
First Name:
Hm. Address:
City/State/Zip:
Heig ht:

HANSEN
Ml: L
CODY
19138 E CANE CIR
Phone: ( ) SPOKANE VALLEY, WA 99016
Class:
6" 3""
Weight: 180 lbs. Sex: M Eyes: BLUE
Hair: BROWN
Lie. Expires:
04/20/2021

IREGISTRATION
Yr. Ve h: 1999
Make: VOLK
SWA
GEN
Color: BLAC

Plate#: AXA6267
Model: PASSAT

State: ID

Style: 4 DOOR
K
VIN : WVWMD63B6XE508962

IPUC:
Hazmat:

USDOT TK Cencus:
GVWR 26001+ :

READ CAREFULLY
This is an MISDEMEANOR charge in which:

Note: If you fail to appear within the time allowed for your appearance, another charge of
failure to appear may be filed and a warrant may be issued for your arrest.
1.
You may be represented by a lawyer, which will be at your expense unless the
judge finds you are indigent.
2.
You are entitled to a trial by jury if requested by you.
3.
PLEA OF NOT GUilTY: You may plead not guilty to the charge by appearing
before the Clerk of the Magistrate's Court or the judge, within the time allowed for
your appearance, at which time you will be given a trial date.
4.
PLEA OF GUilTY: You may plead guilty to the charge by going to the Clerk of the
Magistrate's Court, within the time allowed for your appearance, at which time you
will be told if you can pay a fixed fine or whether it will be necessary for you to
appear before the judge; OR you may have the fine determined by a judge at a
time arranged with the Clerk of the Magistrate's Court, within the time allowed for
your appearance.
6.
You may call the clerk of the court to determine if you can sign a plea of guilty and
pay the fine and costs by mail.
I plead guilty to the charges. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Defendant (if authorized by the Clerk of the Magistrate's Court)

IF this is a citation for failure to have insurance:
If you provide valid proof of insurance to the court, your citation will be
dismissed. If you admit the charge or are found to have committed the charge,
your driver's license will be suspended by the State Department of
Transportation, Drivers Services Bureau. Once you've paid your fines and cost
to the courts, you will then have to pay a reinstatement fee to the State
Department of Transportation, Drivers Services Bureau to reinstate your driving
privileges.
• ALWAYS BRING THIS COPY OF THE CITATION TO ALL COURT APPEARANCES •

16+ Persons:

LOCATION
Upon a Public Street or Highway or Other Location Namely:
EB INTERSTATE 90 AT MILE MARKER 3

IVIOLATIONS

Did unlawfully commit the following offense(s), in violation of State or Local Statute:
Misdemeanor Citation:~
Accident:O
Infraction Citation: □
Date/Time: 09/15/2018 06:25 AM
Violation#1: 37 2734A(1)- DRUG PARAPHERNALIA-USE OR

POSSESS WITH INTENT TO USE

ICOURT INFORMATION
THE STATE OF ID TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT:
You are hereby summoned to appear before the Clerk of the Magistrate's Court of the
District Court of KOOTENAI
Coeur d Alene, ID located at 324 WEST
County,
GARDEN
AVENUE

ICITATION SERVICE

I hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on _0_9_/_15_/_20_1_8_ _ _ _ __

C:
Signature of Officer: ..;'·""""'-'*......- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Officer Name: CURT SPROAT
Officer ID: 3780
Agency Name: IDAHO STATE POLICE

Page 10

ISP3780000062
IDAHO STATE POLICE
IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION NOTES
How ldent.:

C

Signature of Officer:
Officer Name:
Agency Name:

CURT SPROAT
IDAHO STATE POLICE

Officer ID:

3780

Page 11
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

20 fl SEP I 7 AH ff : 43

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
HANSEN, Cody Leigh
)
Defendant.
-------~~=
= ' - - - - - - -)
STATE OF IDAHO

County of KOOTENAI

)
)
)

ss.

FILED:

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 0
W ARRANTLESS ARREST

Incident #18-2201

I,
Sergeant Curt Sproat , being first duly sworn, state that I am the same person whose name
is subscribed to the attached Criminal Citation #ISP3780000062, and that my answers to the questions
asked by the Court with reference to said Citation are as follows:
On September 15th, 2018 at approximately 0625 hours, I, Sergeant Curt Sproat of the Idaho State
Police stopped a black 1999 Volkswagen Passat (Washington registration: AXA6267) on eastbound
Interstate 90 near milepost 3 in Kootenai County, Idaho. The driver of the Volkswagen drifted from
the left lane to the right lane, losing their lane of travel. The driver of the Volkswagen then slowly
drove back into the left lane. At no time was a turn signal used. As the Volkswagen came to a stop, I
observed the back, passenger frantically reaching towards the middle or left side of the backseat.
The Volkswagen's right tum signal was on as I approached the vehicle. The right tum signal
continued to stay on throughout the course of the traffic stop. This was unusual behavior based
on what I see from the general, motoring public. There were three occupants inside the vehicle.
While speaking with the occupants, I observed two backpacks on the back seats: a black backpack
and a blue and black backpack. The back passenger was reaching around near the backpacks as I was
speaking with the occupants. The driver said the Volkswagen was his and he had just bought the
vehicle. The driver stated the bill of sale for the vehicle was at his house. The driver later stated he
had yet to register the Volkswagen and had made a down payment of $450 towards the vehicle.
The driver identified himself as Cody Leigh HANSEN
) with his
Washington Driver's License. The front passenger identified himself as Robert Russell WILTZ (
) with his Idaho Driver's License. The back, passenger side occupant wrote down
and verbally identified himself as Steven James CLIFTON (
). I later
validated CLIFTON's identification by his expired and pictured Idaho Driver's License return.
HANSEN stated he was on felony probation for possession of a controlled substance. While
HANSEN continued to look for the vehicle documentation and his current address, I asked the
occupants if there were any drugs inside the Volkswagen. HANSEN showed a distinct change of
behavior, broke eye contact and looked down. All three occupants stated there were no drugs inside
the vehicle.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
W ARRANTLESS ARREST: Page I
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While waiting for the returns from the Idaho State Police Dispatch, I asked HANSEN to exit the
vehicle. HANSEN stated he was on felony probation for marijuana and heroin and had been on
probation since June 6th of 2018. The Idaho State Police Dispatch confirmed HANSEN was on felony
probation through the state ofldaho. HANSEN acknowledged the 4th amendment waiver he had since
he was on felony probation. HANSEN confirmed he has signed the Idaho Department of Correction
Agreement of Supervision. The agreement states the following, "I consent to the search of my person,
residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by me, or
for which I am the controlling authority conducted by any agent ofIDOC or a law enforcement officer.
I hereby waive my rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution concerning
searches." Based on my training and experience, I knew any person on felony probation as of April
of 2015 was required to sign the agreement of supervision. I asked HANSEN if there was anything I
needed to know about inside the Volkswagen. HANSEN stated, "Not that I know of." Based on my
training and experience, that was likely a deceptive response from HANSEN. HANSEN stated the
blue backpack inside the vehicle was his possession. HANSEN stated the other backpack belonged
to CLIFTON. I asked HANSEN for consent to search the Volkswagen. HANSEN stated, "I thought
you could just search it." HANSEN then denied consent for me to search the vehicle despite the signed
probation agreement.
I asked WILTZ to exit the vehicle. WILTZ stated he did not own anything inside the vehicle. While
waiting for the returns from the Idaho State Police Dispatch, I asked CLIFTON to exit the vehicle.
CLIFTON consented to a pat down. CLIFTON had a big bulge inside his left pocket. CLIFTON gave
me consent to search his pocket. Inside his pocket was a piece of rolled up tin foil, four "Starburst"
candies and a small SIM card. CLIFTON stated the black backpack inside the Volkswagen belonged
to him and he owned nothing else inside the vehicle. I asked CLIFTON to remove his black backpack
and place it outside the vehicle because CLIFTON was not on felony probation.
I left a voice mail with HANSEN's probation officer to speak with them about HANSEN and to let
them know about the traffic stop. I did not receive a return phone call from HANSEN's probation
officer. I asked for an on call probation officer. The Idaho State Police Dispatch stated there were no
on call probation officers available.
Based on the totality of the traffic stop, I searched the Volkswagen. Underneath the radio was a black
"DARE" pouch, which was labeled, "DARE to resist drugs and violence." Inside the pouch was
folded up tin foil. In the center console were two empty "dime" baggies. The "dime" baggies were
black with gold "skulls.". Based on my training and experience, tin foil is used commonly by drug
users as a surface to heat drugs, so then it can be smoked. "Dime" baggies are commonly used to
possess and hold drugs. Underneath the front, driver's seat was another piece of tin foil, which
contained a dark brown residue consist with black tar heroin. Inside HANSEN's (blue and black)
backpack was a roll and box of tin foil and a digital scale, which contained a dark, brown residue
consist with black tar heroin. The backpack also contained a book or journal, which contained
drawings and words. Written inside the book was the word, "Sinner."
On the back, driver's seat next to HANSEN's (blue and black) backpack was a smaller black and
grey, zippered pouch and a handheld torch lighter, which is commonly used by drug users to heat
drugs. Inside the pouch were two of the same black "dime" baggies with gold "skulls." The baggies
contained a dark, brown and sticky substance. Based on my training and experience, I recognized the
substance to be heroin. There were two pieces of foil, one contained a dark, brown residue and there

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
WARRANTLESS ARREST: Page2

Page 13

were also eight pipes, which contained a dark, brown residue again consist with heroin. I asked
CLIFTON if the black and grey pouch was his possession. CLIFTON had been sitting in close
proximity to where the pouch was located. CLIFTON initially denied ownership of the pouch.
CLIFTON then admitted to possessing the black and grey pouch, which was a contrast to what
CLIFTON originally stated when he said he only possessed the black backpack. I placed CLIFTON
under arrest for Possession of Heroin and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. I read CLIFTON the
Miranda warning. CLIFTON again admitted to possessing the heroin and drug paraphernalia located
inside the black and grey pouch.
I continued the search of the Volkswagen. Inside the trunk was a black, plastic container, which
contained another digital scale, which contained the same dark, brown residue. There was a gold tin,
which had a variety of words written on it, including, "Sinner." Next to the gold tin was a "zebra"
print and zippered pouch. The pouch contained the following contraband and items:
• Glass, methamphetamine pipe with a clear, rock like residue wrapped in a black cloth
• Two digital scales
• Small container, which contained a clear, rock like residue
• Black "LG" cell phone
• Plastic container with numerous empty black "dime" baggies with gold "skulls." One of the
"dime" baggies contained four SIM cards
• Another plastic container with two playing cards: a "Joker" and one labeled, "Gemaco. Safety
Peek. Sharps." Inside this container were eighty "dime" baggies, which all contained a clear,
rock like substance. Based on my training and experience, I recognized the substance to be
methamphetarnine. Four out of the eight baggies were black with gold "skulls." The others
were labeled with "8 balls."
• Small measuring spoon
I placed HANSEN under arrest for Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Deliver. HANSEN
and CLIFTON both denied ownership of the methamphetamine. I continued the search of the
Volkswagen. There was a gold and white "iPhone" on the back, passenger seat and a copper
"Samsung Galaxy S7'' mounted on the front dash, by the driver's seat. CLIFTON took ownership of
the "iPhone" and "Samsung." I seized the cell phones and SIM cards from the Volkswagen. I
concluded the search of the Volkswagen.
I transported HANSEN and CLIFTON to the Kootenai County Jail. At the jail, I weighed the eight
dime baggies, which contained the clear, rock like substance. It weighed approximately 6.6 grams.
HANSEN was booked into the Kootenai County Jail for Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent
to Deliver: LC. 37-2732(a) (1) (A) and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia: LC. 37-2734A (1).
CLIFTON was booked into the Kootenai County Jail for Possession of Heroin: LC. 37-2732(c) (1)
and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia: LC. 37-2734A (1).
At the Idaho State Police district office, I tested the clear, rock like substance with the Narcotic
Identification Kit (NIK) and it came back presumptive positive for methamphetamine. I tested the
dark brown and sticky substance with the Narcotic Identification Kit (NIK) and it came back
presumptive positive for heroin. I weighed the heroin inside the dime baggies and it came back with
a weight of approximately 1.0 grams.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
WARRANTLESS ARREST: Page 3
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Videotape # Arbitrator.

NOTE: THE NAME OF THE DECLARANT AND THE DATES MUST BE TYPED BELOW FOR ELECTRONIC
SUBMISSION TO THE COURT. THIS FORM SHOULD THEN BE PRINTED, SIGNED AND SUBMITTED WITH THE
REST OF THE COMPLAINT PAPERWORK.

I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the I ~fthe St e of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho
Code 9-1406, that the information contained in this docume1ft a I \ttached eports and documents that may
i .
be included herein is true and correct to the best of my infotmati \nd

\

I

DATE: September 16th , 2018

'

\

\

\

\
(Signature of Declarari't) \

'·0
PRINTED NAME: Curt Sproat

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
WARRANTLESS ARREST: Page 4
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PRE-BOOKING INFORMATION SHEET
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY BUILDING

Booking #_____

~="....:1'8=-----

Name ID # _ _ _ _ Date _ _4_._/,_lL:S-~[

ARRESTEE:
~$--=·~:..::v'\.'-'-_ _,_(__,,/4:::..=.~1---------l.f-i-f:-1i'J.J.~-~~--Name,_ _ __,__\4---L.:c:\,Cll.lV.......
Middle
First
Last
AKA. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

q \.; F E . C""ne Cir::
STWA
5r~'2. V'l\\~
City
Home Phone(S"o'l\5~'{ - ~ \4. CJ

Locker#
Location
Hold For:
For DUI Charge:
Was Call Requested
Was Call Made

\.

Address

City/State of Birth

5':ro ~e,.

Zip

qqol~

~ •·wA
State

Accepted by: ,-2,'.), ")...
Agency Report# ~ ~ - 2 20 ~
'
/
BAC
Warrant Check
Prob. Check
Prob. Officer

Cf' ci.±+eJ

Employer

W ft

Occupation

l~e .(

€t)

fr_

Work Phone#_ _ __

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:
Height~· l._11 Weight\ g'c Sex M, HairB~ Eyes~ lve
Glasses~ Contacts__kL Facial Hair_ _ _ __
Race \/\-}

1
,~~kf=~ ~"aver.;,
~ \<C{+- e~ bnt\.Ji ~B'0Jj ~t
l o.f-\-~"' "'~-" le.ft::&k':<Zc:t:½Y\ , "':r w~ :h, IL5-...g_ . , rr,hf- ::h:>CfVM., T?t,~--lre.
b'f.. -.J~
Clothing Description WR~ :\::-£ ~ 1 :J Q? 0\.. i.e~vv:
:S"""'
V
ARRESTING OFFIC RI FORMATION:
Dist~
3: -'l O £ V\,\.. l>, .5
Location
OJ-oa
I
Date I Time of Arrest 1 ,~ l 8
rJ:chr
g'j~
# S]{rf:::) Agency ~ho S!«: t~L¼.rrival at PSB
Arresting Officer Cur Stc-ocd::

Scars, Marks, Tattoo's

U'k "'

eI&

CHARGES AND BAIL:
M/F
1. F

2.

ARREST TYPE: Ef'oN-VIEW O WARRANT

□ CITIZEN □ OTHER

o

°t

Warrant or Case #

31-

M. 31-

3.

4.
5.
6.
Is the arresting officer aware of any mental or physicallon itions this inmate may have which might affect his/her safety or
No, D Yes (Explain) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
ability to be held without special attention by jail staff?
No, D Yes
Did the arrestee arrive with prescription medication?

re,(a,.c,kt il

Vehicle Disposition

CITIZEN ARREST:
·

\J O\\:.sw

r

VEHICLE INFORMATION:

YR°l1

Make

h

a

f\

b~

'1 ~

.L

ca€ModeP'l&cS~1

Body

-r

Color(s) _ _/ _

P"'l.:fHoe-el"'. ·1<.p'9e.ct=W;l+c...

I hereby arrest the above named suspect on the charge(s) indicated and request a peace
e arrested.
. I will appear as direc

Ph n :
Occu ation:

Race/Sex

A e

Bus. Phone:
3/11 16
JAIL SHR# 355 RevPage

...

-

Defendant's name: HANSEN, Cody Leigh
Date of arrest: September 15th, 2018

2011 SEP 11 AH II: 43
ORDER
'

Based upon the above Affidavit, the Court hereby finds that there is Probable -~mrDJPi!:.~
believe that a crime(s) has (have) been committed, and that the Defendant committed said
crime(s), and that the defendant may be required to post bail prior to being released.
Dated this

_l_l!ay of _ _ _S_e_~_\_.,-~' 20J! at //!--

hours.

MAGIS~&
CHARGE

IDAHO
CODE

VIOLATION

1.

37-2732(a) (I) (A)

POSS. OF METH WITH INTENT TO DELIVER

2.

37-2734A (I)

POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
WARRANTLESS ARREST: Page 2
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Description CR28-18-15354 Hansen, Cody 20180917 First Appearance Arraignment
Judge Stow
Clerk: Molly Rutland
Defendant Rights

I

I

Date 19/ 17/2018

Time

I

I

Location I 1K-CRT6

Speaker

04:21:51 PM
Judge Stow

Note

Calls Case
Defendant Present In Custody Via Video
PA Present - Ms McClure
DA Present - Ms Drews

04:21:58 PM IDef

Understands Rights

04:21:59 PM

Reviews Charges/Penalties, felony PCS meth, misd poss
para

Ii

04:22:50 PM IDef

Understands Charges/Penalties

04:22:51 PM J

Order to Consolidate Charges

04:23:09 PM

Appoint Public Defender

04:23:17 PM IPA

Req $SOK bond and Submit to testing through Absolute

04:23:27 PM

Reviews criminal history

04:23:37 PM

Reviews facts of case

04:23:58 PM IDA

Reserve bond argument

04:24:03 PM J

Sets bond at $30K

04:24:19 PM

Set PH w/in 14 days

04:25:01 PM IEND

Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION
FILED
9/17/2018
AT 01:00pm
ST ATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
~~E~RT

Signed: 9/18/2018 12:07 PM

DEPUTY

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CR28-18-15354

Cody L Hansen

AndISP3780000062
Defendant.

ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES
The above matters having come regularly before the Court on the date entered below; it
appearing that these cases arise from the same set of facts, acts or transaction(s); it appearing that
a consolidation, or joinder, of the cases would result in judicial economy and fewer hearings and
trials for the parties, attorneys and witnesses; now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the charge(s) in CR28-18-15354 and the charge(s) in
ISP3780000062 be consolidated and joined together pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a) for all further
proceedings. All future filings shall be in CR28-18-15354 and any amended complaints or
information(s) shall contain all charges related to the within incident(s). The case
ISP3 780000062 shall be closed.
ENTERED Monday, September 17, 2018.

ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES
Page 19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent Monday,
September 17, 2018 by me as follows:
Kootenai County Prosecutor - CR
[X] Email [ ] Fax (208) 446-2168

[

] Interoffice Delivery

Public Defender

[X] Email [

] Faxed

[

] Interoffice Delivery

[

] Mailed
Signed: 9/18/2018 12:07 PM

De~

ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES
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Filed: 09/18/2018
09/17/201812:04:58
16:23:09
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Rutland, Molly
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDJCIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

State of Idaho
Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.

Order on Request for Public Defender

Cody Hansen

Defendant Name
Defendant

Idaho Criminal Rule 44
Idaho Code section 19-854

The Defendant requested appointment of counsel at public expense.

r1" The Court finds Defendant indigent pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-854. The Public Defender is ordered to
represent Defendant in all matters pertaining to this action. The Defendant may be required to
reimburse the county for all or a portion of the costs of representation.
The Kootenai County Public Defenders Office is located at 1607 Lincoln Way Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814.
The phone number is (208) 446-1700.

□

The Court does not find Defendant to be indigent, and the application for Public defender is denied.

Date:
Judge

09/18/2018

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ to:
_ _ _ _ _ __
Prosecutor _ _KCPA
Via E-mail: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us

Public Defender
Via E-mail: pdfax@kcgov.us
Signed: 9/18/2018 12:06 PM

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE <_DistrictName_> JUDIOAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAH0, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF <_CountyName_>

State ofidaho
Plaintiff,

Case No. <_CaseNum_>

vs.

Application for Attorney at Public Expense

Defendant Name
Defendant

I want to be represented by an attorney in this case and I cannot afford to hire one. I understand that it is
important for me to be truthful in answering questions and providing information in this form, and that if
I am not I may be subject to penalties for perjury.
l understand that the information in this form cannot be used against me in any criminal case, except
To dispute the truth of my testimony ifl choose to testify in court.
In a prosecution for perjury or contempt if I provide information in this form that I know is false.
.-

Name and Contiict Iitfoi:mation

I Home phone number:

(l n ,iJ ' f-\..ri :/\Clt.7
= ~L
- Jr.>rt>",;·-rr,.'.
Current Address:

Name:

A

h

Mailing address if different
Cell phone number: ~

2..oX _".ll"-.J _~
,.

Employment

Are you employed? (Circle One)

(:ii>
(1 r,.f+.,l n~

If Yes: Name and address of employer:
How much do you eam per month? $

Self-employed

No

Ll.J 7)T)

c..~
-

/i' ',f'\.j

~ ~ ir['{Vil

0.

,

If No, give month and year of last employment
How much did you eam per month?
Are you married? Spouse's name:
Is your spouse employed: (Circle One) Yes

No

If Yes, name and address of employer.
If Yes, how much does your spouse earn per month?
Current Status

•'

..; •.

>

-·

Are you currently serving a sentence of incarceration for a crime for which you have been found guilty?

Page 22

(Circle One)

'No J\

Yes

If yes, in what jail, penitentiary or correctional facility are you being held?

Are you currently housed in a mental health facility? (Circle One)

Yes

No

If yes, what is the name of the mental health facility in which you are housed?
Public Assistance and other Payments

.

Do you or any of your dependents receive public assistance, including Social Security Supplemental Income
(SSD, Social Security Disability (550), Medicaid, AFDC, food stamps, or child care assistance? (Circle One)
Yes
No
If Yes, list persons who receive the assistance, how they are related to you, the type of assistance or payment,
and the monthly amount received.
Dependents

Type of Assistance

Relationship

.

•

Other Income

Monthly Amount

.-

·.11.;

Within the past 12 months, have you received any income from a business, profession or other form of selfemployment, or in the form of rent payments, interest, dividends, retirement or annuity payments, or other
sources?
(Circle One)

n

Yes

No/

'--'

If Yes, give the amount received and identify the sources.
Amount for the Past 12 Months

Source

cash

.

Do you have any cash on hand or money in savings or checking accounts? (Circle One)
No

Yes

If Yes, what is the total amount?

Property

.

.

..

.

Do you own any homes or land?
County

(Circle One)

State

-Yes

No
Value minus amount you owe

Do you own any stocks, bonds, notes, coins, or precious metals? (Circle One)
Property

Yes

No

Value

Page 23

Do you own any vehicles or other items of property with a value in excess of $1,000, excluding ordinary
household furnishings and clothing? (Circle One) Yes
No
If yes, list the property and its value.
Property

Value

Do you receive child support payments for any of the dependents you have listed?
(Circle One)

Yes

No
Monthly Amount

Name of Child

-.

Debts

Monthly Amount Paid

Nature of Debt

I certify under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and
correct.

Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

NOTICE: If an attorney is appointed to represent you at public expense, and if you plead guilty or are
found guilty of any crime, you may be required by the court to reimburse the county for all or a portion of
the cost of the legal services you have received.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE <_DistrictName_> JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF <_CountyName_>
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Description CR 28-18-15354 Hansen, Cody 20180927 Preliminary Hearing Status
Conference
Judge McFadden
Clerk Tiffany Burton

I

Date 19/27/2018

Time

09:17:48 AM

Location I 1K-CRT12

I

Speaker

Judge McFadden

Note

Calls case; Def present in custody w/ DA Ms. Taylor; PA
Mr. Whitaker

09:18:12 AM DA

Def will waive reading, leave set.

09:18:26 AM PA

1 witnesses.

09:18 :33 AM J

Matter will be left set.

09 :18 :42 AM End

Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com
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Description CR 28-18-15354 Hansen, Cody 20180928 Preliminary Hearing
Judge Van Valin
Clerk Symone Sasser
I

Date 19/28/2018

I Speaker
01:36:48 PM Judge Van
Valin

Location I1K-CRT3

I

Time

01 :37:02 PM

lonosko

Note
Calls case, Ben Onosko present with defendant in custody, Stan
Mortensen for the state.
He is on a parole hold. The officer is unavailable. We would
object to a continuance.

01:38:00 PM Judge Van
Valin

Comments.

01:38:09 PM Judge Van
Valin

Continues preliminary hearing. Reset in normal course.

01:39:01 PM lonosko

Move for OR release. Reviews.

01 :39:48 PM Judge Van
Valin

Sets bond $7500.

01:41:06 PM IEnd

Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com
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~
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

DEPUTY

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff
v.

CASENO.CR-

2.-8-16- lt:J35L/

ORDER SETTING BAIL or
RELEASE ON OWN RECOGNIZANCE and

HanK-Y)

CONDITIONS

Defendant
The above case having come before the Court on the below date and the Court having
considered the factors in I.C.R. 46, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that bail be set in the amount of$ 7,l)U
and the following are established as the conditions of release:

/

THE DEFENDANT SHALL:

1. ITTommit no new criminal offenses greater than an infraction (a finding of probable cause on a
s~quent offense is sufficient to revoke bail);
2.

~§j.g6 waiver of extradition and file with the Court;

3. ffM~all court appearances timely;
4. ~~OT consume alcohol, or controlled substances that are not prescribed by a doctor;
5.
6.

0""PJ:6fiiptly notify the Court and defense counsel of any change of address;
. Maintain regular contact with defense counsel;

7. D Do NOT drive, operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle without a valid license and
insurance;
8. D Obtain a Substance Abuse/Batterer' s Evaluation from an approved evaluator by: _ _ _ _ _ __
9. D Submit to: D EtG □ Drug □ Both EtG & Drug urinalysis testing __ times monthly through:
[ ] Avertest (address/phone below)
[ ] Absolute (address/phone below)
Results to be provided to the
[ ] Other___________________
Prosecuting Attorney's office, Public Defender/Defense Attorney_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , D Court
10. □

Other:

Defendant has acknowledged these conditions in open court, and is advised that a violation of any
term may result in the defendant being returned to jail.
Copies sent~/ it) !l '8 To:
[J..P,rosecutor~ c_
[1'in court [ ] interoffice
D ti nse Counsel
[;'fjn court
[ ] interoffice
['1 in court
ndant
Jatl F ~ 0 7 fAt.l\.Qp;
Judge
o. _ _ _ __
D Avertest FAX: (208) 416-2539, 500 N Government Way, Suite 100, CD'A, ID, Ph: (208) 416-2539
D Avertest Emailed: coeurdaleneid@avertest.com
D Absolute FAX: (208) 758-0401, 5433 N Government Way, Suite B, CD'A, ID, Ph: (208) 758-0051
D Absolute Emailed: fastdrugtesting@gmail.com
D Probation Department _ _
D Other

l

Dep~_d_r_k---,--,,,,..----------------D~-e-fi_e-n~dan~-t----------D-a-te-oRDER SETTING BAIL AND CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

PAO-1001 3/18
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF K T
) SS
FILE -~~'""""~......,'""

AT

,·

BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way/P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816-9000
Telephone Number: (208) 446-1800
Email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us
Assigned Attorney: Stanley T. Mortensen

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,
vs.

Case No. CR28-18-15354
Grand Jury No. CV28-18-162
SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT

CODY LEIGH HANSEN

Agency Case: 18ISP2201 I.S.P.

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

CODY LEIGH HANSEN is accused by the Grand Jury of Kootenai County, by this
Superseding Indictment, of the crime(s) of: COUNT I, Possession with Intent to Deliver a
Controlled Substance, Idaho Code §37-2732(a)(l)(A), committed as follows:
COUNT!
That the Defendant, CODY LEIGH HANSEN, on or about the 15th day of September,

J

2018 , in Kootenai County, Idaho, knowingly and unlawfully possess methamphetamine, a
Schedule II controlled substance, with the intent to deliver the aforementioned controlled
substance, all of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case made
and provided and against the peace and dignity of the People of the State ofldaho.

Page 1 of2

SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT
Page 28

A TRUE BILL

Presented in open Court this ~ day of Oc::re~

Presiding Juror of the Grand Jury of
Kootenai County, State of Idaho.

Names of Witnesses Examined
By the Grand Jury:

?1f
Dav11J

Page 2 of 2

Lup,r CSptr!'A.-/-

;,

f)

e-e,r!?ea u )t-

SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF O T
} SS
FILE : ~,.!s4.~.L.!oo<c_...,=AT
.

BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way/P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone Number: (208) 446-1800
Email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us

C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR28-18-15354
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO UNSEAL

vs.
CODY LEIGH HANSEN
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Barry McHugh, Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, State ofldaho,
and hereby moves the Court to unseal the record of the Grand Jury proceeding to include the
recording of the probable cause hearing related to the Superseding Indictment and any exhibits
entered into evidence at said probable cause hearing, but excluding the unsealing of the Voting
Records.
Additionally, the plaintiff further moves the Court to vacate the Preliminary Hearing Status
Conference as well as the Preliminary Hearing and to set Arraignment within 30 days.

DATED this 3rd day of October, 2018.
BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

Stanley T. Mortensen
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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L~I}

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF
FILED: /0 '1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TilE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

SS

0

Case No. CR28-18-15354
Plaintiff,

ORDER TO UNSEAL
vs.

CODY LEIGH HANSEN
Defendant.

The Court having before it the Motion to Unseal, and good cause thus appearing, now
therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the record of the Grand Jury proceeding, the recording ofthe
probable cause hearing related to the Superseding Indictment and any exhibits entered into evidence
at said probable cause hearing, with the exception of the Voting Records, are unsealed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Preliminary Hearing Status Conference is vacated, the
Preliminary hearing is vacated and Arraignment shall be set by the Clerk of the Court within 3 0 days.
ENTERED this

~

day of

CJ~

,2oj_1
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L

CERTIF~

I hereby certify that on the
day of
foregoing was delivered as indicated below:

SERVICE
r'

, 2w&that a true and correct copy of the

J

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney (email: KCPAICOURTS@,kcgov.us)
Coeur d'Alene Prosecuting Attorney (email: cdaprosnotices@cdaid.org)
Post Falls Prosecuting Attorney (email: legalservices@postfallspolice.com)
Rathdrum Prosecuting Attorney (email: legalservices(a),postfallspolice.com)
Kootenai County Public Defender (email: pdfax@kcgov.us)
Defendant/Defendant's Attorney: pdfax@kcgov.us
Kootenai County Warrants (email: warrants@kcgov.us)
Kootenai County Jail (jailpw@kcgov.us)
_ _ Kootenai County Work Release (email: workrelease@kcgov.us)
Community Service (email: jhicks@kcgov.us)
Adult Misdemeanor Probation (email: kcmp@kcgov.us)
Probation & Parole (email: distl@idoc.idaho.gov;
ccdsentencingteam(a),idoc.idaho.gov)
Idaho Department of Transportation (fax: 208-334-8739)
BCI (fax: 208-884-7193)
Idaho Department of Corrections (email: centralrecords(a),idoc.idaho.gov)
Other: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

-:::r

Other: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Other: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

JIM BRANNON

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
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Electronically Filed
10/4/2018 1:25 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

Anne C. Taylor, Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 5836
iCourt Email: pdfax@kcgov.us
Assigned Attorney:
Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, Bar Number: 8448
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CASE NUMBER CR28-18-0015354
FM

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

V.

MOTION TO DISQUALIF Y PURSUANT
TO I.C.R. 25

CODY LEIGH HANSEN,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney Benjamin M.
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 25 and hereby moves the Court
for an Order Disqualifying the Honorable JOHN T. MITCHELL in the above-entitled case.
This motion is not made to hinder, delay or obstruct the administration of justice.
DATED this

Lf

day of October, 2018.
ANNE C. TAYLOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:
BENJAMIN M ONOSKO,
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY
CERTIFICA TE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing
a copy of the same as indicated below on the

L-t

day of October, 2018, addressed to:

Kootenai County Prosecutor
~ Via iCourt kcpaicourts@kcgov.us

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

Page I
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Electronically Filed
10/4/2018 1:25 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender
The Law Office of the Public Defender Kootenai County
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814
Phone:(208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 8448
Email: pdfax@kcgov.us
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
V.
)
)
CODY LEIGH HANSEN
)
)
Defendant.
_________ ______)

ST ATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NUMBER

CR28-18-0015354

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MAKE
AVAILABLE THE RECORD OF ALL
PROCEEDINGS OF THE GRAND JURY
PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 6.3

COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through attorney, Benjamin M.
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order directing the Clerk of
the Court to make the Record available to allow for examination and to allow for the preparation
of transcriptions of all of the proceedings conducted by the Grand Jury in the above-entitled
matter, except for the deliberation portion of the proceedings.
Counsel specifically requests that the following be included in the record to be provided:
1.

A copy of any and all Petitions for Summoning a Grand Jury related to this case or
these charges.

2.

A copy of any and all Order or Orders Assigning Judge related to this case or these
charges.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MAKE AVAILABLE
THE RECORD OF ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
GRAND JURY PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 6.3

Page 1
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3.

A copy of any and all Order to Summons Jurors and Notice of Hearing.

4.

A transcript of the Initial Seating of the Grand Jury which ultimately heard evidence
in the case against the defendant. The transcript should include, but is not limited to, a
list of all prospective jury pool, administration of the oath to prospective grand jurors,
voir dire of prospective grand jurors by the prosecutor and the Court, and any
questionnaires or instructions given to prospective grand jurors as well as a list of all
persons present.

5.

A verbatim transcript of the proceeding in which evidence against the Defendant was
presented to the grand jury. In addition to a record of testimony presented to the grand
jury, that transcript should include a record of comments of the Court and Prosecuting
Attorney, and Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys to the grand jury, whether in opening
statement or closing remarks or response to questions by the grand jury, and any
questions submitted by the grand jury, whether oral or written, as well as a list of all
persons present during to proceeding.

6.

A copy of the jury instructions provided to the grand jurors who heard the evidence
against the Defendant.

7.

A list of the names of the grand jurors who heard the evidence against the Defendant.

8.

A copy of any and all documents or records and a transcript of any and all
proceedings containing information released to the following matters addressed in the
relevant Idaho Criminal Rules provided below, if not otherwise already included in the
record created above:

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MAKE AVAILABLE
THE RECORD OF ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
GRAND JURY PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 6.3

Page 2
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a. The number of grand jurors and presence of a quorum, per Idaho Criminal Rule
6.l(a).
b. The summoning of the grand jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.l(b).
c. The impaneling of the grand jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.l(c).
d. The grand jury presiding juror, oath and duties, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.1 (d).
e. The deputy presidingjuror, oath and duties, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.l(e).
f.

The charge to the jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.l(f).

g. The excuse of any juror, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.1 (g).
h. Any evidence presented to the grand jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(a).
1.

Any inquiry by the prosecutor regarding whether there are any grounds for
disqualification of any grand juror, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(b).

J.

Any list of elements of offenses provided by the prosecutor, per Idaho Criminal Rule
6.2(c).

k. Any advice given by the prosecutor regarding the standard for probable cause or
person's refusal to testify, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(d).
l.

Any grand jury subpoenas issued or served, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2( e).

m. Any opening statements or jury instructions on applicable law provided by the
prosecutor, whether oral or written, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(f).
n. Any Indictment prepared by the prosecutor for consideration by the grand jury or at
the request of the grand jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(g).
o. All recorded proceedings in this case, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.3(a).
p. The presence of any and all persons at all times at the grand jury sessions in this case,
and the permissions for such presence, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.4.
q. Any subpoenas issued in this case, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.5(a).
r.

Any questions asked of any witnesses, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.5(b ).

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MAKE AVAILABLE
THE RECORD OF ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
GRAND JURY PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 6.3
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s. Any evidence for the defendant requested or ordered to be produced by the grand
jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.5(c).
t.

Any returned indictment in this case, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.6(c).

u. A list of the vote of the grand jurors, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.6(d).
v. Any and all other information, documents, records or transcripts regarding the grand
jurors or the indictment subjecting them or it to challenge, per Idaho Criminal Rule
6.7.
w. The term of service of the grand jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.8.
9.

A copy of any and all documents or records and a transcript of any and all
proceedings containing matters related to the relevant Idaho statutory provisions
contained in Idaho Code Idaho Code §§19-1002-15, 1101-15, 1201-07, 1306-08, 140118, 1601, and any other relevant statutes.

This motion is based on the 5th , 6th , and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution;
Article 1, Sections 8 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution and enabling legislation enacting these
guarantees. Furthermore, this motion is made on the grounds that the Record of said proceeding is
necessary for Counsel for the Defendant to prepare a defense in this matter.
Counsel for the Defendant further moves the Court to order that the costs necessary for the
preparation and completion of the Record be paid at County expense and at no expense to the
defense. This request is made on the grounds that the Defendant was determined to be indigent, and
his representation is provided by the Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County.
Leave to present testimony and oral argument is hereby requested if the Court is not
otherwise inclined to grant this motion. Requested hearing time is 10 minutes.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MAKE AVAILABLE
THE RECORD OF ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
GRAND JURY PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 6.3
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DATED this _ _~y+-·_day of October, 2018.

THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY

BY:

#k--

~CZ

----------~-<:::_

BENJAMIN M. ONOSKO
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy¼the foregoing was personally served by placing
day of October, 2018, addressed to:
a copy of the same as indicated below on the
Kootenai County Prosecutor
!,)Court

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MAKE AV AJLABLE
THE RECORD OF ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
GRAND JURY PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 6.3
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STATE OF IDAHO
cou

Anne C. Taylor, Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 5836
iCourt Email: pdfax@kcgov.us

Assigned Attorney:
Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, Bar Number: 8448

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND. FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO

CASE NUMBER CR28-18-0015354
FM
Plaintiff,

V.

ORDER TO DISQUALIFY PURSUANT
TO I.C.R. 25

CODY LEIGH HANSEN,
Defendant.

The Court having before it the timely Motion to Disqualify and good cause appearing, now,
therefore
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable JOHN T. MITCHELL be and hereby is
disqualified from hearing the above-entitled proceeding.
DATED t h i & day of October, 2018.

JO
T. ITCHELL
DIST
, JUDGE

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

.JIthe foregoing was personally served by placing

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy

a copy of the same as indicated below on the--=~~_ day of October, 2018, addressed to:
Kootenai County Public Defender pdfax@kcgov.us-:::..,,
KootenaiCounty Prosecutor kcpaicourts@kcgov.us

ORDER TO DISQUALIFY
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Filed: October 13, 2018 at 12:41 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzi Sverdsten Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

State of Idaho
Plaintiff,
vs.
Cody Leigh Hansen
Defendant.

Case No. CR28-18-15354
Notice of Reassignment

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case has been reassigned to the
Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer.
Dated: 10/13/2018
Jim Brannon
Clerk of the District Court

By: Suzi Sverdsten
Deputy Clerk
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date, I served a copy of the attached to:
Bernard William McHugh
kcpaicourts@kcgov.us

~ By E-mail □ By mail

Benjamin Martin Onosko
pdfax@kcgov.us

~ By E-mail □ By mail

fax (number)
□ By
By overnight delivery/Fed Ex
□ By personal delivery
□
fax (number)
□ By
By overnight delivery/Fed Ex
□ By personal delivery
□

Jim Brannon
Clerk of the Court
Date: 10/13/2018

Notice of Reassignment

By: Suzi Sverdsten
Deputy Clerk

Page 1 of 1
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Filed: 10/17/2018 14:37:13
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice
Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender
The Law Office of the Public Defender Kootenai County
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Phone:(208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 8448
Email: pdfax@kcgov .us
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
V.

CODY LEIGH HANSEN
Defendant.

CASE NUMBER

CR28-18-0015354

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF
GRAND JURY HEARING PROCEEDINGS

)
)

---------------

The Court having before it the foregoing Defendant's Motion to Make Available the Record

of All Proceedings of the Grand Jury Pursuant to IC.R. 6.3, and good cause appearing, now,
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the court shall prepare a complete record of the
Grand Jury proceedings in the above-entitled matter. Such record shall include preparation of the
following documents:
1. A copy of any and all Petitions for Summoning a Grand Jury related to this case of these
charges.
2. A copy of any and all Order or Orders Assigning Judge related to this case or these charges.
3. A copy of any and all Order to Summons Jurors and Notice of Hearing.

ORDER FOR PREPARATIO N OF
GRAND JURY HEARING PROCEEDING S
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4. A transcript of the Initial Seating of the Grand Jury which ultimately heard evidence in the
case against the defendant. The transcript should include, but is not limited to, a list of the
prospective jury pool, administrat ion of the oath to prospective grand jurors, by the
prosecutor and the Court, and any questionnaires or instructions given to prospective grand
jurors as well as a list of all persons present.
5. A verbatim transcript of the proceeding in which evidence against the defendant was
presented to the grand jury, In addition to a record of testimony presented to the grand jury,
that transcript should include a record of comments of the court and prosecuting attorney to
the grand jury, whither in opening statement or closing remarks or response to questions by
the grand jury, and any questions submitted by the grand jury, whether oral or written, as well
as a list of all persons present during the proceeding.
6. A copy of the jury instructions provided to the grand jurors who heard the evidence against
the defendant.
7. A list of the names of the grand jurors who heard the evidence against the defendant.
8. A copy of any and all documents or records and a transcript of any and all proceedings
containing information related to the following matters addressed in the relevant Idaho
Criminal Rules detained below, if not otherwise already included in the record created above:
a.

The number of grand jurors and presence of a quorum, per Idaho Criminal Rule
6.l(a).

b.

The summoning of the grand jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.1 (b ).

c.

The impaneling of the grandjury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.l(c).

d.

The grand jury presidingju ror, oath and duties, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.l(d).

ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF
GRAND JURY HEARING PROCEEDINGS
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e.

The deputy presiding juror, oath and duties, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.1 (e).

f.

The charge to the jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.l(t).

g.

The excuse of any juror, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.1 (g).

h.

Any evidence presented to the grand jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(a).

1.

Any inquiry by the prosecutor regarding whether there are any grounds for
disqualification of any grand juror, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(b).

J.

Any list of elements of offenses provided by the prosecutor, per Idaho Criminal Rule
6.2(c).

k.

Any advice given by the prosecutor regarding the standard for probable cause or
person's refusal to testify, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(d).

1.

Any grand jury subpoenas issued or served, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(e).

m.

Any opening statements or jury instructions on applicable law provided by the
prosecutor, whether oral or written, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(±).

n.

Any Indictment prepared by the prosecutor for consideration by the grand jury or at
the request of the grand jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(g).

o.

All recorded proceedings in this case, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.3(a).

p.

The presence of any and all persons at all times at the grand jury sessions in this case,
and the permissions for such presence, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.4.

q.

Any subpoenas issued in this case, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.5(a).

r.

Any questions asked of any witnesses, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.5(b).

s.

Any evidence for the defendant requested or ordered to be produced by the grand
jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.5(c).

ORDER FOR PREPARAT ION OF
GRAND JURY HEARING PROCEEDI NGS

Page 2

Page 43

t.

Any returned indictment in this case, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.6(c).

u.

A list of the vote of the grand jurors, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.6(d).

v.

Any and all other information, documents, records or transcripts regarding the grand
jurors or the indictment subjecting them or it to challenge, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6. 7.

w.

The term of service of the grand jury, per Idaho Criminal Rule 6.8.

9. A copy of any and all documents or records and a transcript of any al all proceedings
containing matters related to the relevant Idaho statutory provision contained in Idaho Code
§§ 19-1002-15, 1101-15, 1201-07, 1306-08, 1401-18, 1601, and any other statutory sections
relevant to grand juries, if not otherwise already included in the record created above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of preparation and completion of the Record shall
be paid at county expense and at no expense to the Defendant.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the record shall be completed and submitted to all parties
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2018.
November
_ _ day of _ _ _
to this action no later than the _17th
Signed: 10/17/2018 02:17 PM

ORDERED this _ _ _ _ _ day of October, 2018.

~

DISTRICT JUDGE

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing
a copy of the same as indicated below on the _ _ _ day of October, 2018, addressed to:
Signed: 10/17/2018 02:38 PM

Kootenai County Public Defender pdfax@kcgov.us
Kootenai County Prosecutor KCPAICOURTS(a))<cgov.us
Marissa Garza mga:rza@kcgov.us

Clerk-aschertz@kcgov.us
Court Reporter- realtimereporter@hotmail.com
ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF
GRAND JURY HEARING PROCEEDINGS
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Electronically Filed
10/18/2018 11:23 AM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-170 I
Bar Number: 8448
Email: pdfax@kcgov.us
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
ST ATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
V.
CODY LEIGH HANSEN,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NUMBER

CR28-18-0015354

MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION
TO FILE PRETRIAL MOTIONS

---------------

COMES NOW, your undersigned, and moves this Court for its order extending time in
which l 2(b) pre-trial motion may be filed.
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that the Grand Jury Hearing
Proceedings and transcript are due on November 17th , 2018 and counsel needs time to review to
determine what motions should be filed. Defense counsel requests an additional 30 days from
the date Defendant receives the Grand Jury Transcript to review Grand Jury documents.
Oral argument and leave to adduce testimony are herewith requested, should the Court be
not otherwise disposed to grant relief.
DATED this

[

~

day of October, 2018.
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY

BY:

~~
De'\ (Y,Ogl=t)'

~

SENIOR TRIAL ATTORNEY
MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION
TO FILE PRETRIAL MOTIONS
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy orSe foregoing was personally served by placing a
day of October, 2018, addressed to:
copy of the same as indicated below on the

Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-2168
_t.,iCourt

MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION
TO FILE PRETRIAL MOTIONS

~
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Filed: 10/22/2018 13:39:34
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice
Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 8448
Email: pdfax@kcgov.us
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

V.
CODY LEIGH HANSEN,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NUMBER

CR28-18·0015354

ORDER FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME
TO FILE PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS

---------------

The Court having before it the Motion for an extension for filing Pre-Trial Motions and
good cause appearing, now, therefore
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defense Counsel has 30 days from the receipt of the
Grand Jury Transcript to file any Pre-Trial Motions in the above-entitled matter.
Signed: 10/22/2018 12:02 PM

c ~
DISTRICT JUDGE

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by facsimile
on the _ _ _ day of October, 2018, addressed to:
Signed: 10/22/2018 01:39 PM

Kootenai County Public Defender pdfax@kcgov.us
Kootenai County Prosecutor kcpaicourts@kcgov.us

ORDER FOR AN EXTENSION OF
TIME TO FILE PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS
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Electronically Filed
10/22/2018 8:52 AM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

Anne C. Taylor, Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 5836
iCourt Email: pdfax@kcgov.us

Assigned Attorney:
Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, Bar Number: 8448

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
V.

CODY L. HANSEN
Defendant.

CASE NUMBER CR28-18-0015354
FM
MOTION FOR RECOGNIZANCE
RELEASE OR REDUCTION OF BOND

COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through their attorney, and hereby moves
the Court for its Order releasing the defendant on their own recognizance or reducing the bond in this
matter.
This motion is made pursuant to the 8th and 14th amendments of the U.S. Constitution;
Article I,§§ 6 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution; and I.C.R. 46.

MOTION FOR RECOGNIZANCE RELEASE
AND/OR REDUCTION OF BOND

Page 1

Page 48

This motion is made on the grounds that defendant has ties to the community and is not a
flight risk, and the bond as set violates the defendant's rights to due process and to be free from
excessive bond and cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions.
Counsel requests that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument,
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is ten minutes.
DATED this

{1

day of October, 2018.
ANNE C. TAYLOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:
BENJAMIN M ONOSKO,
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing
day of October, 2018, addressed to:
a copy of the same as indicated below on the

lZ-

Kootenai County Prosecutor
Fax (208) 446-2168
Interoffice Mail

j

iCourt kcpaicourts@kcgov.us

MOTION FOR RECOGNIZANCE RELEASE
AND/OR REDUCTION OF BOND
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BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way/P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone Number: (208) 446-1800
Email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us
Assigned Attorney: Stanley T. Mortensen

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CR28-18-15354
Grand Jury No. CV28-18-162
AMENDED
SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CODY LEIGH HANSEN
Agency Case: 18ISP2201 I.S.P.
Fingerprint #:
Defendant.

CODY LEIGH HANSEN is accused by the Grand Jury of Kootenai County, by this
Superseding Indictment, of the crime(s) of: COUNT I, Possession with Intent to Deliver a
Controlled Substance, Idaho Code §37-2732(a)(l), COUNT II, Possession of Paraphernalia,
Idaho Code §37-2734A(l), committed as follows:

COUNTI
That the Defendant, CODY LEIGH HANSEN, on or about the 15th day of September,
2018, in Kootenai County, Idaho, did knowingly and unlawfully possess methamphetamine, a
Schedule II controlled substance, with the intent to deliver the aforementioned controlled
substance; and

Page 1 of 2

SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT
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COUNT II
That the Defendant, CODY LEIGH HANSEN, on or about the 15th day of September,
2018 , in Kootenai County, Idaho, did use and/or possess with intent to use drug paraphernalia,
to-wit: baggies, a scale, and/or tin foil, used to process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, ingest, inhale, and/or otherwise introduce into the human body a
controlled substance, all of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such
case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the People of the State of Idaho.

DATED this 19th day of October, 2018.
BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

Stanley T. Mortensen
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of October, 2018, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was caused to be delivered as follows:
mailed
faxed r1 hand delivered
emailed
JusticeWeb P ICourts
Kootenai County Public Defender

r

r
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Description CR28-18-15354 Hansen, Cody Leigh 20181029 Arraignment, Bond Hearing
CR 2017-13212 Hansen, Cody Leigh 20181029 Probation Violation, Bond
Hearing
Judge Meyer
Clerk Denice Larsen
Court Reporter Diane Bolan
Location lKCRT9

Date 10/29/2018
I

I

Time

02:26:19
PM
I
02:27:33
PM
I
02:27:57
PM
I
02:28 :53
PM
I
02:29:46
PM

02:31:44
PM
I
02:32:15
PM
I
02:32:27
PM
I
02:33:45
PM
I

~
M

02:35:26
PM

I Speaker

Note

Judge
Meyer

Calls case. Def present in custody. Zach Jones for def. Laura
McClinton for state.

Zach Jones

He will be standing silent. He will be entering denials or continuing
the probation violation.

~

CR28-18-15354. Waive reading of amended superseding indictment.
Confirms name, dob and ssn on information. Understand rights.

Judge
Meyer

~
Judge
Meyer

Advises def of charges and penalties.
I just received my GED, understand English, enough time with atty,
understand atty and court, satisfied with legal services, not under
influence, no mental, physical or emotional condition that would
impair judgment.
Explains plea options.

Zach Jones He will stand silent.
Judge
Meyer

2 day trial. PTC 11/26/ 18 at 9am. JT 12/03/18 at 9am.

Judge
Meyer

CRl 7-13212. Set for a status conference on November 26 at 9am.

We are only asking the bond be reduced in the probation violation
Zach Jones case. Bond in the new one is $7500. We are asking for a similar bond
in CRl 7-13212, so a total of $15,000.
Re Criminal Rule 5.3. Bond was appropriately set at $7500 in CRl 713212. He is 28. He has rather limited criminal history. He has lived
in Spokane all his life. He was living with his aunt and mother in Post
Zach Jones
Falls. He was employed full time at Crafted, and will lose that
employment, but he is employable. He would be able to post bond.
He would waive extradition. He would check in with probation and

Page 52

parole.
02:39:11
-PM

I think it is pretty unusual that a magistrate will set a bond in a felony
case. I am opposed to bond reduction in either of these matters. In the
Laura
newest matter, he was on supervised felony probation. He was not
McClinton complying with the terms of his probation. He is supposed to allow
law enforcement to search his property if he is on probation. In this
case he was asked to search, but denied the request.

02:40:54
-PM

He has been failing to make some of his tests. There are at least two
positive tests. He just recently came off a period of retained
jurisdiction in the 201 7 case. We are just a few months later and he is
Laura
McClinton falling back into his own ways. The 2017 started out as a trafficking
case and was reduced down. I think lowering the bond, poses a risk to
the community.

02:42: 17
PM
I
02:43:02
PM

02:45:03
-PM
I
02:45:43
PM
I

Zach Jones

This case was appropriately done when he got brought in on an
agent's warrant and the magistrate set bond.

Judge
Meyer

I have not been presented this argument before. It is not unheard of
for magistrates to set bond on agent's warrants. But probably more
often or not they don't set bond on them and wait for the district judge
to set bond. I will take this under advisement so I can look into the
rules.

Judge
Meyer

It causes me some concern and disappointment that you come back
from a rider and tum around and get yourself in trouble.

F
Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com
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Filed: 11/26/2018 07:57:52
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - O'Reilly, Cindy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CODY HANSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
) Case No. CR28-18-15354
)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT FILED
Please be advised that the transcript of the Grand
Jury Proceedings held October 2, 2018, totaling 56
pages, in the above-entitled matter has been prepared
and filed with the Clerk of the Kootenai County
District Court.

____________________________ Date: 11-24-18
Diane Bolan
Official Court Reporter
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Electronically Filed
12/4/2018 11:03 AM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

Benjamin M Onosko, Deputy Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number 8448
iCourt: PDF AX@kcgov.us

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
V.

CASE NUMBER CR28-18-0015354
FM
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

CODY L HANSEN
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above named defendant by and through their attorney, Benjamin M.
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order suppressing any and all
evidence gathered against the above named defendant including all statements made by the
defendant, the observations made by the officers of the defendant before, during and after the stop,
and any evidence seized subsequent to the stop. The evidence must be suppressed because the
warrantless stop by the officer was unlawful and without legal justification, therefore in violation of
the Fourth Amendment to the constitution of the United States and Article I§ 17 of the Constitution
of the State of Idaho. Additionally, defendant was subject to an unlawful seizure when the officer
unlawfully prolonged the stop, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the constitution of the
United States and Article I§ 17 of the Constitution of the State ofldaho. Finally, the defendant and
his belongings were unlawfully searched without a warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the constitution of the United States and Article I§ 17 of the Constitution of the State ofldaho.
Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution affords greater protection than the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution based upon the long-standing jurisprudence of the Idaho appellate
courts, the uniqueness of the State ofldaho, and the uniqueness of the Idaho Constitution. See State
v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224 (Ct.App. 1996) (Idahoans have higher expectation of privacy in their land):
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 995 (1992) (not the exclusionary rule, but the constitutional
provision itself impedes fact-finding function of Court - but this is a "price the framers anticipated
and were willing to pay"); State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746 (1988) (Idahoans have a higher
expectation of privacy in the home); State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387 (1981) (judicial integrity
mandates exclusionary rule); State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586 (1978) (admission of illegally seized
evidence itself a violation of constitution); State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927) (application of
exclusionary rule in Idaho 34 years prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
Counsel requests that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument,
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is 2 hours.
DATED this

~

day of December, 2018.
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:
BENJAMIN M ONOSKO
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
V.

CASE NUMBER CR28-18-0015354
FM
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

CODY L HANSEN
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above named defendant by and through his attorney, Benjamin M.
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits this Brief in Support of his Motion to
Suppress Evidence.
FACTS
On September 15, 2018, Sergeant Sproat was driving eastbound on I-90 when he observed a
vehicle being driving by Defendant, Cody Hansen, some distance in front of him. Officer Sproat
reported that he observed Mr. Hansen's vehicle fail to maintain its lane of travel by drifting from the
left lane into the right lane, before returning to the left lane. Based on this alleged traffic violation,
officer Sproat conducted a traffic stop of Mr. Hansen.
Officer Sproat approached and reached the passenger side of the vehicle at approximately
6:26 a.m. Besides Mr. Hansen, a front seat passenger, Mr. Wiltz, and a backseat passenger, Mr.
Clifton, were also in the vehicle. Officer Sproat asked the occupants for their ID's, as well as the
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registration and insurance on the vehicle. Officer Sproat gathered the occupants IDs and spoke with
them for approximately five minutes. During this time, Mr. Hansen told the officer he was insured,
but didn't have a copy of the insurance card with him. Mr. Hansen also told the officer he had just
purchased the vehicle and had not got it registered in his name yet. Officer Sproat asked the
occupants if they were on probation, and Mr. Hansen told the officer he was. Officer Sproat then
asked dispatch to send a K-9 to scene. Officer Sproat asked if there were any weapons in the vehicle,
and got a negative response. Officer Sproat told the occupants he had a K-9 working, and asked if
there was anything illegal in the vehicle. The occupants told the officer there was not. Officer
Sproat then asked the occupants about specific drugs in the vehicle and asked if the K-9 would alert
on anything, the occupants told him no.
At approximately 6:31, officer Sproat got back into his vehicle and asked dispatch to run the
occupants information. At approximately 6:34, officer Sproat reproached the vehicle and asked Mr.
Hansen to get out of the vehicle to speak with him. Officer Sproat told Mr. Hansen to keep his hands
out of his pockets, and then began questioning him about his prior criminal charges. At about this
time, dispatch informed the officer that Mr. Hansen was clear in-house. The officer then questioned
him about his employment. Officer Sproat asked if he could frisk Mr. Hansen, and Mr. Hansen
consented. Officer Sproat then asked if he could search Mr. Hansen's pockets and under Mr.
Hansen's hat, and Mr. Hansen consented. The officer asked Mr. Hansen for consent to search the
vehicle, and Mr. Hansen told the officer he would not consent to a search of the vehicle. Officer
Sproat again asked about illegal substances in the vehicle, and Mr. Hansen denied there were any.
Officer Sproat then asked Mr. Hansen to walk 50 feet up the side of the highway, and hang out there.
As Mr. Hansen was walking away, officer Sproat asked him if he was hiding anything in his
underwear, and Mr. Hansen told him no.
Officer Sproat then had Mr. Wiltz exit the vehicle. The officer asked for permission to frisk
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him, and Mr. Wiltz consented. After the frisk, the officer asked if Mr. Wiltz owned anything in the
vehicle, and he told the officer no. At about this point in time, at 6:42, officer Hodl arrived on scene
and walked up near the vehicle. Officer Sproat then told Mr. Wiltz to walk down the road and stand
near Mr. Hansen farther away from the vehicle. Officer Sproat then briefly spoke with officer Hodl.
At approximately 6:43, officer Sproat instructed Mr. Clifton to exit the vehicle. The officer
frisked Mr. Clifton, and asked if he owned anything in the vehicle. Mr. Clifton told the officer that
he owned the black backpack in the car, and told the officer he didn't know who the other backpack
belonged to. The officer instructed Mr. Clifton to take his backpack out of the vehicle, and set it on
the side of the road. He then asked Mr. Clifton to walk down to the other occupants and tell Mr.
Hansen to come back to the vehicle. Mr. Hansen came back and confirmed for the officer that he
owned the blue and black backpack in the vehicle; and was then instructed to go back and stand with
the other occupants.
At approximately 6:46, officer Sproat began walking back to his vehicle and told officer Hodl
that he was going to call Mr. Hansen's probation officer. At approximately 6:49, an officer tried to
call Mr. Hansen's PO, but was unable to get ahold of him. The officer left a voice mail stating he
was out with Mr. Hansen and wanted to talk about him. At 6:51, officer Sproat commented to
officer Hodl that he guessed he could try and get ahold of another PO. For the next several minutes,
officer Sproat and officer Hodl engaged in small talk and conversations about Mr. Hansen's prior
criminal charges. At approximately 7:00, the officer asked dispatch if there were any on-call POs
that he could talk to, and was told no.
At approximately 7:02, officer Hodl told officer Sproat about all the occupant's prior
criminal history record. Officer Sproat then told officer Hodl that he doesn't have much experience
with this probation stuff, and asked what he should do. Officer Hodl said he didn't know much
either; and the two conversed about their knowledge of probation searches for several minutes.
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Ultimately, the officers decided that it would probably be ok if they just search Mr. Hansen's
backpack, and maybe limit the search to his area of the vehicle. Shortly after 7:06, while the vehicle
occupants were still 50 feet up the road, officer Sproat walked up to the driver side, entered the
vehicle, and began searching. The officer searched inside a pouch in the center console, then under
the seat, then in Mr. Hansen's backpack, and ultimately the trunk of the vehicle.
It does not appear that officer Sproat did any work on the original purpose of the stop, Mr.

Hansen's ticket, after gathering his information and learning he was clear at 6:35. Officer Sproat
ultimately discovered controlled substances in the trunk and paraphernalia in the vehicle.

LEGAL STANDARD
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in part, "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. This language mirrors the language of the
Idaho Constituti(Jn which also protects persons and their papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. I.D. Const. art. 1, § 17. Despite the identical language, this Court is free to
interpret the Idaho Constitution as more protective of the rights ofldaho citizens than the Federal
Constitution. State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988). On several occasions Idaho
Courts have interpreted Article 1, § 17 to provide for greater protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures than the Fourth Amendment. See Id.; State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,824 P.2d 660
(1992); State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 760 P.2d 1162 (1988). Evidence obtained in violation of
these Constitutional protections generally may not be used against the victim of the illegal
government action. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). "This rule,
known as the exclusionary rule, applies to evidence obtained directly from the illegal government
action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original illegality, or the fruit of the
poisonous tree." Id. When a defendant seeks to have evidenced suppressed under this theory, the
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State bears the burden of showing that the search and seizure were reasonable. Id.
Seizures of the person must typically be justified by probable cause; but, in appropriate
circumstances an officer may briefly detain a person for purposes of investigating criminal behavior
without probable cause. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). "However, in order to pass constitutional
muster, an investigatory seizure, or 'stop' must be justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion on
the part of the police that the person to be seized has committed or was about to commit a crime."
State v. Fry, 122 Jdaho 100, 103, 831 P. 2d 942, 945 (Ct. App. 1992). "Reasonable suspicion must be

based on specific, articulable facts." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811,203 P.3d at 1210. "[R]easonable
suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." Id. (internal
quotation omitted).
When a defendant challenges his detention, the burden is first on defendant to prove that a
seizure occurred. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454,456 (2004). The burden then
shifts to the State to show that the seizer was based upon reasonable suspicion and sufficiently
limited in scope and duration. State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8, 217 P.3d 1, 8 (Ct. App. 2009).
Both the Idaho and United States Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Id. Const. art. 1, § 17. Because of this protection, any
warrantless search is presumptively invalid. Woolery, 116 Idaho at 370, 755 P.2d at 1212. If a
search is conduc~ed without a warrant, the burden falls on the State to justify why police saw fit to
disregard the citizens Constitutional rights. Id.
ARGUMENT

I. Warrantless Stop
Mr. Hansen was pulled over by the officer for allegedly failing to maintain his lane of travel,
a violation of LC.§ 49-637(1). This stop was conducted without a warrant and therefore the State
bears the burden of justifying the seizure.
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LC.§ 49-637(1) provides in pertinent part: "A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable
entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first
ascertained that the movement can be made with safety."
Our Courts have tended to interpret Idaho's traffic regulations to avoid unduly harsh
interpretations for what most would consider normal driving behavior. See e.g., State v. Emory, 119
Idaho 661, 809 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439,362 P.3d 514 (2015); State v.

Fuller, Docket No. 44172, Opinion No. 41 (April 26, 2018).
In Emory, a defendant was observed driving by an officer at 2:40 a.m. The officer observed
the defendant have a slow response to a traffic light by just sitting at a green light, and drive very
close to other vehicles parked on the side of the road. Despite observing this traffic violation, our
Court of Appeals found the stop to be unlawful, and not supported by reasonable suspicion because
the defendant's driving fell "within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving
behavior." Emo;y, at 664, 809 P.2d at 525. While the Court appreciated the officer's inferences
based upon his training and experience, the Court held the officer's "inferences must still be
evaluated against the backdrop of everyday driving experience." Id.
In Neal, our Supreme Court held that an officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop a
defendant for failing to maintain his lane, LC.§ 49-637, when his vehicle's tires touched the fog line
on the roadway. The Court first found the statutory language "as nearly as practicable entirely within
a single lane," to be "reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning and therefore[] ambiguous."

Neal, at 445, 362 P.3d at 520. The Court explained that when engaging in statutory interpretation,
"Courts should presume that a statute was not enacted to work a hardship or to effect an oppressive
result. Constructions that would render the statute productive of unnecessarily harsh consequences
are to be avoided." Id. (quoting Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 177, 560 P.2d 497, 499 (1977)).
The Court next focused on the fact that the statute at issue deals primarily with "managing traffic
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safety vis-a-vis other vehicles," and preventing "dangerous, unsafe movement out of a lane of traffic
and into another lane of traffic." Id.
Three years later, our Supreme Court again found that reasonable suspicion was lacking when
a Kootenai County officer stopped a vehicle because his tires crossed over the fog line on the
roadway. State v. Fuller, Docket No. 44172, Opinion No. 41 (April 26, 2018).
In Neal and Fuller, the Court never reached the issue presented in Mr. Hansen's case because
those Courts found the drivers did not leave their lanes of travel; so neither case is directly on point.
However, two important ruling from the Court are applicable to the analysis today. First, that the
statutory language is ambiguous and requires interpretation, and second, that the statute should be
interpreted in line with the primary evils it was designed to remedy.
In Mr. Hansen's case, defendant asks the Court to find officer Sproat lacked reasonable
suspicion to believe defendant violated the traffic law. More specifically, defendant contends that he
did drive his vehicle "as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane" on the date in question,
and that a single instance of briefly touching or slightly crossing a lane of travel does not constitute a
violation of the statute, absent a "dangerous, unsafe movement."
Courts should avoid statutory construction that renders language "surplusage." Duncan v.

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The language of the statute, "as nearly as practicable" would be
rendered surplusage under the State's interpretation of the statue. According to the State, a driver's
single instance of crossing a travel lane violates the statue regardless of how brief the instance is, or
whether or not it was dangerous or unsafe under the circumstances. If this were the case, our
legislature would have simply written the statue to require a driver to drive their vehicle "entirely
within a single lane." The addition of the words "as nearly as practicable" suggests the legislature
recognized that no one is a perfect driver all the time. Drivers can, and at some point all do, briefly
touch or cross lines on the road without effecting or endangering other drivers or traffic; and drivers
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should not be subjected to warrantless seizures for such normal conduct.
The Ninth Circuit reached this same conclusion after interpreting a Nevada statute with
identical language. United States v. Delgado-Hernandez, 283 F.App'x 493 (9th Cir. 2008). The
Ninth Circuit found that a driver's brief (several seconds) crossing over the lane of travel was
insufficient to give rise to a violation of the statute. Id. The Court, much like our Court in Fuller
and Neal, focused on the purpose of the statutes, which is to "promote safety on multi-lane roads."
Id., at 499.

The Court found it was therefore appropriate to consider whether, under the

circumstances, "the driver's conduct did threaten, or could be reasonably construed as potentially
threatening, the safety of other motorists." Id. The Court concluded that "a driver who briefly fails
to stay within his lane of travel does not violate" a statute such as LC. § 49-637. Id.
Finally, this interpretation was urged by Justice Brody in his concurring opinion in the Fuller
case. Fuller, Do~ket No. 44172, Opinion No. 41 (BRODY J. Concurring) ("I believe that Fuller's
minor breach of the lane of travel would not constitute a violation of section 49-637(1) in light of the
entire text of the. statute.")
Defendant respectfully requests the Court find officer Sproat lacked reasonable suspicion to
believe Mr. Hansen violated LC. §49-637.
II. Prolonging of the Stop

Officer Sproat unlawfully prolonged the seizure of Mr. Hansen when he abandoned the
original purpose of the stop in order to conduct a drug investigation.
When an officer makes a valid traffic stop, the scope and length of that stop must be
"temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop," i.e., addressing
the traffic violation. State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 922, 367 P.3d 1231, 1234 (Ct. App. 2016).
"[W]hen an offa:er abandons his or her original purpose, the officer has for all intents and purposes
initiated a new seizure with a new purpose; one which requires its own reasonableness under the
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Fourth Amendment." State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605,609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016).
"[W]hile an officer may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic
stop, the officer may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion
ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual." State v. Linze, Docket No. 42321 (Ct. App.,
Jan. 8, 2016)(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015)). "Authority for the
seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are, or reasonably should have been,
completed." Linze, Docket No. 42321. "Recently the United States Supreme Court held that
authority to detain a motorist ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are completed or
reasonably should have been completed." State v. Kelley, 361 P.3d 1128, 1288 (Ct. App. 2015).
The reasonable suspicion required to prolong a stop must be "more than mere speculation or
instinct on the part of the officer." State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct.
App. 1999). The length and scope of the detention may only be expanded if "there exist objective
and specific articulable facts that justify suspicion of criminal activity." Kelley, 361 P.3d at 1287.
The Supreme Court has definitively stated that a traffic stop may not be prolonged beyond the
time reasonably necessary to complete the purpose of the stop, and that delaying the stop further is
unconstitutional; absent reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity. Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct.
1609. In Rodriguez, an officer stopped a vehicle for a traffic offense. Id. The officer completed the
traffic warning at 12:28, but kept the vehicle on scene until 12:33 so that a drug dog could walk
around the vehicle. Id., at 1613. The government argued that this prolonging of the stop was de
minimis, and was therefore permissible. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and continued to

adhere to its established precedent that a traffic stop "may 'last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate"' the purpose of the original stop. Id., at 1614 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
407 (2005)). Because the purpose of the stop could have been completed before the dog sniff
occurred, the seizure was unlawfully prolonged. Id., at 1616.
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In Gutierrez, a traffic stop was prolonged when the officer questioned the vehicle occupants
for approximately one minute concerning drugs, which was not the purpose of the traffic stop. Our
Court of Appeals found that prolonging the traffic stop by 60-90 seconds for questioning constituted
an unlawful seizure. Gutierrez, at 652, 51 P .3d at 466. "Further detention was not lawful after the
point at which the purpose of the stop was resolved." Id, at 652, 51 P.3d at 466 (quoting United

States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395 (5 th Cir. 2001)).
In Linze, an officer stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction. The defendant was a passenger
in the vehicle. The officer learned the defendant had an extensive drug history, and had recently
been found to be in possession of drugs by police. While the officer was writing the ticket, a canine
unit arrived to do a sweep around the vehicle. The officer who was writing the ticket stopped
working on the ticket for only two and a half minutes to act as cover officer for the canine officer.
Within 30 seconds of conducting the canine sweep, the dog alerted on the vehicle. The passenger
was subsequently charged with possession of controlled substances. Our Court of Appeals found the
first officer unlawfully prolonged the seizure when he stopped working on the original purpose of the
stop, the infraction, and acted as a cover unit for the canine officer. Id. Because a traffic stop "must
be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop," the Court found
the delay of approximately two minutes to be unlawful. Id. The Court also found that despite the
fact the defendant had an extensive drug history, and had recently been found in possession of drugs,
that fact alone did not give the officer reasonable suspicion to believe she was in possession of drugs
on this day. Id.
The State ofldaho appealed the Court of Appeals decision in Linze, and our Supreme Court
agreed to consider the case. Our Supreme Court fully affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals,
and even took the time to put an exclamation point on the importance of the rule:
[T]he United States Supreme Court did not restrict its analysis to cases in which
the underlying purpose of the traffic stop was completed prior to a drug dog
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Page 10

Page 66

sweep. Instead, the United States Supreme Court reached a much broader
holding: "a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which
the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable
seizures." This rule is both broad and inflexible. It applies to all extensions of
traffic stops including those that could reasonable be considered de minimis.
Linze, at 608, 389 P .3d at 153 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court also

pointed out that "a deviation from the original purpose of a traffic stop will inevitably lengthen the
time needed to complete the original purpose of the seizure," and thus, "the timing of an officer's
departure from the original purpose of the seizure is irrelevant, it only matters that the officer
departed from that purpose." Id., at 608-609, 389 P.3d at 153-154.
Our Courts have held on numerous occasions that an officer's mere hunch that a defendant
may be in possession of drugs is insufficient to give the officer reasonable suspicion to extend a
traffic stop. In Neal, an officer stopped the defendant for several traffic violations. 159 Idaho 919,
367 P.3d 1231. The officer observed that the defendant was nervous, anxious, had a marijuana
symbol on his shirt, and refused to consent to a search of his vehicle. Id. The State argued that the
officer's observations, coupled with his training and experience, was sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion for the crime of drug possession. Id. Our Court of Appeals disagreed. The Court first
held that each of these facts alone provided little, if any, reasonable suspicion of drug possession.
Id., at 924-925, 367 P.3d at 1236-1237. The Court specifically found the defendant's nervous

behavior was of "limited significance in establishing reasonable suspicion," because most normal
citizens exhibit nervousness when stopped by police. Id., at 924, 367 P .3d at 1236 FN4. Finally, the
Court found that even when all of these facts, coupled with the officers experience, were taken into
account, the State still failed to establish that reasonable suspicion existed for a drug investigation
and had merely shown the officer had a "hunch" there was drug activity occurring. Id., at 925, 367
P.3d at 1237.
The same year, our Court of Appeals considered a second case where an officer prolonged a
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traffic stop in ord_er to conduct a drug investigation. State v. Kelley, 160 Idaho 763,379 P.3d 351
(Ct. App. 2016). In Kelley, an officer stopped the defendant for a traffic violation. Id. The officer
ultimately extended the traffic stop in order to conduct a drug investigation based on the fact that ( 1)
defendant displayed extreme nervousness; (2) defendant lacked eye contact; (3) defendant was
trembling on a warm evening; (4) defendant had a pulsing carotid artery; (5) defendant had an
unusual travel itinerary; and (6) defendant was traveling on a known drug-trafficking corridor. Id., at
765,379 P.3d at 353. Our Court found these facts, even when considered together, failed to give rise
to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id.
Finally, and also in the same year, our Court found reasonable suspicion for a drug
investigation to be lacking despite the officer learning that defendant had an extensive drug history
and had recently been found by police to be in possession of drugs. Linze, Docket No. 42321 (Ct.
App., Jan. 8, 2016).
The first determination this Court must make is whether officer Sproat prolonged the traffic
stop in order to conduct a drug investigation. The answer to this question appears clear. After
gathering Mr. Hansen's information and returning to his vehicle, officer Sproat ran the occupants
information through dispatch. Approximately four minutes later, officer Sproat exited his vehicle,
and had each occupant of the vehicle exit one by one while he searched them and questioned them
about items in the vehicle. At no time after exiting his vehicle did officer Sproat do anything to
further the original purpose of the stop, and it appears Mr. Hansen never received a ticket or warning
for his original traffic violation. For the next half hour, officer Sproat continued to investigate the
defendant's past criminal history, question the occupants about drug possession, try to contact the
defendant's probation officer and others at the probation office, and speak with officer Hodl about
how a search of the vehicle should be conducted. The record appears sufficiently clear for the Court
to find that officer Sproat abandoned the purpose of the stop and began a drug investigation at least
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by the second time he approached defendant's vehicle, at approximately 6:34. This prolonging
lasted for shortly over half an hour, until at least 7:06.
Because the stop was prolonged in this case in order to conduct a drug investigation, the
Court must next consider whether there was reasonable suspicion for the officer to conduct a drug
investigation. In this case, just as in those discussed above, officer Sproat extended the duration of
this stop withoufreasonable suspicion that Mr. Hansen was in possession of drugs.
The only facts officer Sproat identified as leading him to believe that Mr. Hansen was in
possession of drugs that day was the fact that the occupants of the vehicle had backpacks, that Mr.
Hansen was on probation, that one of the times officer Sproat asked if there were drugs in the
vehicle, Mr. Hansen broke eye contact and looked down before telling the officer no, and that when
the officer separated Mr. Hansen and asked if anyone had drugs in the vehicle, Mr. Hansen told him
not that he knew of.
These facts are woefully insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
sufficient to justify a seizure for a drug investigation. In Neal, Kelley, and Linze, the defendants all
had similar behavior to Mr. Hansen, and our Courts found the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
prolong the stop for a drug investigation. Officer Sproat arguably had even less to work with than
the defendants ~n those cases.

Mr. Hansen was not shaking or showing signs of extreme

nervousness, as was the defendant in Kelley. Mr. Hansen was not wearing clothing promoting drugs
as was the defendant in Neal. Even officer Sproat's report about what exactly Mr. Hansen did in
response to the question he asked is not clear. In his report, officer Sproat notes that when he asked
Mr. Hansen this question, Mr. Hansen looked down. While on scene, office Sproat said that when he
asked Mr. Hansen ifthere was anything illegal in the vehicle, Mr. Hansen looked ahead, not down.
For the above reasons, Defendant respectfully requests the Court find he was subject to an
unlawful prolonging of his seizure when officer Sproat abandoned the purpose of the stop to pursue a
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drug investigation, and that this seizure was made without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

III. Warrantless Search
Mr. Hansen's vehicle and belongings were subjected to an unlawful search that was
accomplished without a warrant, and without probable cause.
Once a Defendant has demonstrated that a warrantless search occurred, the burden shifts to
the State to demonstrate that the search was lawful under some exception to the warrant requirement.
One exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception outlined by the Supreme
Court. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The automobile exception grants police some
authority to search an automobile without a warrant if they have probable cause for the search. Id
The automobile exception is limited in scope. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
The exception only allows police to search parts of an automobile, or containers therein, for which he
has probable cause to believe contain evidence of a crime. Id.
Probable cause requires more than mere reasonable suspicion, and requires that the officer's
belief be supported by "factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
"[T]he probable-cause determination must be based on objective facts that could justify the issuance
of a warrant by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith of the police officers."
Ross, at 808.

"[R]easonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion," and probable cause requires even more than reasonable suspicion. State
v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (internal quotation omitted).
"The standard of probable cause involves the same quantum of evidence regardless of
whether an arrest or a search is involved." State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,283, 108 P.3d 424,430
(Ct. App. 2005).
In this case, there is no dispute that office Sproat conducted a warrantless search of the
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vehicle and Mr. Hansen's belongings. The burden is therefore on the State to demonstrate that
probable cause existed that controlled substances were in the vehicle. For the same reasons that
reasonable suspicion did not exist to prolong the stop, probable cause also did not exist to search the
vehicle.
Defendant respectfully requests the Court find officer Sproat lacked probable cause to believe
there were controlled substances in the vehicle, and suppress the evidence discovered from that
search.

IV. Other Warrant Exceptions
In light of officer Sproat's testimony at the grand jury hearing, Defendant anticipates the State
may attempt to argue that this warrantless search was justified pursuant to some "probation"
exception to the warrant requirement.
Defendant would first point out to the Court there is no such thing as a "probation" exception
to the warrant requirement. What the State commonly refers to as a probation exception is actually a
conflation of two separate exceptions to the warrant requirement; the consent exception, and the
special needs exception. Compare State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227,657 P.2d 1095 (Ct. App. 1983)
(upholding warrantless search based on probation officer possessing reasonable suspicion); with

State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359,972 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding warrantless search based on
defendant's consent to it). Defendant will discuss each possible exception below.
Additionally, Defendant would point out that each of these alleged exceptions would only
apply to the warrantless search in this case. Thus, if the Court were to find the traffic stop was
unlawfully prolonged, the Court need not even reach these issues.

A.

Consent exception

Searches conducted pursuant to a defendant's consent are a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 116, 175 P.3d 801, 805 (Ct. App. 2007).
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The State bears the burden of showing that the consent exception applies. State v. Eversole, No.
41063, 2015 WL 1542545 (Id. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2015). In order to meet its burden, the State must
show that "the consent was voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or
implied." State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481,484 (Ct. App. 2006). "A voluntary
decision is one that is 'the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker."'
Id., at 97, 137 P.3d at 484 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,225 (1973)). "The
consent must be 'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given."' United States v.
Page, 302 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1962) (citation omitted).
Even if consent has initially been given by a citizen, that consent may be revoked or limited
at any time. See State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 696-697, 978 P .2d 881, 884-885 (Ct. App. 1999);
State v. Eversole, 160 Idaho 239, 371 P.3d 293 (2016).
In this case, officer Sproat asked Mr. Hansen ifhe would consent to a search of the vehicle.
Mr. Hansen told the officer he would not consent to such a search. Because Mr. Hansen had the
right to withdraw any previous consent he may have granted, the search in this case cannot be
justified as a search pursuant to consent.
B.

Special needs exception

Another recognized exception to the warrant requirement are "special needs" searches. The
"special needs" exception to the warrant requirement may allow for warrantless searches when
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable." Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v.
TL.O., 469 U.S. 325,351 (1985) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgement)).
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Included within this special needs exception are searches of probationers by probation
officers. "A State's operation of a probation system ... presents 'special needs' beyond normal law
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements."

Griffin, at 873-874. "Supervision, then, is a 'special need' of the State ... " Id., at 875.
"[N]onconsensual warrantless searches of probationers and their property by probation or
parole officers constitute an exception to the warrant requirement independent of consent." State v.

Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 486, 95 P.3d 635, 637 (2004). "[A] probation officer may make a
warrantless search of a probationer if (a) he has reasonable grounds to believe that the probationer
has violated some condition of probation and (b) the search is reasonably related to disclosure or
confirmation of that violation." Pinson, at 233, 657 P.2d at 1101.
However, even under this lowered special needs standard, the State must still show that
reasonable suspicion existed for the search:
One of the exceptions to the warrant restriction is a search conducted pursuant to
the administration of probation or parole. But, for this exception to be applicable,
the State must show that the warrantless search was reasonable, that is, a parole
officer may make a warrantless search of a parolee and his residence if the officer
has reasonable grounds to believe that the parolee has violated some parole
condition and the search is reasonably related to the disclosure or confirmation of
that violation.

State v. Peters, 130 Idaho 960,962, 950 P.2d 1229, 1302 (Ct. App. 1997). This standard has been
found to be justified as an exception to Article I,§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution. State v. Devore, 134
Idaho 344, 347, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Ct. App. 2000).
Our Courts have had no trouble applying this standard for the last three decades. See e.g.,

State v. Vega, 110 Idaho 685, 718 P.2d 598 (Ct. App. 1986) (reasonable suspicion to search
probationer where store employee identified him as robbery suspect, and probationer's girlfriend
called to report probationer may have been involved in the robbery); Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 657
P .2d 1095 (reasonable suspicion existed where probationer's mother twice told probation officer that
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Page 17

Page 73

probationer had drugs in his possession and may have burglarized a home); Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,
148 P.3d 1240 (second report during a police intel meeting that probationer may be selling drugs
gave probation officer reasonable suspicion to search probationer); State v. Adams, 146 Idaho 162,
191 P.3d 240 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding reasonable suspicion to search after probationer sold
methamphetamine to a confidential informant); State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364,347 P.3d 1025
(Ct. App. 2015) (finding reasonable suspicion existed when probation er's mother called police to
report that her son was in her house, possibly under the influence, and acting in a way that made her
fearful for her safety).
The special needs that justify these types of searches are based upon the fact that "parole
authorities have a special and unique interest in invading the privacy of parolees under their
supervision." Consuelo-Gonzalez, at 265-266 (quoting Latta, at 249). "Parole conditions must be
reasonable and have an acceptable aim towards rehabilitation." Mellinger v. Idaho Dept. of
Corrections, 114 Idaho 494,501, 757 P.2d 1213, 1220 (Ct. App. 1988).

Probationers and probation officers occupy a unique, middle ground in our judicial system.
"Although a probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police officer who
normally conducts searches against the ordinary citizen ... while assuredly charged with protecting the
public interest, [a probation officer] is also supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer."
Griffin, at 876. "Because of the special relationship between the probation officer and the

probationer, the law relating to probation searches cannot be strictly governed by automatic reference
to ordinary search and seizure law." Pinson, at 233,657 P.2d at 1101 (quoting State v. Earnest, 293
N.W.2d 365,368 (Minn. 1980)). This special, middle ground type status, has also caused our Courts
to "perceive[] a distinction between searches of probationers conducted by a supervising probation
officer and those conducted by the police." Id., at 234, 657 P.2d at 1102.
As a condition of granting probation, society has the right to impose stringent limitations on a
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probationer's behavior, including "restrictions on important liberties such as the right to travel, to
change jobs or residence, or even to marry." Pinson, at 231,657 P.2d at 1099. However, "[i]mplicit
in the system's concern with parole violations is the notion that the parolee is entitled to retain his
liberty as long as he substantially abides by the conditions of his parole." Brewer, at 479.
[I]t is necessary to recognize that when fundamental rights are curbed it must be
done sensitively and with a keen appreciation that the infringement must serve the
broad purposes of the Probation Act. This burden cannot be avoided by asserting
either that the probationer has voluntarily waived his rights by not objecting in a
proper manner to the conditions imposed upon him or that he must accept any
condition the court deems best as a consequence of being in custody.

Consuelo-Gonzalez, at 265 (internal quotation omitted).
Idaho Courts have recognized that searches conducted without a warrant by probation officers
serve important goals related to probation and are permissible. "[T]he probation department needs to
be able to assure compliance with probation in an expedited fashion without the necessity of
probable cause." Klingler, at 497, 148 P.3d at 1243. "For probation authorities to evaluate a
probationer's progress in reintegrating into society, the probation officer must have a thorough
understanding of the probationer's environment and personal habits." Pinson, at 231, 657 P.2d at
1099. For these reasons, "the ability of a parole officer to conduct warrantless searches of persons
under his supervision may be 'necessary to effective operation of the parole system."' Id. (quoting

Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246,250 (9th Cir. 1975)).
As with any exception to the warrant requirement, when the State argues the "special needs"
exception applies it must still show that the search actually fell within the rational for the exception,
and was otherwise reasonable.
"While approving the search in this case, we note that intrusions upon a probationer's privacy
which do not relate to proper administration of probation are invalid." Pinson, at 233,657 P.2d at
1101. "A search cannot be based upon a mere hunch without factual basis, nor upon 'casual rumor,
general reputation, or mere whim.' Moreover, searches intended merely to harass or intimidate
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probationers or parolees cannot be tolerated." Id (quoting State v. Simms, 516 P.2d 1088, 1096, 10
Wn. App. 75, 83 (Wa. Ct. App.1973)).
While the justification for a probation officer conducting a warrantless search clearly satisfies
the special needs doctrine; the logical connection between special needs and warrantless probation
searches falls to the wayside when no probation officers are involved. "The 'special and unique'
interest which probation authorities have in invading the privacy of probationers 'does not extend to
law enforcement officers generally."' Pinson, at 233, 657 P .2d at 1101 (quoting Consuelo-Gonzalez,
at 266).
Thus, a search under the probation special needs exception "'may not be done for the prime
purpose of circumventing the ordinary constitutional process for the convenience oflaw enforcement
officers in the course of their investigation."' Vega, at 688, 718 P.2d at 601 (quoting Lafave, Search
and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment§ 10.10, at 449 (1978)). "It is impermissible for
the police to use parole officers in lieu of a warrant to search, when conducting a criminal
investigation." Vega, at 688, 718 P.2d at 601. "[U]nder no circumstances should cooperation
between law enforcement officers and probation officers be permitted to make the probation system
'a subterfuge for criminal investigations."' Consuelo-Gonzalez, at 267 (quoting Latta, at 249).
"The police officers had no authority to engage in the general supervision of [Defendant] or
his parole; the police officers could not determine whether the terms of parole were being complied
with, file a report of parole violation, impose discretionary jail time, or enforce the terms of parole."
Armstrong, at 369, 347 P.3d at 1030. Despite not sanctioning police officers to act purely on their
own in conduction parole special needs searches, Idaho does allowed parole officers to "enlist the aid
of the police when conducting a justified search," Peters, at 962, 950 P.2d at 1301.
In this case, the search conducted by officer Sproat cannot be justified as a "special needs"
search. Idaho case law is uniform on this point, a special needs search for probation is one
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Page 20

Page 76

conducted by, or at the request of, a defendant's probation officer. In this case, officer Sproat never
received a request or permission from anyone at Probation & Parole to search Mr. Hansen's vehicle.
Officer Sproat never even talked to anyone from P&P prior to this search. Because this was not a
search conducted by a probation officer in furtherance of the special needs of probation, the search
does not fall under the special needs exception.
Further, even if the Court were to find the exception applied in this case, the State would still
bear the burden of demonstrating reasonable suspicion for the search. Pinson, at 233, 657 P.2d at
1101. As argued above, officer Sproat did not even possess this lower standard of suspicion, and
thus the search would have been unlawful even if it did fall under the special needs exception.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, Defendant respectfully requests the Court grant his Motion to
Suppress Evidence.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER

V.

CODY LEIGH HANSEN

CR28-18-0015354
FM

MOTION TO SET ASIDE INDICTMENT

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Benjamin M
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court to set aside and dismiss the
Indictment in this case.

FACTS
On September 15, 2018, Sergeant Sproat pulled over a vehicle driven by Defendant,
Cody Hansen.

Also in the vehicle were a front seat passenger, Mr. Wiltz, and a backseat

passenger, Mr. Clifton. In the backseat were two backpacks, one black, and one blue and black.
Mr. Hansen told the officer the blue and black backpack was his. Mr. Clifton told the officer the
black backpack was his. Also in the backseat was a black and grey pouch that Mr. Clifton
admitted ownership of.
Officers searched the vehicle.
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paraphernalia in the various containers throughout the vehicle.

Inside the blue and black

backpack, officers found tin foil, a scale, and a journal book. Inside the black and grey pouch,
officers found heroin. Also inside the vehicle, officers found two cell phones, which Mr. Clifton
claimed ownership of.
Inside the trunk, officers found a zebra print pouch that contained paraphernalia, two
scales, a cell phone, and a plastic container which held eight dime bags of methamphetamine.
Officer Sproat also reported there was a gold tin container near the zebra pouch in the trunk.
Officer Sproat reported he weighed the eight dime bags at the jail, and they weight
approximately 6.6 grams. On September 25, officer Sproat and officer Ercanbrack packaged all
the exhibits from this search, including the dime bags as Exhibit 1.
Mr. Hansen was charged with possession of the methamphetamine with intent. In a
separate case, Mr. Clifton was charged with possession of heroin. On October 3, 2018, the State
convened a grand jury. In one single grand jury proceeding, the State presented the grand jury
with both Mr. Hansen's and Mr. Clifton's cases.

LEGAL STANDARD
Idaho Criminal Rule 6.6 states that an Indictment may be dismissed by a court when it is
not properly found. A Court reviewing a defendant's motion to set aside an indictment must
determine whether "the grand jury received legally sufficient evidence to support a finding of
probable cause." See State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477,483, 873 P.2d 122, 128 (1994) (citing State
v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 236, 743 P.2d 459, 465 (1987)).
"[T]he district court may set aside the indictment if, given the evidence before the grand
jury, the court concludes that the probable cause is insufficient to lead a reasonable person to
believe that the accused committed the crime." State v. Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 885, 887, 908
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P.2d 578, 580 (Ct. App. 1995).
An Indictment may also be dismissed when the prosecutor engages in misconduct, and
that misconduct rises to the level of a due process violation. See generally Edmonson, at 23 7,
743 P.2d at 466. "Prejudicial effect" exists if the Defendant would not have been indicted but
for the prosecutorial misconduct. Id.
ARGUM ENT

Idaho Code § 19-1105 specifies the type of evidence the State may present to a Grand
Jury. Our Supreme Court has previously examined the issue of whether improper evidence had
been presented to a Grand Jury. State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 873 P.2d 122 (1994). In Jones,
the Court found that improper evidence had been presented to the Grand Jury. Id., at 483, 837
P.2d at 128. The Court explained that once it is established that improper evidence was given to
the Grand Jury, the Court must answer two remaining questions to determine whether the
Indictment should be set aside.
First, we must determine whether, independent of any inadmissible evidence,
the grand jury received legally sufficient evidence to support a finding of
probable cause. Second, we must dismiss the indictment if, despite an
adequate finding of probable cause, the prosecutorial misconduct in submitting
the illegal evidence was so egregious as to be prejudicial.
Id.
The Idaho Rules of Evidence apply at Grand Jury proceedings, and the State is prohibited
from introducing inadmissible hearsay. Idaho Code § 19-1105 (2018); Idaho Rule of Evidence
101 (2018).
I. Due Process Violations
1. Joining Mr. Hansen and Mr. Clifton Together for the Grand Jury Proceeding

In this case, the State took the extraordinary, and heretofore unheard of, step of having
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the grand jury consider two separate indictments against two separate defendants for two
separate crimes, in one grand jury proceeding. Not only is this process without precedent, it
creates new problems unique to each defendant concerning jury instruction and admission of
evidence.
To start, counsel for Defendant has been unable to identify any rule that would allow the
State to proceed in this unusual manner, or any case where a similar process has been used.
Unless the State has some authority for such an unusual and prejudicial method of conducting a
grand jury, this Court should not sanction such a process.
Even setting aside the lack of any rule or authority permitting such a procedure at a grand
jury hearing, Defendant would point the Court to the Criminal Rules which govern similar
procedures once a case is at the trial court level. Idaho Criminal Rule 13 allows for a court to
order two or more indictments to be tried together if "the offenses, and the defendants ... could
have been joined in a single complaint, indictment or information." Idaho Criminal Rule 8
explains when multiple defendants can be joined in a single indictment. Multiple defendants
may be joined in the same indictment when "they are alleged to have participated in the same act
or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses."
1.C.R. 8(b) (2018).
Even if the Court were to find that I.C.R. 13 and 8 are applicable to grand jury
proceedings, the State still fails to meet the requirements of either of these Rules. In this case,
Mr. Hansen and Mr. Clifton were not even alleged to have participated in the same act or
transaction, and their offenses were completely separate.

Mr. Hansen was charged with

possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. That methamphetamine was found in a
zebra pouch in the trunk, with no identifying information connected to it.
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charged with possession of heroin. That heroin was located in a black and grey pouch inside the
vehicle that Mr. Clifton admitted ownership of. As the Supreme Court long ago remarked:
[J]oinder cannot be sustained where the parties are not the same, and where the
offenses are in no wise parts of the same transaction, and must depend upon
evidenc~ of a different state of facts as to each or some of them. It cannot be
said in such case that all the defendants may not have been embarrassed and
prejudiced in their defense, or that the attention of the jury may not have been
distracted to the injury in passing upon distinct and independent transactions.
McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 81 (1896).

The improper joining of the cases together also led to a host of other improprieties in the
proceedings. First, Idaho has a criminal jury instruction that is to be given when two or more
defendants are tried together. I.CJ .I. 109 (2018). The State, as far as the record reveals, never
gave this jury instruction to the grand jury. While the State did tell the grand jury at the very
beginning of the proceedings that it should examine the evidence as it relates to each person and
make your findings as to each person, the State did not track the language of the jury instruction,
or, give the grand jury the actual instruction to have while deliberating.
Second, the process of trying both defendants in one proceeding allowed the State to
introduce evidence again Mr. Hansen that would otherwise not have been admissible against
him. During the proceeding, the State asked, and officer Sproat testified as to statements Mr.
Clifton made. For example, the officer testified that Mr. Clifton told him the pouch and other
items in the vehicle belonged to him. Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings, P. 19, L. 18 (Oct.
3, 2018) (hereinafter Trans.). These statements were hearsay, and not admissible against Mr.
Hansen.
Third, the State never instructed the jury that it could not consider Mr. Clifton's
statements when determining whether probable cause existed against Mr. Hansen. As discussed
above, the State elicited statements made by Mr. Clifton. These statements would have been
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inadmissible hearsay but for the fact that Mr. Clifton was also a defendant in the proceeding. In
situations like this, it is incumbent upon the State to inform the grand jury that it may not
consider Mr. Clifton's statements when judging Mr. Hansen's case.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), two defendants were tried together, and
the statements of one defendant were introduced at trial.

The trial court gave the jury an

instruction that it was not to consider the statement by one defendant in determining the guilt of
the other defendant. Id., at 124. The Supreme Court found that "despite the concededly clear
instruction to the jury to disregard [defendant l] inadmissible hearsay evidence ... " the second
defendan t's constitutional rights were clearly violated by introduction of the statements. Id., at
137. While it is true the statements in Bruton involved a confession, and thus were more likely
to be prejudicial than the statements in this case; the fact remains that Mr. Clifton's statements
were inadmissible in Mr. Hansen's case, and the jury received absolutely no instruction from the
State that it could not consider these statements when evaluating Mr. Hansen's case.
Finally, the irregular procedure allowed the State to introduce evidence which would
have been irrelevant had Mr. Hansen been tried alone. This included evidence and testimony
about other controlled substances and paraphernalia in the vehicle which had no connection to
Mr. Hansen, and only served to prejudice him by allowing the jury to draw negative inferences
based upon Mr. Hansen's proximity to it. See e.g., Trans., P. 18-19, L. 22-7.
Perhaps the most prejudicial irrelevant evidence introduced came when the State asked
officer Sproat if he found any items that were "indicative, according to your training and
experience, of drug sales?" Id., P. 24, L. 7. Office Sproat proceeded to testify that he found
"three cell phones," and he had previously testified that a person having multiple cell phones was
indicative of possession with the intent to deliver. Id., P. 24, L. 13; P .15, L. 1. However, none
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of these cell phones belonged to Mr. Hansen, and in fact, Mr. Clifton had told the officers on
scene that two of those cell phones belonged to him. Defendant fails to see the relevance of Mr.
Clifton having possessed multiple cell phones to Mr. Hansen's case. Not only was this evidence
not relevant to

Mr. Hansen, it was highly prejudicial as the officer had just testified that finding

multiple cell phones is indicative of drug sales.
2. Testimony Concerning Defendant's Truthfulness

During officer Sproat's testimony, the State asked the officer how Mr. Hansen responded
when he was asked if there were any drugs in the vehicle. Officer Sproat testified that Mr.
Hansen responded "not that I know of." Trans., P.28, L. 3. The State then asked if the officer
noticed any alarming non-verbal cues when this answer was given. Id., at L. 4. The officer
answered yes, and proceeded to testify that when this happened, Mr. Hansen broke eye contact,
and that was different and distinct from before then. Id., at L. 6
To begin, officer Sproat misstated Mr. Hansen's answer to the officer's question. While
he was in the vehicle and the officer asked this question, Mr. Hansen answered "no." Affidavit of
Benjamin Onosko, Ex. 1 (Hereinafter A.ff.). That fact was noted in the officer's report, but the

State failed to correct the officer on the stand after giving the false testimony. The "not that I
know of'' response did not come until later in the encounter when Mr. Hansen was outside the
vehicle by himself with the officer. Id.
But setting aside the false testimony, the questions and answers here were designed to
elicit improper expert testimony that Mr. Hansen was lying when he told the officer there were
no drugs in the vehicle. Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 governs expert testimony, and Rule 608(a)
governs testimony about a person's truthfulness or untruthfulness.
"Pursuant to [I.R.E. 608(a)], testimony by one witness that another witness was, or was
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not, telling the truth when they made a particular statement is not admissible evidence." State v.
Raudenbaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 768, 864 P.2d 596, 606 (1993). Whether a statement made by a

defendant is truthful, is a determination for the grand jury not a testifying police officer. In
Raudenbaugh, a police officer testified he believed a witness had given an untruthful statement

based on his body language. Id. Our Supreme Court found this testimony to be "inadmissible,"
even if the officer was properly certified as an expert, because it "usurped the jury's function."
Id.

In this case, officer Sproat's testimony was improper for two reasons.

First, no

foundation was laid to establish him as an expert on human body language. Second, even if such
foundation had been laid, the testimony still would have been improper because it touched upon
the truth or falsity of Mr. Hansen's statement and "usurped the jury's function." Id. While
Defendant acknowledges officer Sproat did not come out and say he believed Mr. Hansen was
lying, the implication of the State's questions and the officer's answers leaves room for no other
inference. The testimony was clearly designed to imply that Mr. Hansen was being untruthful
with the officer. Trans., P. 28, L. 4-14.
3. 404(b) Evidence
The State allowed the grand jury to hear prejudicial 404(b) evidence which had no
relevance to the case, and served only as propensity evidence against Mr. Hansen.
Idaho Courts have held time and again that introduction of 404(b) evidence is not taken
lightly, and that there is a substantial risk of prejudice to a defendant by its introduction. State v.
Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 178 P.3d 28 (2008) (reversible error to admit evidence a defendant had

admitted to selling drugs in the past); State v. Rupp, 118 Idaho 17, 794 P.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1990)
(reversible error for court to admit evidence of defendant's reputation); State v. Wood, 126 Idaho
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241, 880 P.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1994) (reversible error to admit evidence of defendant's past violent
acts); State v. Pilik, 129 Idaho 50, 921 P.2d 750 (Ct. App. 1996) (reversible error to admit prior
conviction for DUI). As the Court in Pilik put it:

It seems to plain for argument that to place before a jury the charge in an
indictment, and to offer evidence on trial as part of the state's case that the
defendant has previously been convicted of one or more offenses is to run a
great risk of creating a prejudice in the minds of the jury
Pilik, at 54, 921 P.2d at 754 (quoting State v. Wiggins, 96 Idaho 766, 768, 536 P.2d 1116, 1118

(1975)).
The first instance of improper testimony in the case came when a juror asked officer
Sproat what made him want to pull the Defendant over. Officer Sproat testified about the
alleged traffic violation, which was certainly proper. However, the officer then added that he
thought the driver might be really tired or impaired. Trans, P. 30, L. 16. The officer's testimony
that he believed Mr. Hansen might have been impaired was improper. The officer's own report
fails to mention any belief that Mr. Hansen may have been impaired prior to the traffic stop. Ajf.
Idaho Courts, as well as others throughout the country, have found that a single incident of
briefly crossing a line on the road is insufficient to give even reasonable suspicion to believe a
driver is DUL See e.g., State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 362 P.3d 514 (2015). Additionally, officer
Sproat failed to note any indications upon contacting Mr. Hansen that he was under the
influence, and no DUI evaluations were ever conducted. Aff. In sum, it was improper for the
State to allow the officer to baselessly testify that prior to the stop he believed Mr. Hansen may
have been committing the crime of DUL
The second instance of improper 404(b) testimony came when one of the grand jurors
asked the officer why he searched the Defendant's vehicle.

Officer Sproat testified it was

because Mr. Hansen was on probation. Trans, P. 31, L. 8. This was certainly 404(b) evidence,
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and there was no proper reason for its admission. After allowing this testimony, the State told
the jury that the evidence was only offered to explain why the officer searched the vehicle. Id.,
L. 17. The State also told the jury that the fact that Mr. Hansen was on probation should not
weigh into its decision whether or not to indict him. Id., L.16.
Defendant disagrees with the State's proffer as to why the evidence was offered. The
reason for officer Sproat searching the car was not an issue that was before the grand jury, and
was therefore irrelevant.

Additionally, rather than simply telling the jury that the officer's

testimony was improper, had no foundation, and was not evidence, the State chose to confirm the
officer's testimony to the jury by telling them that Mr. Hansen being on probation was a fact, i.e.
it was true. Id.
4. Dismissal of Juror 5

The State committed another instance of misconduct when it sua sponte dismissed Juror
number 5. After the State finished questioning Mr. Sincerbeaux and asked if any of the jurors
had questions for him, Juror 5 told the state that he "just realized my sister may work for the
same place he does. I don't know if that will be a problem." Trans., P. 48, L. 15. Juror 5 then
said that his sister is Anne Nord. The prosecutor, without any further questions and without any
input from the presiding juror, told Juror 5 that he was dismissed from this case. Id., L. 21.
A grand jury should be composed of 16 qualified jurors. I.C.R 6(a). The criminal rules
provide that "the court or the presiding juror may temporarily or permanently excuse a juror for
good cause shown." I.C.R. 6(g). Idaho Criminal Rule 6.l(b) describes the powers and duties of
the prosecuting attorney in a grand jury proceeding. Notably absent from these powers and
duties is the power to excuse members of the grand jury.
In this case, Defendant was deprived of having Juror 5 sit in deliberation on this case.
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Defendant was deprived of this right without any legal cause, and in violation of the proper
grand jury procedure.
While this improper dismissal did not cause a lack of quorum, it still took away a juror
who could have potentially voted in favor of no indictment and convinced other jurors to vote the
same way. While Defendant freely concedes there is no way at this point to know how Juror 5
would have voted or how his presence would have affected the outcome, it must equally be
conceded by the State that the only reason we don't know this is because the State did not follow
proper grand jury procedure and took it upon itself to exercise a power it did not have.
5. Testimony Concerning "Writings"

The State permitted officer Sproat to improperly testify about the contents of two
writings in this case.
While testifying about the contents of the trunk, officer Sproat testified that he found a
gold tin with the word "sinner" written on it. Trans., P. 21, L. 8. No controlled substances or
paraphernalia was found in that tin. The State then asked the officer if he found anything else in
the vehicle with that word on it. Trans., P. 22, L. 9. Officer Sproat testified that inside Mr.
Hansen's backpack, he found a journal, and one of the pages of the journal also had that word
"sinner" written on it. Id., L. 15. The State then asked the officer if the two instances of the
writing were similar to each other. Trans., P. 23, L. 10. Officer Sproat was then allowed to
testify that yes, they were written "very similar[ly]" to each other. Id., L. 11.
I.RE. l00l(a) defines a "writing" as "letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent set
down in any form." I.RE. 1002 explains that "an original writing, recording, or photograph is
'
required in order to prove its content unless these rules or a statute provides otherwise."

Likewise, I.C. § 9-411 provides in part, "There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing
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other than the writing itself... " These rules are generally referred to as the "best evidence rule."
The exceptions to the best evidence rule are found in LR.E. 1004, and LC. § 9-411. The rules
also allow for the production of duplicates in certain circumstances. LR.E. 1003.
In this case, the words "sinner" on both the gold tin and in the journal are clearly
"writings" within the meaning of the term. Thus, the dictates of LR.E. 1002 and LC. § 9-411
that "there can be no evidence of the contents of a writing other than the writing itself" apply to
these two writings. Additionally, none of the exceptions to the best evidence rule apply in this
case. The originals were not lost or destroyed, the originals were not in a party opponent's
possession, they were not a record or document in the custody of a public officer, the originals
were not recorded with a certified copy, the originals did not consist of voluminous documents,
the originals did not consist of medical charts, the originals were reasonably available by any
judicial process, the defendant was not in control of the originals, and the writing was closely
related to a controlling issue, i.e., the possession of the methamphetamine. See, LR.E. 1004; LC.
§ 9-411(1)-(6).

In this case, if the State wanted to introduce evidence to the grand jury concerning these
writings, it was \equired to either produce the writings for the grand jury to view itself, or,
produce a duplfoate, such as a photograph of the writings, in compliance with LR.E. 1003.
Because none of the exceptions to the best evidence rule applied, the State improperly allowed
the officer to testify to the content of these writings.
In addition, the State allowed the officer to improperly give expert testimony without any
foundation.

No foundation was laid that officer Sproat had any training or experience in

comparing handwriting samples. Despite this lack of foundation, the State allowed the officer to
testify that he compared the writing found on the gold tin with the writing in the journal and
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found the two to be very similar to each other. Trans., P. 23, L. 11
This improper admission of testimony was one more example of the misconduct that
occurred during this grand jury hearing, and one more reason why Mr. Hansen's due process
this
rights were violated. However, in addition to being a violation of his due process rights,
jury
error also has an impact on the issue of whether probable cause was shown at the grand
in the
hearing. The only evidence presented by the State connecting Mr. Hansen to the drugs
zebra pouch was this testimony that his handwriting was found on the gold tin near the pouch.
No evidence was submitted that any other identifying information found in the pouch. Without
nt
this improper testimony, no evidence was available for the grand jury showing that Defenda
e
had any knowledge or intent to control the drugs found in the zebra pouch. Without evidenc
have
that Defendant had knowledge or the intent to control these substances, the State would
failed to show probable cause for a necessary element of the charge.
6. Closing arguments

The State committed misconduct when the prosecutor chose to give a closing argument to
the grand jury, and argued they should indict Mr. Hansen.
I.C.R. 6.l(b) lists a prosecutor's powers and duties at a Grand Jury proceeding. The rules
ed list
give the prosecutor the power to "present opening statements." Absent from this prescrib
y.
of powers is the power to present closing argument, comment on the facts, or give testimon
be an
There is good reason for this; the prosecutor's duty at a grand jury proceeding is NOT to
("the
advocate for any side. See United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313, 326 (D. Idaho 1908)
by
prosecutor must 'remain neutral, must be impartial, must not undertake to control the findings
undue influence.") The law is well settled that a prosecutor at a Grand Jury proceeding cannot
Id.
"express opinions on questions of fact or as to the weight and sufficiently of the evidence."
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That is precisely what the prosecutor in this case did when he gave his closing argument to the
Jury.
In Wells, the Court gave a thorough analysis of the history of grand juries, dating back to
their founding in England. "At common law the prosecutor had no right to attend the sessions."
Id., at 324.
[T]he only valid basis on which the institution of grand juries rests is that they
are an independent and impartial tribunal between the prosecution and the
accused; and it is the duty of the courts to refuse to tolerate any practice which
conflicts with this independence and impartiality ... they would cease to answer
this purpose, and would increase the danger they were intended to avert, if they
should be put under the official direction of the prosecuting authorities of the
state.
Id., at 325 (quoting Wharton, Criminal Pleadings and Practice (9th Ed. Sec. 366)). The Court,
relying on well-established precedent, stated, "[t]he district attorney should not give advice or
express his opinion as to the sufficiency of the evidence." Id.
The Court also had occasion to interpret the precursor to LC. § 19-1111, the language of
which remains unchanged today. Id., at 326-327. The Court found the language used was
"meant to confine [the prosecutor] to those traditional duties of giving advice concerning
procedures and ~he like, to the examination of witnesses, as expressly provided, and not to the
expression of opinions or the making of arguments." Id., at 327.
While there was dispute in the Wells case as to what the prosecutor's purpose in making
the closing arguments were, the Court found that "it would be utter nonsense to say that this
speech, address, argument, or whatever it may be called ... was not for the purpose of securing an
indictment."

Id., at 319.

The Court also found that the "remarks made amounted to an

expression of opinion on his part that the defendants were guilty and should be indicted." Id., at
320.
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In this case, the prosecutor expressly told the grand jury after the evidence had been
presented that he was going to give them closing arguments.

Trans., P. 49, L. 25.

The

prosecutor proceeded to ask the jury to find probable cause to believe Mr. Hansen possessed
methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. The prosecutor highlighted some of officer Sproat's
testimony concerning the things he looks for in drug deliver cases. And the prosecutor asked the
grand jury to draw specific inferences from some of the evidence presented.

In short, the

prosecutor gave a closing argument.
This is precisely the type of advocacy and partisanship grand jury proceedings are
designed to avoid, and it violates the principle that prosecutors must not "express opinions on
questions of fact or as to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence or attempt in any way to
influence the findings." Id., at 326. A grand jury proceeding is not simply a chance for the State
to rile up the citizenry against a defendant. It is meant to be a fair, impartial proceeding in which
the prosecutor's role is to advise the grand jury only on the law, and assist with other matters the
grand jury may need help with as provided for by law.
7. Cumulative Errors
"[T]he cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there is 'an
accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated,
the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right
to due process."' State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-573, 165 P.3d 273, 286-287 (2007) (quoting

State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998)).
In this case, there are multiple instances and multiple types of prosecutorial misconduct.
While each individual instance on its own may not be sufficient to establish prejudice or a denial
or due process; when the Court considers them as a whole, the overall effect of all these errors
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was a proceeding that in no way resembles how a grand jury should be conducted. Because Mr.
Hansen was entitled to a fair and impartial grand jury proceeding, the cumulative effect of all
these errors deprived Mr. Hansen of his due process rights.
This case is also one more example of a troubling trend that has been occurring with
grand jury proceedings in this County. The State has been electing to proceed by grand jury, a
non-adversarial proceeding, but still conducting the hearings as if they were adversarial
proceedings, i.e. a preliminary hearing; with all the benefits that accrue to the State in such
preliminary hearings. At preliminary hearings, the State is allowed to make closing arguments,
whereas in grand jury proceedings they are not. In this case and others, the State has made the
choice to proceed by grand jury but still make arguments on the case as if it were a prelim. At a
preliminary hearing, the State is relieved from laying a proper foundation for scientific test
results, but not at a grand jury. In this case, the State introduced scientific test results as if they
were just at a prelim. In adversarial proceedings, it is expected that some improper testimony
may be elicited, but opposing counsel is there to object and an impartial magistrate is there to
rule on the admissibility. In non-adversarial proceedings, it is entirely incumbent on the State to
ensure no improper testimony is elicited. Again, in this proceeding, as well as others in this
County, the State takes little care to ensure that no improper testimony is elicited; acting as if
there were another party present who could simply object if they step over the line.
In sum, the State wants to have its cake and eat it too. The State chooses to proceed by
grand jury, while still availing itself of all the benefit that accrue only at an adversarial
proceeding. This practice in general is offensive to defendants', including Mr. Hansen's, right to
due process.
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II. Insufficient Evidence

Aside from the issue of whether Mr. Hansen received due process, there is also the
question of whether the State presented sufficient, properly admissible evidence to show that
probable cause existed for an indictment. In this case, the State failed to do that. The testimony
concerning the results of Mr. Sincerbeaux's drug testing was improperly admitted without proper
foundation. Without this evidence, there would not have been probable cause to believe that Mr.
Hansen possessed a controlled substance.
During the proceedings, the State asked officer Sproat if his department has policies or
procedures for placing items, like those found in this case, into evidence. Trans., P. 25, L. 6.
Officer Sproat testified his department does, and explained what those are. Id., L. 11. The
officer testified i'n part that after finding evidence in the field, it is taken back to the district office
to be booked into evidence. "At that time, we package each piece of evidence individually. We
conduct a field test on the substance, and then we weigh them. Then we submit it to the Idaho
State Police lab." Id. The State later asked the officer if he processed the evidence in this case in
the same way he just described for the grand jury, and the officer responded that he did. Trans.,
P. 27, L. 10. However, the fact of the matter is the officer did not process the evidence in
accordance with the policies he testified to. Ajf., Ex. 1.
The officer's report indicates that when he returned to the district office after discovering
this evidence, he tested it and weighed it. Aff. Ex. 1. But, he did not package the evidence.
After weighing the evidence, officer Sproat put the evidence in temporary storage. Id. Office
Sproat's report indicates that it was not until ten days later, on September 25, that he and Trooper
Ercanbrack retrieved the evidence and packaged it at that time. Id.
Also during the officer's testimony, the State asked him if this traffic stop got assigned an
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"agency case number or incident number." Trans., P. 25, L. 21. Officer Sproat testified that it
did, and that number was "18-2201." Trans., P. 26, L. 1. The State then asked the officer if
items put in evidence receive a number that's unique. Id., L. 3. The officer testified, yes. Id., L.
5. The officer then testified that the unique number for the methamphetamine was "Exhibit 1."

Id., L. 8. The following exchange then occurred:
Q: Okay. And that exhibit number, is that a long number?
A: Yeah, there's a tag number, and then right after the tag number - the tag number I
believe is about eight digits, and then it's hyphen, and then 1.

Q: Okay. So the longer number ... Let's say if you put ten pieces of evidence into
evidence in a case, that longer number would all be the same for the whole case; correct?
A: That's correct.
Q: But then the last digit, do you call that a tag number?
A: Exhibit number.
Q: Exhibit number. The tag number is the long number.
A: Yes.
Q: And that number is going to be the same, and then the last number, the exhibit
number, that's going to be a unique number?
A: Yes.

Trans., P. 26-27, L. 9-3. In sum, the officer testified that the case number for this incident was
18-2201, that evidence receives a tag number and an exhibit number, and that the exhibit number
for the methamphetamine was 1.

The officer gave no testimony about what the

methampheta mine's tag number was.
The State later called Mr. Sincerbeaux to testify.

The following exchange occurred

regarding a chemical test Mr. Sincerbeaux had conducted:
Q: Okay. And Mr. Sincerbeaux, did you analyze evidence in ISP case 18-2201? It may
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be different. Is it C18002201?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And did the evidence you analyzed in this case have an exhibit number or
exhibit numbers?
A: Yes, it did.
Q: And what are those exhibit numbers?

A: There was 180003567-1, and then there was 180035674-3.
Q: Okay. So, ultimately, there were agency exhibits ending -1 and -3?
A: Correct.

Trans., P. 34-35, L. 18-5.

Later in his testimony, Mr. Sincerbeaux was asked what his

conclusions wei:e regarding the exhibit number ending in -1.

Mr. Sincerbeaux testified it

contained methamphetamine. Trans., P. 39, L. 23.
Based on the testimony of officer Sproat and Mr. Sincerbeaux, the State failed to lay a
foundation to establish that what Mr. Sincerbeaux tested, exhibit number 180003567-1, was the
methamphetamine that officer Sproat testified to finding in the trunk of the vehicle in Mr.
Hansen's case. The only parts of their testimony that overlapped was the officer's testimony that
the exhibit ended in -1, and Mr. Sincerbeaux testimony that the exhibit number was 180003567-1
(which happens to end in a -1). That fact alone was insufficient to lay a proper foundation to
establish that these were the same pieces of evidence. Any ISP crime lab case with multiple
pieces of evidence will have exhibit numbers that in in -1, -2, -3 etc .... The "-1" is not a unique
number that identifies a specific piece of evidence by itself. Mr. Sincerbeaux was never asked,
and never testifi~d that these exhibits had "tag" numbers, and officer Sproat was unable to testify
what the tag number in Mr. Hansen's case was.
In sum, the State failed to lay an adequate foundation for the admission of the lab results
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in Mr. Hansen's case. Without a proper foundation, establishing that what was tested by Mr.
Sincerbeaux was what was found by officer Sproat, the evidence would have been irrelevant and
excludable.
Additionally, the State offered Mr. Sincerbeaux's expert testimony without properly
laying a foundation for the machines he testified that he used in this matter. In order for a party
to elicit scientific testimony, such as the results of a machine like the "infared instrument" used
here, the party must make a prima facie showing. Trans., P. 39, L. 11.
"[T]he appropriate test for measuring the scientific reliability of evidence is 1.R.E. 702."
State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691, 694 (1992). Idaho Rule of Evidence 702

provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of

fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no
assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and, therefore, is inadmissible as evidence. Bromley
v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999). The Court has not adopted

the Daubert standard for admissibility of an expert's testimony but has used some
of Daubert's standards in assessing whether the basis of an expert's opinion is scientifically
valid. See Swallow v. Emergency Med of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 595 n. 1, 67 P.3d 68, 74
(2003) ("this Court has not adopted the Daubert test for admissibility"). See State v. Parkinson,
128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1996) (where expert's testimony did not identify
components of sex offender profile, how it was developed, how it was tested for accuracy, its
error rate, or how it was used, the court excluded expert's testimony for defective foundation);
Swallow v. Emergency Med of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68, (2003) (court did not
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admit expert's testimony where opinion was based on adverse reaction reports that were not
statistically significant); State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418,224 P.3d 485 (2009) (expert testimony
deemed inadmissible where no evidence, aside from a colleague's notes, was introduced to
establish facts); State v. Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 911 P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1995) (where doctor
based his opinion merely on logical inconsistencies and did not utilize skills that were
unavailable to the average juror, his testimony was inadmissible); State v. Marks, 156 Idaho 559,
328 P.3d 539 (Ct. App. 2014) (where medical examination did not specifically state it was
internal, expert testimony beyond external appearance of genitals was impermissibly speculative
and unsubstantiated).
Here, the state failed to provide any evidence that the "infrared instrument," whatever
that might be, is scientifically sound. The closest the evidence comes from Mr. Sincerbeaux is
that this is "the instrument that we use most of the time .. " Trans., P. 39, L. 10. But that
testimony does not tell the grand jury that the machine has been accepted by the Idaho State
Police, much less that it is scientifically sound. Mr. Sincerbeaux also did not testify as to the
procedures for running an infrared machine, or the procedures that are required to be followed in
order to ensure the machine is in proper working order and there is no cross-contamination.
While Mr. Sincerbeaux did testify as to the procedure used on the GC-MS to prevent crosscontamination ("we run a blank"), the State never asked and he never testified what the
procedures for the infrared instrument are. Trans. P. 42, L. 7. Without any testimony that the
method used in this matter was reliable, the result of the testing from the "infared instrument"
must be excluded.
In sum, the State failed to lay a proper foundation for admission of any test results
regarding the substance that Mr. Hansen was charged with possessing. Without this improperly
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admitted testimony, probable cause could not have existed for the grand jury to bind Mr. Hansen
over.
CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests the Court find his due process rights were violated, and
find that probable cause was not established at the grand jury proceeding. Defendant requests
the Court set aside and dismiss this indictment.
Counsel requests that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument,
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is 2 hours.

DATED this

/

,3

day of December, 2018.
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:~~~--·~~~~--BENJAMIN M ONOSKO
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by
day of December, 2018, addressed
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the

lf4

to:
Kootenai County Prosecutor
Via Fax
iCourt
Via Email

MOTION TO SET ASIDE INDICTMENT

PAGE22

Page 99

Electronically Filed
12/14/2018 10:48 AM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 8448
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ST ATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
V.

CODY LEIGH HANSEN,
Defendant.

STA TE OF IDAHO
County of Kootenai

CASE NUMBER CR28-18-0015354
AFFIDAVIT OF
BENJAMIN ONOSKO

)
) ss.
)

Benjamin Onosko, after being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1. That your affiant is an adult, over the age of 18, and has personal knowledge of the
facts in this Affidavit;
2. On or about October 18, 2018, I received Plaintiffs 3rd Supplemental Response to
Discovery;
3. Included in that Response was an Incident Report prepared by Officer Sproat;
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4. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of that incident report
I received.

Further your affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this

JJ_ day of December, 2018.

BenJamm

n
~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

)3

day of December, 2018.

,Arrow°' R&iYl~D~

Notary Public in and for the State
of Idaho, residing at Coeur d'Alene therein.
My commission expires: 7 ) ~I l ~ d-~
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Idaho State Police
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DRUGS

700 S. Stratford Drive
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SPROAT,CURT
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1
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Offense
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Use
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cargo?

35A 1
omp(ainl Type

#0 enses

AC
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2
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M
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nvofvement
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Article: Radio, TV, Home electronicJ CDRECO

Report Officer

3780/SPROAT ,CURT

Ex. 04-black LG phone
Ex. 05-4 SIM cards

ntedAl

10/17/2018 10:42
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C18002201

FEL METH DEL/H EROIN
Idaho State Police
Propert y ~umma ry

_

_

_

SUpp-1 No

ORIG

_

Involvement

EVD
De•Cf1Jliorl

Article: Office equipme nt/cellu lar phones TELEPH
iPhone

Ex. 06-gold & white

JnWllvamenl

EVD
Description

Article: Office equipme nt/cellul ar phones TELEPH
phone

Ex. 07-coppe r Samsung

Summa ry Narrativ e
Arbitrator
Digital Photographs
State Police stopped
On September 15th, 2018 at approximately 0625 hours, I, Sergeant Curt Sproat of the Idaho
90 near milepost 3
Interstate
eastbound
on
AAA.6267)
:
a black 1999 Volkswagen Passat (Washington registration
losing their
lane,
right
the
to
lane
left
the
from
drifted
n
Volkswage
the
of
driver
in Kootenai County, Idaho. The
a tum signal
was
time
no
At
lane.
left
the
into
back
drove
slowly
then
n
Volkswage
the
of
driver
The
lane of travel.
n Driver's
Washingto
his
with
)
used. The driver identified himself as Cody Leigh HANSEN
his
with
)
WILTZ
Russell
Robert
as
License. The front passenger identified himself
Steven
as
himself
identified
verbally
and
down
wrote
occupant
side
passenger
back,
The
Idaho Driver's License.
). I later validated CLIFTON's identification by his expired and pictured
James CLIFTON
were located inside the
Idaho Driver's License return. Heroin, methamphetamine and assorted drug paraphernalia
etamine with Intent
Metharnph
of
Possession
for
Jail
County
Kootenai
the
into
Volkswagen. HANSEN was booked
was
CLIFTON
(1).
37-2734A
I.C.
alia:
Paraphern
Drug
of
Possession
and
(A)
(1)
)
37-2732(a
J.C.
to Deliver:
Drug
of
Possession
and
(1)
37-2732(c)
booked into the Kootenai County Jail for Possession of Heroin: I.C.
Paraphernalia: I.C. 37-2734A (1).

Printed AJ

ReponO!lfcer

3780/SPRO AT,CURT
------

-

--

10/17/20 18 10:42
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Supplement No

C18002201

FEL METH DEUH EROI N
Idaho State Police

ORIG

Sex

Name

Male

HANSEN,CODY LEIGH
Aoe

DOB

Elhnlcity

Juvenile?

\llc/Olnd Age

Eye Color

Weight

6 1 03 11

180# Brown Blue

No

Unknown

Hair Color

Height

28

PRN

191538
Type

Address

Home 19138 E CANE CIRCLE

City

SPOKANE

Slate

ztp Code

Dale

WASHINGTON

99016

09/15/2 018

VlaY

Type

ID No

FBI number

7M08VT5K7

OLS

ID No

Type

WASHINGTON

HANSECL103JO

Operato r License

OLS

Type

IDAHO

State Crimin al Identif ication Number
Date

PhOne o

Phone Type

09/15/2 018

(509)34 4-9190

Home

Arrest Type

lnvolvemel\l

Arreste d

Citation No

Arrest Date

Arrest Time

Status

09/15/2 018

07:50:0 0

Booked

ON VIEW (WITHOUT WARRANT)

3780000 062

Multi-arrests

Armed

Not applica ble

Unarme d
Charge

37 2732 (A) ( 1) (A)
Charge

37 2734A( l)

Level

Charge Literal

F

MANUFACTURE,DELIVER,

Level

Charge

M

POSSESS ION OF DRUG P

el

Sex

Ra(;8

CLIFTON,STEVEN JAMES
Aoe

DOB

Elhrlcity

Unknown
Juvenile?

Unknow n

5 '10

No

Hair olor

Weliiht

Height
11

160# Brown

OFN_INVL

Eye Color

Mal.a
Vic/Ofnd llge

2

Blue

29

PRN

191539
Type

Addre$$

Home 224 N WILLOW ROAD
WASHINGTON

SPOKANE

Date

ZIPCode

-

City

Type

ID No

FBI number

765064A D8

09/15/2 018

99201

OLS

~No

Type

Operato r License

IDAHO

QK37833 2A

State Crimin al Identif ication Number
State Crimin al I:denti ficatio n Number

NORTH DAKOTA
OLS

WASHJ:NGTON
OLS

IONo

WYOMING

WY0028 9578

State Crimin al Identif i.catio n Number

Unarme d

MONTANA

WA2702 0639

State Crimin al Identif ication Number

Armed

MT0312 5487
ND0021 4253

Type

Arreste d

OLS

ID No

Type

(509)27 9-5734

ID No
IDNo

Type

Home

IDAHO

ID10076 650

State Crimin al Identif ication Number
Type

lnv<llYamenl

OLS

IDNo

ype

Phone No

CAL:IFORNIA

CA3222 7680

State Crimin al Identif ication Number

Phone Type

OLS

IDNo

Type

Dale

09/15/2 018
lvrest Delo

Anesi Type

09/15/2 018

ON VIEW (WITHOUT WARRAN'l')

l\mlat Time

Status

Cttallon No

07:30:0 0

Booked

3780000 063

11--arram

Not a p1icab le

Che,ge

Level

Charge Uleral

37 2732 (C) (1)

F

POSS
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Name

WILTZ,ROBERT RUSSELL

6' 00"

No

Unknown

Hair Color

Weight

Haight

Jwenle?

Elhniclly

Age

D B

Supplemenl No

C18002201

FEL METH DEL/HEROIN
Idaho State Police

ex

MNI

Race

864316

Unknown

Male

PRN

Reo Status

Eye Color

ORIG

191540

240# Brown Brown Reside nt

Address

Type

Home 2306 E MULLAN AVE APT 4

City

Stale

ZIP Code

COEUR D'ALENE

IDAHO

83814

Type

ID No

FBI n'Ulllber

455920NC7

Date

09/15/2 018
OLS

ID No

Type

WASHINGTON

PW221088F

0 erator License

WASHINGTON

WA23573475

State Crimin al Identif ication Number
TYPO

Involvement

AUTOMOBILE (includ es

EUIILEASED TO OWNER OR OTHER

Uc Type

Lie Year

State

WASHINGTON

AXA6267

OL

IDNo

fype

Vehicle : AXA6267

IDAHO

ID11010 996

State Crimin al Identif ication Number

UcenseNo

OLS

IONo

Type

2018 Re

1999

VIN

Color

Slyla

Ye,ir

lar Passen er Automo bile Plates

Sedan Dark green

WVWMD63B6XE508962

Race

u

LEIGH

Sex

M

DOB
Ink

Involvement

ARR

PAS

Involvement

PAS

Name

2

CLIFTON,

lnvl No

Name

3

Drugs

u

involwmenl

ARR

Sex

M

hetamin es

taminas , meth

narcot ics

Enlenid Date

GRAM 09/25/2 018

6.600
SUS

sure

Sex

M

Race

lBR8Type

Dru s/Narc otics
Quanllty

u

STEVEN JAMES

WILTZ, ROBERT RUSSELL

Mlcia

Link

Race

lnvl No

Transfer

Canltol

coessfu l

3780

0925181 143

Jn\11 No

Race

Sex

U

M

l

DOB

04/20/1 990
Prop t

2

lnvl Dale

lnvolwment

SEIZED -Drug/$ /veh/we a on
Deocriptlon

Value
Cal

Security

Yes

No

Entered Dale

nl«ed Time

RMS Tranlfer

09/25/2 018

11:12

Succes sful

Involvement

ARR

Tag No

Item No

1800035 67

2
Typ

A
IBR

ypa

Drug, narcot ic equipm ent

Paraph erna1ia /Narco tic Equipm ent

Other

SUS

In Custody?

ipes, tin foil

Ex. 02-sca les,

$1.00

Link

09/15/2 018

onlrol

3780

0925181 143

Name

HANSEN,CODY LEIGH

Race

Sex

U

M

008

04/20/1 990
Report Officer
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3

I 09/15/2018 I

In Cuslody?

Inv! Date

SEIZED-D rug/$/veh/w eapon

Descnplion

IDrugs,

Ex. 03-heroin
Miele

IBRST)lpe

Drugs/Na rcotics
Entered Time

11:13

I
SUS

Link

I RMS Trsnsrer

Successfu l

lnvolwment

ARR

I2

lnvl No

I

I Control

Yes

I l. 000

No
I Security ITag
No 180003567
ITypD ICalOther

Heroin

I3

Item No

Measure

Entered Date

092518114 3

IR;ce15;;

.

Nam&

ORIG

I GRAM I 09/25/2018

Quanttty

D111g Type

narcotics

3780

supplement No

C18002201

FEL METH DEUHE ROIN
Idaho State Police
Prop# I Involvement

CLIFTON,STEVEN JAMES

DOB
Prop#

4

I 09/15/2018
lnvf Date

lnvolvement

EVIDENCE -Non-Drug

In Cuatody?

Yes

I No ITag180003567 I 4

Item No

No

S•C1Jril)I

IT:

Description

Ex ..04-black LG phone

Ar!lcle

Cat

Office equipmen t/cellular phones
Office type equipment
Link

OWN
Prop#

5

I 09/25/2018
Entered Date

IBRllType

j lnvolwment
ARR

I1

lnvl No

IHANSEN,CODY
Name

Involvement

EVIOENCE ~Non-Drug

Cell Fhone/Tel ephone
Entered

rune I RMS T,,...fer

I 3780
Control

Successfu l

11:14

IR~,

LEIGH

I lnvl Date

In Custody?

Yes

09/15/201 8

I Security ITag No

l~e

Compact Disc (CD)/DVD Recorder

Radio, TV, Home electroni cs

I1
I
OWN ARR

Link

Involvement

Inv! No

-

5

11:

Ex. 05-4 SIM cards
Cal

Radios, TVs, VCRs

5;;

( Item No

180003567

No

Description

IBRl:i Type

092518114 3

I Entered Dale

I Name
HANSEN,CODY

I 11:15

I 3780
Confltlj

Enlered Time \ RMS Transfer

09/25/201 8

Successfu l

092518114 3

LEIGH

1R;1s;

OOB
Prop#

6

I 09/15/2018
lnvl Dale

Involvement

EVIDENCE -Non-Drug

tn Custody? \ Secur«y

No

Yes

I 180003567 I 6

OesalJ)Uon

Ex. 06-gold

&

IT

white :I.Phone
Artltle

Cat

Cell Phone/Tel. ephone

Office equipmen t/cellular phones
Office type equipment
Link

OWN

I

ARR

j lnvl No
2

006
Pcop #

7

I 09/25/2018

Entered Time

Elllered Date

IBRSType
ln\/Olvemonl

I~IF'l'ON' STEVEN

Involvement

EVIDENCE -Non-Drug

11:33

I Successful
RMS Transfer

j 1nV1 Date

09/15/201 8

In Custody?

Ex. 07-copper Samsung phone
Office equipmen t/cellular phones

I
OWN

I 09/25/2018
Entered Date

Office tVt:>e equipment
Involvement

ARR

I .2

lnvl No

I Name
CLIFTON,STEVEN

3780

Yes

092518114 3

IR;e! s;;

l No l 180003567 I 7

Item No

Tag No

:;ecunty

Ir;:

Ar1lcle

Cat

IBRSType

1Conlrol

JAMES

Description

Link

Item No

Tag No

Cel.l Phone/Tel ephone
Entered Tune

11:35

I
I""""
Successfu l 3780
1

ransrer

Conlrol

092518114 3

I

R;e I

JAMES

5;;

DOB

Narrative

1. On September 15th, 2018 at approximately 0625 hours, I, Sergeant Curt Sproat of the Idaho State Police
stopped a black 1999 Volkswagen Passat (Washington registration: AXA6267} on eastbound Interstate 90 near
milepost 3 in Kootenai County, Idaho. The driver of the Volkswagen drifted from the left lane to the right lane,
a
losing their lane of travel. The driver of the Volkswagen then slowly drove back into the left lane. At no time was
turn signal used.
RaportOfflcer
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Narrative
2. As the Volkswagen came to a stop, I observed the back, passenger frantically reaching towards the middle or
left side of the backseat. The Volkswagen's right turn signal was on as I approached the vehicle. The right tum
signal continued to stay on throughout the course of the traffic stop. This was unusual behavior based on what I
see from the general, motoring public.
3. I approached on the passenger side of the vehicle and informed the driver the reason for the traffic stop. There
were three occupants inside the vehicle.
4. While speaking with the occupants, I observed two backpacks on the back seats: a black backpack and a blue
and black backpack. The back passenger was reaching around near the backpacks as I was speaking with the
occupants. The driver said the Volkswagen was his and he had just bought the vehicle. The driver stated the bill
of sale for the vehicle was at his house. The driver later stated he had yet to register the Volkswagen and had
made a down payment of $450 towards the vehicle.
) with his Washington Driver's
5. The driver identified himself as Cody Leigh HANSEN (
) with his
WILTZ
Russell
License. The front passenger Identified himself as Robert
as Steven
himself
identified
verbally
and
down
wrote
occupant
side
passenger
back,
Idaho Driver's License. The
). I later validated CLIFTON's identification by his expired and pictured
James CLIFTON (
Idaho Driver's License return.
6. HANSEN stated he was on felony probation for possession of a controlled substance. While HANSEN
continued to look for the vehicle documentation and his current address, I asked the occupants if there were any
drugs inside the Volkswagen. HANSEN showed a distinct"change of behavior, broke eye contact and looked
down. All three occupants stated there were no drugs inside the vehicle.
7. While waiting for the returns from the Idaho State Police Dispatch, I asked HANSEN to exit the vehicle.
8. HANSEN stated he was on felony probation for marijuana and heroin and had been on probation since June
6th of 2018. The Idaho State Police Dispatch confirmed HANSEN was on felony probation through the state of
Idaho. HANSEN acknowledged the 4th amendment waiver he had since he was on felony probation. HANSEN
confirmed he has signed the Idaho Department of Correction Agreement of Supervision. The agreement states
the following, "I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real property
or structures owned or leased by me, or for which I am the controlling authority conducted by any agent of !DOC
or a law enforcement officer. I hereby waive my rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution
concerning searches." Based on my training and experience, I knew any person on felony probation as of April of
2015 was required to sign the ag'reement of supervision. I asked HANSEN if there was anything I needed to know
about inside the Volkswagen. HANSEN stated, "Not that I know of." Based on my training and experience, that
Was likely a deceptive response from HANSEN. HANSEN stated the blue backpack inside the vehicle was his
possession. HANSEN stated the other backpack belonged to CLIFTON. I asked HANSEN for consent to search
the Volkswagen. HANSEN stated, "I thought you could just search it."
9. HANSEN consented to a pat down. I patted down HANSEN for weapons in front of my patrol vehicle. No
weapons were located. HANSEN stated they were up early, so they could pick up WILTZ from Washington. They
of
were headed back to the Coeur d'Alene from Spokane. HANSEN stated he had one "dirty" urine sample in July
2018 since he's been on probation. HANSEN stated the "dirty'' urine analysis was caused from alcohol use.
HANSEN denied consent for me to search the vehicle despite the signed probation agreement. I asked HANSEN
to walk ahead of the Volkswagen, so I could speak with the other occupants.
10. I asked WILTZ to exit the vehicle. WILTl consented to· a pat down. I patted down WILTZ for weapons in front
of my patrol vehicle. No weapons were located. WILTZ stated he did not own anything Inside the vehicle. I asked
WILTZ to walk ahead of the Volkswagen, so I could speak with CLIFTON.
11. Corporal Andy Hodl of the Idaho State Police arrived on scene to assist.
12. While waiting for the returns from the Idaho State Police Dispatch, I asked CLIFTON to exit the vehicle.
CLIFTON consented to a pat down: CLIFTON had a big bulge inside his left pocket. CLIFTON gave me consent
to search his pocket. Inside his pocket was a piece of rolled up tin foil (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02), four
ReportOll1cer
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"Starburst" candies and a small SIM card. CLIFTON stated the black backpack inside the Volkswagen belonged
to him and he owned nothing else inside the vehicle. I asked CLIFTON to remove his black backpack and place it
outside the vehicle because CLIFTON was not on probation.
13. According to the Idaho State Police Dispatch, HANSEN's probation officer was listed as Christine Juvan
through, the Idaho Department of Corrections. I left a voice mail with HANSEN's probation officer to speak with her
about HANSEN and to let her know about the traffic stop. I did not receive a return phone call from HANSEN's
probation officer. I asked for an on call probation officer. The Idaho State Police Dispatch stated there were no on
call probation officers available.
14. Based on.the totality of the traffic stop, I searched the Volkswagen. Underneath the radio was a black "DARE"
pouch, which was labeled, "DARE to resist drugs and violence" (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02). Inside the pouch
was folded up tin foil (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02). In the center console were two empty "dime" baggies. The
"dime" baggies were black with gold "skulls" (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02). Based on my training and
experience, tin foi! is used commonly by drug users as a surface to heat drugs, so then it can be smoked. "Dime"
baggies are commonly used to possess and hold drugs. Underneath the front, driver's seat was another piece of
tin foil, which contained a dark brown residue consist with black tar heroin (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02). Inside
HANSEN's (blue and black) backpack was a roll and box of tin foil and a digital scale, which contained a dark,
brown residue consist with black tar heroin (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02). The backpack also contained a book
or journal, which contained drawings and words. Written inside the book was the word, "Sinner." On the back,
driver's seat next to HANSEN's (blue and black) backpack was a smaller black and grey, zippered pouch (drug
paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02) and a handheld torch lighter, which is commonly used by drug users to heat drugs.
Inside the pouch were two of the same black "dime" baggies with gold "skulls." The baggies contained a dark,
brown and sticky substance (Exhibit 03). Based on my training and experience, I recognized the substance to be
heroin. There were two pieces of foil, one contained a dark, brown residue (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02) and
there were also eight pipes, which contained a dark, brown residue (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02) again consist
with heroin. I asked CLIFTON if the black and grey pouch was his possession. CLIFTON had been sitting in
close proximity to where the pouch was located. CLIFTON initially denied ownership of the pouch. CLIFTON then
admitted to possessing the black and grey pouch, which was a contrast to what CLIFTON originally stated when
he said he only possessed the black backpack. I asked CLIFTON how much heroin was inside the black and grey
pouch. CLIFTON stated, "I think it's only like three, four points." CLIFTON stated he was not on probation.
15. I placed CLIFtON under arrest for Possession of Heroin and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. I placed
CLIFTON in handcuffs. I checked the handcuffs for proper fit and double locked them. I placed CLIFTON into the
rear, passenger side of my patrol vehicle. I read CLIFTON the Miranda warning. CLIFTON again admitted to
possessing the heroin and drug paraphernalia located inside the black and grey pouch.
16. I continued the search of the Volkswagen. Inside the trunk was a black, plastic container (drug paraphernalia)
(Exhibit 02), which contained another digital scale, which contained the same dark, brown residue (drug
paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02). There was a gold tin, which had a variety of words written on it, including, "Sinner."
Next to the gold tin was a "zebra" print and zippered pouch (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02). The pouch
contained the following contraband and items:
a)
A. Glass, methamphetamine pipe with a clear, rock like residue wrapped In a black cloth (drug paraphernali
(Exhibit 02)
B. Two digital scales (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02)
C. Small container, which contained a clear, rock like residue (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02)
D. Black "LG" cell phone (Exhibit 04)
E. Plastic container with numerous empty black "dime" baggies with gold "skulls" (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit
02). One of the "dime" baggies contained four SIM cards (Exhibit 05).
F. Another plastic container (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02) with two playing cards: a "Joker" and one labeled,
"Gemaco. Safety Peek. Sharps." Inside this container were eight "dime" baggies, which all contained a clear, rock
like substance (Exhibit 01). Based on my training and experience, I recognized the substance to be
Report Off,cer
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gold "skulls." The others were labeled with "8
methamphetamine.· Four out of the eight baggies were black with
balls."
G. Small measuring spoon (drug paraphernalia) (Exhibit 02)
ine with Intent to Deliver and Possession of
17. I placed HANSEN under arrest for Possessior) of Methamphetam
ffs for proper fit and double locked
handcu
the
Drug Paraphernalia. I placed HANSEN in handcuffs. I checked
N into the rear, driver's side of my.
HANSE
placed
I
ine.
phetam
them. HANSEN denied ownership of the metham
'
patrol vehicle.
voice mail with HANSEN's probation officer.
18. The Idaho State Dispatch informed me they had also left a
19. CLIFTON denied ownership of the methamphetamine.
and white "iPhone" (Exhibit 06) on the back,
20. I continued the search of the Volkswagen. There was a gold
mounted on the front dash, by the driver's seat.
passenger seat and a copper "Samsung Galaxy S7" (Exhibit 07)
the cell phones and SIM cards from the
CLIFTON took ownership of the "iPhone" and "Samsung." I seized
the search of the Volkswagen.
ed
conclud
I
e.
Volkswagen. I photographed the vehicle and evidenc
21. l secured the evidence into my patrol vehicle.
22. With HANSEN's permission, I released the Volkswagen to WILTZ.
Jail.
23. l transported HANSEN and CLIFTON to the Kootenai County
the clear, rock like substance (Exhibit 01}. It
24. At the jail, I weighed the eight dime baggies, which contained
e receipt for the methamphetamine (Exhibit
evidenc
an
weighed approximately 6.6 grams. ! later left HANSEN with
and four SIM cards (Exhibit 05). I also later left
01 ), drug paraphernalia (Exhibit 02), •LG" cell phone (Exhibit 04)
paraphernalia (Exhibit 02), iPhone (Exhibit 06)
CLIFTON with an evidence receipt for the heroin (Exhibit 03), drug
and "Samsung Galaxy S7'' cell phone (Exhibit 07).
sion of Methamphetamine With Intent to Deliver:
25. I booked HANSEN into the Kootenai County Jail for Posses
I.C. 37-2734A (1).
I.C. 37-2732(a) (1) (A) and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia:
sion of Heroin: I.C. 37-2732(c) (1) and Possession
26. I booked CLIFTON into the Kootenai County Jail for Posses
of Drug Paraphernalia: I.C. 37-2734A (1).
the clear, rock like substance (Exhibit 01)
27. At the Idaho State Police district office in Coeur d'Alene, I tested
ptive positive for methamphetamine. I tested the
with the Narcotic Identification Kit (NIK) and it came back presum
ation Kit (NIK) and it came back
Identific
c
dark brown and sticky substance (Exhibit 03) with the Narcoti
and it came back with a weight of
baggies
dime
the
inside
heroin
presumptive positive for heroin. I weighed the
approximately 1'. O grams.
State Police district office at 615 West Wilbur
28. I secured the evidence into temporary storage at the Idaho
Avenue in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.
office, Trooper Cody Ercanbrack and I packaged
29. On September 25th, 2018 at the Idaho State Police district
Exhibits 01-07. I took additional photographs of the evidence.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the LL{ day of December, 2018, addressed
to:
Kootenai County Prosecutor Via iCourt@ kcpaicourts@kcgov.us

NOTICE OF HEARING
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Electronically Filed
12/26/2018 1:23 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way/P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone Number: (208) 446-1800
Email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us

Assigned Attorney
Stanley T. Mortensen Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CR28-18-15354

vs.
MOTION TO CONTINUE
CODY LEIGH HANSEN,
Defendant.
COMES NOW, BARRY MCHUGH, Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, Idaho,
and hereby moves the above entitled Court for an Order to continue the Motion to Suppress
scheduled for the 11th day of January 2019, before the Honorable Judge Meyer. This motion is
made for the reason that the officer involved is not available for said hearing. The officer
involved is unavailable January 10th and 11th, but is available any other day in January 2019.
For these reasons, the State respectfully requests that this court reschedule the abovementioned
hearing for a date other than January 10th and 11th, 2019.

MOTION TO CONTINUE
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Dated this 26th day of December, 2018.
BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

Stanley T. Mortensen
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of December, 2018, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was caused to be delivered as follows:
mailed
faxed r1 hand delivered
emailed
JusticeWeb P ICourts
Kootenai County Public Defender
Benjamin M Onosko

r

r

r

r

MOTION TO CONTINUE

Page 112

Filed: 01/02/2019 09:59:38
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CR28-18-15354

vs.
ORDER TO CONTINUE
CODY LEIGH HANSEN,
Defendant.
The Court having before it the above Motion to Continue, and good cause appearing now,
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Suppress in above entitled matter set for 11th
day of January 2019

is hereby continued and to be re-set on the _ _
__
16th

day of

_ _January
_ _ _ _ _ ,20_.
19 at 9:00 a.m.

Signed: 1/2/2019 09:15 AM

ENTERED this __ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ , 20_.

ORDER TO CONTINUE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 1/2/2019 10:00 AM
I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of _
_ _ _ _ _ , 20_ that a true and con-ect copy of the
foregoing was delivered as indicated below:
✓

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney (email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us)
Coeur d'Alene Prosecuting Attorney (email: cdaprosnotices@cdaid.org)
Post Falls Prosecuting Attorney (email: legalservices@postfallspolice.com)
Rathdrum Prosecuting Attorney (email: legalservices@postfallspolice.com)
Kootenai County Public Defender (email: pdfax@kcgov.us)
✓
Defendant/Defendant's Attorney: pdfax @kc gov. us
Kootenai County Warrants (email: warrants@kcgov.us)
Kootenai County Jail (j ailpw@kcgov.us)
_ _ Kootenai County Work Release (email: workrelease@kcgov.us)
Community Service (email: jhicks@kcgov.us)
Adult Misdemeanor Probation (email: kcmp@kcgov.us)
Probation & Parole (email: distl@idoc.idaho.gov;
ccdsentencingteam@idoc.idaho.gov)
Idaho Department of Transportation (fax: 208-334-8739)
BCI (fax: 208-884-7193)
Idaho Department of Corrections (email: centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov)
Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

JIM BRANNON

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

ORDER TO CONTINUE
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Electronically Filed
1/15/2019 4:38 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

BARRY McHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
501 Government Way/P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone:
(208)446-1800
Facsimile:
(208)446-1833

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
v.
)
)
CODY L. HANSEN,
)
Defendant.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

CASE NO. CR28-18-15354
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS

COMES NOW the State, by and through Stanley T. Mortensen, Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, and hereby submits its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Suppress.
FACTS

On September 15, 2018, at approximately 6:25 a.m., Cody L. Hansen (the Defendant)
was driving a vehicle eastbound on Interstate 90 (1-90) in Kootenai County, Idaho, at
approximately milepost three (3). The Defendant had two (2) passengers with him: front-seat
passenger Robert R. Wiltz and rear-seat passenger Steven J. Clifton. 1-90 at this location is a
controlled access highway, with both east and westbound lanes divided by both concrete jersey
barriers and a wide median containing dirt, grass, and other natural objects. Specifically, along
this portion of the highway, 1-90 contains two (2) eastbound lanes and two (2) westbound lanes.
The eastbound lanes are divided by a white hashed line; as are the westbound lanes.
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Idaho State Police Sergeant (Sgt.) C. Sproat was on duty in his patrol vehicle traveling
along I-90 behind the Defendant. Sgt. Sproat observed the Defendant’s vehicle traveling in the
left eastbound lane. Sgt. Sproat observed the Defendant’s vehicle partially drift from the left
lane and into the right lane, to the point where the Defendant’s vehicle was straddling both
eastbound lanes for a period of time. Sgt. Sproat observed that when the Defendant’s vehicle did
this, no turn signal was used. Sgt. Sproat then observed the Defendant’s vehicle drift entirely
back into the left lane. Again, Sgt. Sproat observed that when the Defendant’s vehicle did this,
no turn signal was used.
Sgt. Sproat initiated a traffic stop of the Defendant’s vehicle and contacted its occupants.
Immediately upon contacting the Defendant and his passenger’s, Sgt. Sproat advised the
Defendant of the reason for the stop. Sgt. Sproat then briefly asked the occupants about their
travel plans before asking the Defendant for his driver’s license and proof of the vehicle’s
registration and insurance. Sgt. Sproat also identified both passengers at this time. Sgt. Sproat
observed that Wiltz was not wearing his seatbelt; a violation of Idaho Code §49-673. The
Defendant was unable to provide Sgt. Sproat with proof of his vehicle’s registration and
insurance; a violation of Idaho Code §§49-1229 and 49-1428. Sgt. Sproat asked the occupants if
there were any illegal substances in the vehicle; specifically, marijuana, cocaine, and
methamphetamine. Sgt. Sproat was told there were no illegal substances in the vehicle. Sgt.
Sproat asked, if a K9 were to arrive on scene, would it alert on anything in the vehicle. Sgt.
Sproat was told no. When asked, the Defendant advised Sgt. Sproat that he (the Defendant) was
on probation and had a probation officer.
Sgt. Sproat returned to his patrol vehicle to have his dispatch center verify the
Defendant’s driver’s license and to have all of the occupants checked for warrants. While
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waiting for his dispatch center to provide the requested information, Sgt. Sproat re-contacted the
Defendant and asked him to exit the vehicle and talk with him on the side of the road; with the
intention of asking the Defendant for consent to search the vehicle. As Sgt. Sproat began
discussing the fact that the Defendant was on probation, Sgt. Sproat’s dispatch center provided
Sgt. Sproat with the requested information for the Defendant and Wiltz; but not yet Clifton.
Immediately after getting this information, Sgt. Sproat confirmed with the Defendant that
he (the Defendant) had signed a Fourth Amendment waiver as part of his conditions of
probation.

Having recently attended training with the Probation and Parole Department

concerning the nature of a probationer’s Fourth Amendment waiver, Sgt. Sproat decided he was
going to search the Defendant’s vehicle pursuant to the Defendant’s admitted waiver. However,
knowing that the Defendant had a probation officer, Sgt. Sproat wanted to report to the probation
officer concerning the Defendant’s level of cooperation during the traffic stop. Sgt. Sproat then
asked the Defendant for consent to search his vehicle. The Defendant did not immediately tell
Sgt. Sproat, “yes” or “no.” The Defendant’s responses moved from, “I thought you could just
search” to “yeah, if you have to, yeah.” In an effort to get a clear, “yes” or “no” from the
Defendant, Sgt. Sproat asked again for consent and was ultimately told, “no.”
Sgt. Sproat then had each of the passengers exit the vehicle, before consensually frisking
them. Once all of the occupants were out of the vehicle, Sgt. Sproat had each passenger remove
their belongings from the Defendant’s vehicle. Then, Sgt. Sproat began working on the citations
he had decided to issue. Once these things were done, and with another officer on scene to
assist, Sgt. Sproat began searching the Defendant’s vehicle. In the Defendant’s vehicle, Sgt.
Sproat located many items of evidentiary value, to include: controlled substances and drug
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paraphernalia. The Defendant was arrested and transported to jail where he was booked for
possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia.

LAW AND ARGUMENT
1. Sergeant Sproat had reasonable articulable suspicion, if not probable cause, to

believe the Defendant's vehicle was being driven in violation of Idaho Code. As
such, the stop of the vehicle was reasonable and did not violate the Defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights.
A stop and investigatory detention is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). An officer may stop and detain an
individual if, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer has a reasonable suspicion,
based on specific and articulable facts, that the individual has been, is, or is about to engage in
criminal activity. See Terry; State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930 (1992); State v. Gallegos, 120
Idaho 894 (1991); State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873 (1987); and State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920
(1974). While a traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, ordinary
and routine traffic stops are more analogous to a Terry stop than an arrest.

Berkemer v.

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). A traffic stop is justified if the officer has reasonable suspicion
to believe the driver committed a traffic offense. State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 442 (2015).
The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but more than mere
speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205 (Ct.App.1998);
See State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10 (Ct.App.1994) (Abrogated on other grounds); State v.
Emory, 119 Idaho 661 (Ct.App.1991). "The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality
of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop." Neal, 159 Idaho at
443 (quoting State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013)). "Reasonable suspicion must be
based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those
facts." Id. (quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). Violations of the Idaho traffic
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code furnish probable cause to stop a motor vehicle. Matter of Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364 (1987);
See State v. Fanning, 117 Idaho 655 (Ct.App.1990); State v. Ryan, 117 Idaho 504
(Ct.App.1990).
Idaho Code §49-637(1) provides: "Whenever any highway has been divided into two (2)
or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following, in addition to all else, shall apply: (1) A
vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be
moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with
safety."
"The stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of all its occupants and is subject to Fourth
Amendment standards." State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 6 (Ct.App.2009). "Because a seizure
results in restrictions to an individual's personal freedom, any individual in a seized vehicle has
standing to challenge the validity and reasonableness of the stop." Id. "Any evidence seized
pursuant to an unlawful stop or an unreasonable detention is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and is,
therefore, inadmissible." Id.; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
In the case at hand, Sgt. Sproat observed the Defendant's vehicle partially drift from the
left lane and into the right lane, to the point where the Defendant's vehicle was straddling both
eastbound lanes for a period of time. Sgt. Sproat observed that when the Defendant's vehicle did
this, no turn signal was used. Sgt. Sproat then observed the Defendant's vehicle drift entirely
back into the left lane. Again, Sgt. Sproat observed that when the Defendant's vehicle did this,
no turn signal was used. As such, the warrantless stop of the Defendant's vehicle did not violate
the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
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2. The duration of the traffic stop was not unlawfully prolonged.
Because a traffic stop is limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an investigative
detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641 (Ct.App.2008). An
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop. See State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608 (2016); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176
(Ct.App.2004); State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647 (Ct.App.2002). There is no rigid time-limit for
determining when a detention has lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court must consider the
scope of the detention and the law enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the duration of
the stop. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886
(Ct.App.2008).
"Authority for the seizure [] ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are - or
reasonably should have been - completed." Linze, 161 Idaho at 608. When a person is detained,
the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. See Roe;
Ramirez; State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357 (Ct.App.2000). The scope of the intrusion permitted
will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. See Roe;
Ramirez; Parkinson. However, brief inquiries not otherwise related to the initial purpose of the
stop do not necessarily violate a detainee' s Fourth Amendment rights. See Roe; Ramirez. Any
routine traffic stop might turn up suspicious circumstances that could justify an officer asking
further questions unrelated to the stop.

See Ramirez; State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608

(Ct.App.1990).
Typically, a reasonable investigation of a traffic stop may include asking for the driver's
license, registration and insurance, requesting the driver to sit in the patrol car, asking the driver
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about his destination and purpose, and determining whether there are outstanding warrants
against the driver. See Ramirez; Parkinson; and State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476 (Ct.App.2015).
During the course of a lawful traffic stop, general questioning on topics unrelated to the purpose
of the stop is permissible as long as it does not expand the duration of the stop. See Ramirez;
Stewart; see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005). Brief, general questions about drugs and
weapons, in and of themselves do not extend an otherwise lawful detention.

See Ramirez;

Parkinson; State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560 (Ct.App.2005). A mere brief request for consent to a
search during or at the conclusion of an otherwise valid detention does not impermissibly extend
a traffic stop. See Ramirez; State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848 (Ct.App.2000).
"Although an investigative detention must ordinarily last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop, a detention initiated for one investigative purpose may
disclose suspicious circumstances that justify expanding the investigation to other possible
crimes." State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916 (Ct.App.2001). It is well established that "[t]he
purpose of a stop is not permanently fixed at the moment the stop is initiated, for during the
course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of criminality different from that which
initially prompted the stop." Hays, 159 Idaho at 482-83; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362.
A stop will remain a reasonable seizure as long as the officer is diligently pursuing the
purpose of the stop, for which there is reasonable suspicion to support. Linze, 161 Idaho at 609.

If the officer abandons the purpose of the stop, the original reasonable suspicion no longer
supports the stop. Id. When the original purpose for the stop is abandoned, a new seizure with a
new purpose is initiated. Id. Unless this new seizure is justified by its own new reasonable
suspicion, the abandonment of the original purpose for the stop serves to violate the seized
party's Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
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At no time during his traffic stop did Sgt. Sproat ever abandon the original purpose for
the stop. In the case at hand, the underlying justification for the traffic stop was Sgt. Sproat's
observation of a traffic violation. Having pulled the Defendant over for this traffic violation, Sgt.
Sproat was lawful in contacting the Defendant to advise him of the reasons for the stop and
request his driver's license and proof of vehicle registration and insurance. It was during this
interaction with the Defendant that Sgt. Sproat observed Wiltz was not wearing his seatbelt.
This observation provided Sgt. Sproat with the legal justification to expand the purpose of the
traffic stop to include Wiltz's violation of Idaho's seatbelt law.

Upon speaking with the

Defendant, Sgt. Sproat discovered that the Defendant was unable to provide proof of his
vehicle's registration and insurance; additional violations of Idaho law.

Additionally, upon

speaking with the Defendant during the traffic stop, Sgt. Sproat discovered the Defendant was on
supervised probation. Knowing that the Defendant was on supervised probation and in violation
of several Idaho laws, Sgt. Sproat was reasonable in wanting to report to the Defendant's
probation officer regarding the traffic stop and the Defendant's level of cooperation. It was for
these reasons that Sgt. Sproat first desired to ask the Defendant for consent to search his vehicle.

3. The search of the Defendant's vehicle was conducted to his previous, voluntarily
given, consent.
"Establishing that a search is reasonable ordinarily reqmres that the government
demonstrate probable cause to a neutral magistrate and obtain a particularized warrant
authorizing the search."

State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 747 (Ct.App.2011).

"There are,

however, limited exceptions to the warrant requirement for intrusions that are reasonable under
the circumstances, such as searches conducted with consent voluntarily given by a person who
has the authority to do so." Id. "Idaho precedent holds that a felony probationer's consent to
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searches incorporated as a condition of probation provides justification for warrantless searches
of the probationer's residence." Id.
The State believes that the question of whether or not a probationer may deny or revoke
consent is a matter of first impression in Idaho. Id. (Footnote 3); State v. Jaskowski, 163 Idaho
257 (2018) (Footnote 2).

However, the Court's logic in State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584

(Ct.App.584) is valuable in answering this question. While the facts of Ellis may be different
from those in the case at hand, the Court held that a parolee may not unilaterally suspend his
parole agreement by committing a wrongful act because to do so would allow the parolee to be
able to commit further parole violations with impunity. Id. 589. Additionally, the Court held
that "applicable terms and conditions of [] parole, such as [a] Fourth Amendment waiver,
remain[] operative until revoked through a due process hearing." Id. at 590.
In the case at hand, this Court should find that Fourth Amendment waivers pursuant to
probation agreements should be treated the same as those found within parole agreements. This
Court should not allow the Defendant to revoke his previously given consent on the side of the
road, unilaterally, and in a setting other than in a formal due process hearing.
CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court deny the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Date this 15th day of January, 2019.

STANLEY T. MORTENSEN
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 15 th day of January, 2019, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was caused to be delivered as follows:
mailed
faxed r1 hand delivered P
emailed
JusticeWeb P !Courts
Kootenai County Public Defender
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Description CR28-18-15354 Hansen, Cody Leigh 20190116 Motion to Suppress
Judge Meyer
Clerk Denice Larsen
Court Reporter Diane Bolan
Location lKCRTl0

Date 1/16/2019
I

Time

I Speaker

Note

09:01:30
AM

Judge
Meyer

Calls case. Def present in custody. Ben Onosko for def. Stan
Mortensen for state.

09:05:42
AM

Judge
Meyer

Brief recess.

09:05:49
AM

Judge
Meyer

Back on the record.

09:27:55
AM

Stan
There was a warrantless seizure and search. I would argue it is consent
Mortensen search. Call PO Chris Juvan

09 :28:33
AM

F

09:28:49
AM
-

Chris
Juvan

I am employed with IDOC Probation and Parole Adult Felony. I am a
PO. I am POST certified. Cody Leigh Hansen is my probationer. I first
began supervising him in June 2018. I met with him in person, he
identified himself to me. He is in the courtroom today seated across
from me wearing a Kootenai County Jail suit next to defense counsel.

Chris
Juvan

I went over the probation packet with him. Sometimes we have the
judgment, if we don't we still do the orientation and review the
agreement of supervision. July 26, 2018 I went over the agreement of
supervision with Mr. Hansen. We review each bulleted item to
confirm understanding and ensure they don't have any further
questions. He acknowledged the agreement. I resolved all the
questions he had. He initialed each condition indicating he agreed and
signed the bottom of it.

Chris
Juvan

Re PL 1--the agreement of supervision that I reviewed with Mr.
Hansen and confirmed his understanding and witnessed his signature.
He initialed each condition. Condition number 5 deals with searches.
Reads condition number 5.

09:31:01
AM

09:33: 17
AM

09:35:05
AM
I
09:35:09
AM
I

Swears witness

Stan
Move to admit PL 1
Mortensen
Ben
Onosko

No objection
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09:35: 13
AM

Judge
Meyer

PL 1 is admitted.

09:35:26
AM

Chris
Juvan

He never asked me to modify the conditions of probation. 09-15-18 I
was supervising Mr. Hansen.

09:36:21
AM

Ben
Onosko

Cross

09:36:24
AM

Chris
Juvan

The conditions don't say that the condition is irrevocable.

09:36:45
AM
-

Judge
Meyer

Witness excused.

09:36:56
AM
-

Stan
Call Curtis Sproat
Mortensen

09:37:01
AM
-

F

09:37:46
AM
-

Curt
Sproat

I am a Sgt. with the ISP. I am POST certified. 09/15/18 I was POST
certified. Describes duties. 09/15/18 I was working. About 6:25 I was
on patrol in Kootenai County on I-90. I was traveling eastbound and
was in the left lane, I observed a vehicle ahead of me drift from the
left lane to the right lane and then back to the left lane. I didn't see any
tum signals.

Curt
Sproat

The vehicle straddled the dash line, it didn't go completely into the
right land. No tum signals were used. It straddled the line for a few
seconds. I was following the vehicle. There were no obstructions in
the highway. It was a Saturday morning, there were vehicles on the
roadway. When I see a vehicle drift into another lane that is
concerning, they could drift or crash into another vehicle.

Curt
Sproat

I activated my overhead emergency lights and made a traffic stop on
the vehicle. I was wearing a uniform and in a marked patrol vehicle.
My vehicle has a dash cam. I was not wearing a body cam. This traffic
stop was captured on my dash cam. The drifting into the other lane my
camera didn't pick up. I was probably half a mile away from the
vehicle. It was daytime and the sun was starting to come up. The
weather was clear. There were no obstructions between me and the
vehicle.

Curt
Sproat

I saw the drifting with my own eyes. The vehicle pulled over for me.
The right tum signal was on. I approached the vehicle on the
passenger side. As I was coming to a stop, it was a Volkswagen
Passat, there were furtive movements in the back seat. The driver had
rolled down the window. There were three occupants in the vehicle. I
explained why they were being pulled over.

09:40:03
AM

09:42:23
AM

09:44:32
AM

I 09:46:01

Swears witness

!curt

The driver and front passenger were not wearing seatbelts. I asked the
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AM

--

09:47: 19
AM
-

09:48:25
AM
-

Sproat

Curt
Sproat

He told me he had bought the vehicle and he had yet to register it. He
later said he made a down payment on it. He said he had a bill of sale
at his residence. He started to talk something about his driver's license
but didn't have a copy of his insurance.

Curt
Sproat

I was thinking of writing citations for the seatbelts. I asked him where
he lived, he said he lived in Idaho but he had a Washington driver's
license. He said he didn't know it or didn't have the address
memorized. He never gave me his address, proof of insurance or
registration.

Curt
Sproat

He told me he was on probation. I called for a K-9 to the scene based
on things I saw. I asked the occupants ifthere was anything illegal in
the vehicle. I saw furtive movements in the vehicle. The right tum
signal stayed on during the traffic stop. Mr. Hansen immediately broke
eye contact when I asked if there was anything I needed to know about
in the vehicle.

Curt
Sproat

I requested a K-9 I think within a couple minutes of the traffic stop. I
was still on the passenger side of the vehicle. It didn't add any time to
the traffic stop. A K-9 didn't arrive on scene, dispatch said one wasn't
available. I was not waiting for a K-9 to arrive.

09:50:00
AM

09:53:22
AM

driver for his license, registration and proof of insurance and asked the
occupants for their licenses. The driver identified himself as Cody
Leigh Hansen with his Washington driver's license. He is seated at the
defendant's table in an orange jump suit. He didn't give me the proof
of insurance or registration.

09:55:08
AM

Stan
We have an agreement to the dash cam, PL 2. Move to admit PL 2 and
Mortensen seek to publish it.

09:55:33
AM

Ben
Onosko

No objection

09:55:35
AM

Judge
Meyer

PL 2 is admitted. You may publish.

09:57:03
AM

Stan
Publishes PL 2.
Mortensen

09:57:58
AM

Curt
Sproat

09:58: 15
AM

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

09:59:48
AM

Curt
Sproat

10:00:00
AM

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

Corporal Andy Hodl joined me at some point in the traffic stop.

The back passenger was moving, there were furtive movements going
on.
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Curt
Sproat

I spoke with all three occupants and let the driver know why I pulled
them over. I asked for ID. The back passenger didn't have ID, so I
asked him to write down his information.

I

10:02: 16
AM
-

Before I expanded this video there is an option to de-activate the in car
Stan
Mortensen audio and I did that so there wasn't as much background noise.

I

10:03:05
AM
-

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

10:05:42
AM
Curt
Sproat

I

10:07:43
AM
-

~
M

I

10:09:28
AM

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen
Curt
Sproat

~
I

10: 13:35
AM

Curt
Sproat

My patrol car backed up a little bit. I was feeling a little uneasiness
and wanted to distance myself a little if I had to protect myself. It had
a lot to do with the furtive movements. I asked dispatch to get the PO
for Mr. Hansen and log it into our system so I could go back into it
and make a phone call. I still didn't have Mr. Hansen's current address
to write him a ticket.

Curt
Sproat

PO's have the current addresses of their probationers. This is a way for
me to find out the information I need to write the ticket. I had
determined that I would call the PO

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

10: 14:49
AM
Curt
Sproat

I

10: 16:22
AM

I saw additional furtive movements while I was up at the front
window. I asked ifhe was looking for his ID, I don't recall his answer,
but he didn't have an ID. I don't know what he was reaching for.

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

10: 11 :23
AM

M

I asked the defendant ifhe lived in Spokane Valley. He told me he
lives in Idaho but didn't know his address by heart. He told me he was
on probation and who his PO was. Dispatch said the K-9 wasn't
coming. This was while I was waiting for the information for the
citations. I came back to my patrol car to run the driver's information
as well as the other occupants. I did it through dispatch. I asked
dispatch to run the driver first.

I had been waiting in my car for information from dispatch. I got out
to see if the driver had the address. I wanted to speak to him outside
the vehicle about his probation. He noted he was on probation for
possession of a controlled substance. My intention was to ask for
consent to search the vehicle. I still don't have the defendant's or the
passenger who was not wearing the seatbelt information.

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen
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I

10: 17:37
AM
10: 19:23
AM
-

I

10:20:37
AM
-

~
M

I

10:23:05
AM
10:24:03
AM
-

10:25:33
AM

I

10:27:52
AM

Curt
Sproat

I asked the driver if he had his address yet. When I reapproached he
was looking at his cell phone that was mounted to the dash. He did not
have his address. I asked him to step out of the vehicle.

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen
Curt
Sproat

Dispatch told me the status of Mr. Hansen and the front passenger,
Mr. Wiltz, driver's license. I still didn't have Mr. Hansen's address for
the ticket. I asked him about his probation and work before dispatch
called. My intentions were to ask for consent to search the vehicle.

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen
Curt
Sproat

I asked him if there was a fourth amendment waiver with his probation
and he said there was. He agreed that he signed it. I have had training
regarding probation and fourth amendment waivers.

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

Curt
Sproat

I asked who owned the backpacks in the vehicle. The others weren't
on probation so I wanted a distinction of what items were Mr.
Hansen's. I intended on searching the vehicle. I didn't feel like it was
my role to search the occupants possessions because they weren't on
probation.

Curt
Sproat

I asked him consent to search. It is nice for the PO's to know of their
level of cooperation with me. At first he said he was not comfortable
with searching, but said yeah if you have to. I was going to search the
car whether or not he gave consent because of the fourth amendment
waiver.

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

10:32:20
AM
Curt
Sproat

He ultimately told me no to search. Mr. Hansen goes up the road and
then I patted the front passenger down. I asked the back passenger,
Mr. Clifton which backpack was his. He put it roadside. The other
passenger Mr. Wiltz said he did not own anything in the vehicle. Mr.
Clifton also consented to a pat down. Officer Hodl was not there yet. I
haven't began to write the ticket yet. I was going to search the vehicle.

I

10:34:26
AM

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

I

10:35:58
AM

Curt
Sproat

I

10:36:39
AM

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

At this time I was talking to Corporal Andy Hodl. He just arrived on
scene. At this point I am going to get Mr. Clifton out of the car.
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Curt
Sproat

At this point I am done dealing with Mr. Clifton. I am about to call the
PO to find out Mr. Hansen's address for the ticket and to update her of
his level of cooperation. There is a huge benefit to calling the PO for
information.

10:42 :44
AM

Judge
Meyer

Recess.

10:42:54
AM

Judge
Meyer

Back on the record.

10:54:22
AM

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

10:57:09
AM

Curt
Sproat

10:57:41
AM

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

10:58:27
-AM

Curt
Sproat

10:59:05
AM

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

10:41 :26
AM

11 :05:03
-AM

Curt
Sproat

I called the PO but she didn't answer. I asked her to call me back. I
attempted to have dispatch give me the on call PO's number.

I wanted to give the assigned PO time and opportunity to call me. I
haven't searched the vehicle yet, but I still intended to search

I wrote out seatbelt violations. It is an electronic ticket. I was talking
while I was writing the ticket. It didn't slow my ticket process down. I
still didn't have Mr. Hansen's address. I asked Corporal Hodl to go
back to his vehicle to read through the criminal history returns on the
occupants.

I

11:07:58
AM

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

I

11:12:36
AM

Curt
Sproat

I

11:13:03
AM

Stan
Continues to publish PL 2.
Mortensen

I finished another ticket related to the traffic stop. I asked dispatch if
there was an on call PO, they said there was not one.

Curt
Sproat

I was speaking to Sgt. Hodl. We are debating on whether or not to
search. I found the evidence charged against Mr. Hansen. I went to
POST. I wrote a true and accurate report. It would be very tedious to
put everything in the report. I testified today to things I didn't put in
the police report.

Judge
Meyer

Did you ever serve the seatbelt tickets on them?

I

11 :20:21
AM

Curt
Sproat

Yes

I

11 :20:42
AM

IBen

Cross.

11:17:18
AM

I 11 :20:43
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I

AM

--

lonosko

AM

Curt
Sproat

I pulled Mr. Hansen over for crossing the lane divider. I gave him a
verbal warning I believe at some time during the course of the
investigation. Most likely it would be on the video. I didn't give him a
ticket for no insurance or no registration.

11:21:56

Curt
Sproat

He crossed onto the line for a few seconds. There was no one in the
next lane when he did that. I see a lot of people driving.

11:20:51
--

AM
11 :22:28

AM

--

11 :22 :34

AM
11:22:37

AM
11 :23:09

AM
11 :23:12

AM

~
M

Stan
Objection, irrelevant and beyond scope
Mortensen
Judge
Meyer

Overruled.

Curt
Sproat

I don't think it is common, but I have seen driver's cross onto the lines
for a second of two.

Stan
Objection, irrelevant.
Mortensen
Judge
Meyer

Overruled.

Curt
Sproat

I have crossed over lane dividers before. I didn't tum on my lights
immediately after seeing the land crossing. I continued to follow him.
I didn't see any other driving infractions.

Curt
Sproat

The front passenger has an Idaho driver's license with his address. I
can still write a ticket with no address, but it can present problems for
identification. There are some people that don't know their address so
I have done it before.

Curt
Sproat

I asked dispatch to run criminal history for the occupants which they
would log into our system. Any officers can look at that information. I
hadn't had the opportunity to look at that information, so I asked
Corporal Hodl to look at it and relay the information to me.

Curt
Sproat

All the probation and parole records indicate is the name, dob,
physicals and who their PO is. I believe there is a case number on
there too. It is my responsibility to do a thorough investigation. If I am
missing pieces I can proceed but it is not preferred.

11 :25:00

AM

11 :26:24

AM

11 :28: 15

AM

11 :30:35
I

AM
11:31:00

I

AM

~
M

Stan
Objection, best evidence, irrelevant.
Mortensen
Judge
Meyer

Sustained.

Curt
Sproat

It was about half an hour from the time Mr. Hansen got out of the
vehicle to when I searched the vehicle. I don't believe I asked him if
he got his address after he got out of the vehicle.
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11:33:14
AM

~
M

Curt
Sproat

When I asked the occupants in the vehicle if they had drugs in the car,
Mr. Hansen broke eye contact with me and looked down. I laid out
what I was observing, at least to try to help him see it from my view.
The main thing I observed was that he broke eye contact. What I
observed was that he looked forward.

Curt
Sproat

I spoke to Officer Hodl briefly when he arrived. I said he had given
consent to search but then withdrew consent. I know I wanted to
clarify him with his PO his probation status.

I

11 :37:38
AM

Stan
Objection, speculation.
Mortensen
Judge
Meyer

Overruled.

I

11:37:47
AM

Curt
Sproat

I was talking to Hodl about what I had on the traffic stop. My thought
process was that based on Mr. Hansen stating he was on probation and
signed the waiver, the PO didn't return my call, there was no on call
PO, so based on all that I said I would be conducting a search.

Curt
Sproat

I called the PO first off to see how the PO is doing. And I still didn't
have a valid address for him. PO's have current addresses. I asked to
speak to an on call PO. They have access to all the information. I
knew they would have a lot more information than I would.

Curt
Sproat

I asked dispatch to see if I could talk to an on call PO after I wrote the
tickets. Once we start a ticket and even print a ticket, there is an option
to edit it. I like to do a thorough investigation and having the address
is part of that.

11 :41 :07
AM

Curt
Sproat

I understand that I am not a PO and don't have the same
responsibilities they do.

11 :41 :28
AM

Stan
Objection, relevance.
Mortensen

11:41:33
AM

Ben
Onosko

The state was allowed to ask about his training. I want to see what his
powers are to probationers.

11 :42:03
AM

Judge
Meyer

Sustained.

11 :42:24
AM

Stan
Objection. Re PL 1. We have the waiver on file and is illustrative to
Mortensen what Mr. Hansen consented to when placed on probation.

11 :43: 17
AM

Judge
Meyer

11 :43:48
AM

Stan
Objection, relevance, facts not in evidence.
Mortensen

11 :37:50
AM
-

11:38:46
AM
-

11 :40:04
AM

11 :43:55

IJudge

Sustained, beyond scope, irrelevant, calls for legal conclusion.

Overruled.
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I

AM

--

IMeyer

11 :44:00
AM
Curt
Sproat

I was trained what I am allowed to do with regards to probationers. I
am allowed to search if the waiver is within a certain time limit and if
they signed it. I was trained in accordance to the exhibit admitted on
the agreement of supervision. I think it is bullet point number 5. As far
as I am aware of there are no limits to the search as long as you are
IDOC or a law enforcement officer.

I

11:47:12
AM
-

Stan
Objection, irrelevant.
Mortensen
Judge
Meyer

Sustained.

I

11:47:23
AM
-

~

Curt
Sproat

I was waiting on the proper information on the vehicle and ID from
the driver, that is why I waited to write tickets. It took about 10
minutes to complete both tickets.

Judge
Meyer

Witness excused.

I

11 :50:28
AM
-

I

11:51:21
AM
-

Stan
State rests.
Mortensen

I

11 :52:27
AM

Ben
Onosko

We are arguing first this traffic stop was conducted without reasonable
suspicion. Re Neal case. Re Emery case. Re Fuller case.

Ben
Onosko

We don't dispute the officer saw Mr. Hansen's vehicle briefly touch
the lane divider. There were no other vehicles next to Mr. Hansen and
did not put any vehicles in danger nor was a traffic risk. Mr. Hansen
drove perfect in all respects other than this brief crossing of the line.

Ben
Onosko

Re United States vs. Delgado Fernandez.

M

Judge
Meyer

Re Fuller case. Re Neal case. You would agree that touching or even
briefly crossing over the fog line is different from crossing or touching
the center line.

M

Ben
Onosko

Yes I would agree. He did cross over the lane divider. I recognize the
distinction. Re Neal and Fuller case. In this case the driving didn't
affect or endanger the other traffic. Re Fuller decision.

Ben
Onosko

Our second argument is the stop was prolonged. The state and officer
conceded he abandoned the purpose of the stop and was going to
search the vehicle. He did prolong the stop. The stop lasted for about
40 minutes until the vehicle was searched. He was able to write two
citations in about 10 minutes. There is a whole lot of dead time doing
a drug investigation.

Ben
Onosko

He thought he had cause to conduct a drug investigation. Our
argument is that he did not. Most people get nervous when talking to

M

11:54:53
AM

I

11 :56:28
AM

~
~
12:01 :49
PM

I

12:04: 18
PM
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I

12:05:57
PM

I

law enforcement, most people can break eye contact, that does not
give reasonable suspicion.

Ben
Onosko

Re warrantless search. There is no dispute Mr. Hansen withdrew his
consent to a search. Re State vs Stats. Re State vs Eversole. All the
case law says that consent can be revoked. I didn't find one
specifically talking about probationers. None of these cases identify
probation exceptions. The general rule on consent applies in any
context. Anyone can consent and revoke consent to a search.

I

12:09: 16
PM

Ben
Onosko

There is no case law to support irrevocable consent in regards to
probation.

I

12:10:02
PM

Judge
Meyer

But probationers are subject to conditions that everyone else not on
probation are subject to. Searches are one, do you agree?

Ben
Onosko

Yes. Consent is based solely on consent.

I

12:10:27
PM

I

12: 11:08
PM

Judge
Meyer

If someone invokes the consent in the agreement of supervision, what
does that do to their probationary status

Ben
Onosko

Nothing, it may be the basis for a probation violation. A person can
choose to terminate or not accept probation at their will. Mr. Hansen
can come into court at any time and say he doesn't want to be on
probation. The court can't force someone on probation.

Judge
Meyer

But is your argument at any time a probationer can say at any time he
doesn't consent to conditions

Ben
Onosko

Yes. They can get a probation violation. It doesn't break the law.
There will be recourse, the have violated probation. I think the state
would have a pretty good argument he has violated probation to not
consenting to searches.

Ben
Onosko

Re irrevocable consent to blood draw in DUI's. Re Eversole case. I
don't see any basis for holding irrevocable consent is even a thing. Be
it in the probation context or any other context. Re special needs
exception. I concede Mr. Hansen had a reduced expectation of
privacy. That is separate and apart from consent.

Ben
Onosko

Re Penson case. Re Griffin vs Wisconsin. Re State vs Penson. Re
State vs Vega.

Ben
Onosko

There are two possible ways a search like this can occur. First if
consent was given. Mr. Hansen withdrew consent. So consent is out
the window. We concede he had a lower expectation of privacy. But
Idaho case law makes clear the special needs exception applies only if
PO's are involved.

Ben
Onosko

Idaho case law does not approve of a police officer taking unilateral
moves to search. This case could have gone different ways if the PO

12:11:27
PM

I

12: 12:29
PM
12: 12:59
PM

12:14:17
PM

I

12:18:31
PM
12:20:49
PM

I

12:21:52
PM
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had gotten a hold of the officer. If the officer had reasonable suspicion
or probable cause this case would have gone a different way. But he
didn't. I am a bit troubled by the training these officers are receiving.
His understanding if someone signed this waiver, all bets are off and
the officer can do whatever he wants.

~
M

12:25:37
PM

12:28: 14
PM

12:30: 10
PM

Ben
Onosko

I don't think the court should interpret these fourth amendment
arguments as broadly as the state. First you have to have special needs
exception if the PO is involved.

Ben
Onosko

Ask to find the fourth amendment waiver constitutional if it gives
officers unbridled leave to search. Re Article 10 Section 5. The court
can't take powers afforded to probation and parole and hand them to
law enforcement officers.

Ben
Onosko

Any conditions of probation have to be reasonably related to the goals
of probation. Re State vs Russell. Requiring a defendant to completely
waive his fourth amendment right to any reason or condition is
unconstitutional, vague and overly broad and not related to the goals
of probation.

Ben
Onosko

Re unconstitutionals doctrine. Re US vs Scott. Re unequal bargaining
power. Mr. Hansen said yes when he signed the forms, but we can't
say that is the end of the story. A complete absolute waiver of fourth
amendment rights would be unconstitutional.

I

12:33:49
PM

Stan
The line of cases Mr. Onosko cited are fog line cases and different
Mortensen from these.

I

12:34:20
PM

Judge
Meyer

12:34:41
PM

A violation of Idaho law is probable cause. When there is a violation
of Idaho traffic law is probable cause. It doesn't matter if the tickets
were written first or the search first, consent was granted. It was
Stan
Mortensen granted months before this. At no point did I argue the purpose of the
stop was abandoned. Prolonging the stop does not abandon the
purpose of the stop.

12:36:31
PM

Officers can ask anyone out of the vehicle for any reason. During the
course of a lawful stop, officers can ask for consent. Early on in the
Stan
traffic stop Officer Sproat was informed Mr. Hansen was on
Mortensen
probation. It doesn't take him very long to find out he signed the
consent waiver. Timing is not an issue in this case.

12:38:18
PM

Somebody who denies consent will lead to a probation violation. But
that is not where it stops. The fourth amendment waiver does not
Stan
contain the words "at the consent of the PO". Here we are talking
Mortensen
about a vehicle. All these cases talk about the conditions of probation
being a contract.

I agree they are completely different cases. I think there was
reasonable suspicion for pulling Mr. Hansen over.
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12:40:06
PM

When he was placed on probation, he entered a contract with your
honor. Re Gawron case. The issue is when can consent be revoked.
Stan
Yes, most people when they give consent can revoke consent. But
Mortensen
probationers are a little different from your average person. Re Ellis
case.

12:42:48
-PM

I have seen people come into court and tell them they will not abide by
the conditions of probation and they serve their time. Mr. Hansen
Stan
chose to waive his fourth amendment rights for his freedom. I don't
Mortensen think that is unconstitutional. The issue is when they can revoke the
consent. It should not be able to be revoked unilaterally or on the side
of the road or outside a due process hearing.

~
M

My bigger issue is whether there need be some reasonable grounds for
the search, even if the consent to search is irrevocable absent a
hearing.

12:45 :00
PM

I don't know what is worse, that Mr. Onosko is ignoring the law or he
doesn't know the law. Re Penson case. Re State vs. Gawron. Re
Stan
Sampson vs California. Re United States vs Knight. Re State vs
Mortensen
Fuller. Re State vs Barker. Re State vs Buehler. Re State vs Misner.
Re State vs Devor. Re State vs Pecor. Re State vs Peters.

12:48:32
PM

If the probationer has entered into an agreement, the three prong test
Stan
in Vega and Penson does not apply. We have that here. A waiver of
Mortensen his fourth amendment rights. This is an opportunity for new law. Re
Ellis case.

Ben
Onosko

Re Turick case and Ellis cases. I don't disagree with those cases. Here
we have an active revocation of consent. Re consent exception and
special needs exception. I fully recognize the distinction. I ask the
court to compare the Penson and Pector cases. I have case law that
says consent can be revoked.

M

Ben
Onosko

The court has to go with the general rule that consent is revocable. Re
Sampson vs Knight cases. Those cases were not about a defendant's
consent.

12:58:27
PM

Ben
Onosko

Re blood, breath or urine consent.

12:50:27
PM

~
I

Judge
Meyer

01 :00:00
PM
I
01 :00:47
PM
I
01:02:05
PM
I
01:02:28
PM
I

Re long list of cases I cited, if the court could focus on Pecor, Peters,
Stan
Mortensen and Gawron cases.
Judge
Meyer

I will take this under advisement. I will issue a written opinion.

Ben
Onosko

WE had also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. I notice that
hadn't been noticed up. Can we get it noticed up?

Judge
Meyer

Yes. What is the status of speedy?
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01:02 :52
PM

Stan
If we could have the benefit of the decision on the motion to suppress
Mortensen and a couple weeks after that for a brief.

01:03:41
PM

Judge
Meyer

Speedy runs April 29.

01:04:08
PM

Ben
Onosko

I will need 45 minutes for the motion to dismiss.

01:05:30
PM

Judge
Meyer

February 15 at 1:30 for the motion to set aside the indictment.

01:06: 15
-PM

Judge
Meyer

We will have to move the trial. Reset to PTC 02/21/19 at 3pm. JT
03/04/19 at 9am.

01:07:21
PM

~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
V.

CASE NUMBER CR28-18-0015354
FM
REPLY BRIEF

CODY L HANSEN
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above named defendant by and through his attorney, Benjamin M.
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits this Reply to the State's Memorandum in
Opposition. Attached to and in support of this Brief are Defendant's Exhibits A and B, copies of
audio from Defendant's Retained Jurisdiction Review hearing on June 6, 2018.

I.

Unlawful Prolonging

The State argues that officer Sproat did not unlawfully prolong the seizure in this case
because he was always pursuing some legitimate purpose of the traffic stop. The video in this case
and the officer's testimony belie that contention.
Officer Sproat testified that by approximately 6:35 a.m., he had gotten returns on both
Defendant and the front seat passenger and decided he would issue them citations for not wearing a
seat-belt. We know from the video that it took officer Sproat approximately ten minutes to prepare
these two citations. However, the search in this case did not take place until approximately 7:06.
REPLY
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During this time, officer Sproat did many things that were not related to the purpose of the stop and
not geared towards issuing those citations. The officer attempted several times to contact the
probation office. The officer questioned each person in the vehicle individually about drugs and
possessions in the car. Case law is clear that absent reasonable suspicion, questions concerning drug
possession that prolong the length of the stop are not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop.

See e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 51 P.3d 461 (Ct. App. 2002). The officer searched each
individual in the vehicle. The officer engaged in small talk with officer Hodle. And the officer spent
at least six minutes after the completion of the citations just speaking with officer Hodle about the
law and procedure surrounding probation searches.
Case law establishes that the purposes of a traffic stop include issuing citations, "checking the
driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants, and inspecting the automobile's
registration and proof of insurance." State v. Burgess, Docket No. 45317 (Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2018)
(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015)). Thus, "[a] traffic stop's purpose does
not encompass 'on-scene investigation into other crimes."' Id. In Burgess, our Court of Appeals
found that an officer's investigation into the probation status of a passenger did not qualify as a
purpose of a traffic stop. Defendant would ask this Court to hold likewise in this case concerning the
officer's numerous inquiries and discussions with other officer's about Mr. Hansen's probation
status.
Defendant respectfully requests the Court find the stop in this case was unlawfully prolonged
beyond the time reasonably necessary to complete the purpose of the stop, the issuance of citations.

II.

Consent to Search

The State has only argued and raised the issue that the search in this case was justified by
consent. While the State concedes that Mr. Hansen told the officer on scene he would not consent to
the search; the State argues that Mr. Hansen lacked the ability to withdraw his previously given

REPLY

Page2

Page 139

consent.
Defendant would first point out that the State's argument lacks the support of case law.
Defendant has been unable to find any Idaho case, aside from Diaz and its progeny, which holds
there is any such thing as irrevocable consent. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007)
(overruled by State v. Wuljf, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575 (2014)). In Diaz, our Court held that
consent to a blood draw, which was given by every driver in Idaho, could not be unilaterally revoked
at roadside once an officer established probable cause to believe the driver was under the influence.
However, the Diaz holding that consent was irrevocable could not withstand later constitutional
scrutiny. Following the Supreme Court's decisions in both Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552
(2013) and Aviles v. Texas, 134 S. Ct. 902 (2014), our own Supreme Court overruled Diaz's
irrevocable consent doctrine. Wuljf, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575. Aside from the Diaz case,
counsel for Defendant has not found any Idaho case holding that any form of consent to a search,
given by any citizen, is irrevocable.
Defendant has, however, found numerous Idaho cases holding that consent, once given, can
be revoked or limited by the person who granted the consent. See e.g., State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho
556,560,716 P.2d 1328, 1332 (Ct. App. 1986) ("Even if consent has been given, expressly or
impliedly, it may be revoked, thereby terminating the authority of the police to continue a warrantless
search."); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 696-697, 978 P.2d 881, 884-885 (Ct. App. 1999) (same);

State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 106 P.3d 477 (Ct. App. 2005) (same); State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho
643,646,339 P.3d 368,371 (2014) ("Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the
right of the person to withdraw that consent."); State v. Greub, 162 Idaho 581,401 P.3d 581 (Ct.
App. 2017) (same).
The theory of irrevocable consent has also been the subject of much scholarly criticism:
Moreover, to say, in effect, that such "implied consent" is irrevocable, so that it
has continuing effect notwithstanding the defendant's subsequent express refusal
REPLY
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to give consent, is unsound, as such a "irrevocable consent doctrine conflicts with
both the knowing waiver doctrine and the voluntariness test."
4 Search & Seizure, Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise On The Fourth Amendment,
§ 8.2(1) (5th ed.) (citation omitted).
The cases cited by the State are not to the contrary. In Turek, Jaskowski, and Ellis, all cited
by the State in support of its argument that consent is irrevocable, the probationer never revoked or
attempted to revoke any previously given consent.
The State's argument would require this Court to take the extraordinary step of creating a
new per se exception to the warrant requirement that has never before been recognized in Idaho and
runs contrary to current Idaho precedent.

Defendant would point out that under the State's

interpretation, the McNeely and Wulff decisions would apparently have no effect on probationers. If
a probationer has waived her Fourth Amendment rights, then any police officer would have the right
to forcibly draw her blood, against her will and over her objection, without any suspicion of criminal
activity at all.
Finally, Defendant disagrees with the State's stated concerns that recognizing a probationer's
right to withdraw previously granted consent somehow gives the probationer immunity or a free pass
to violate the law without recourse. These alleged concerns are laughable. First, recognizing that a
probationer, like any citizen, has the right to grant or withhold consent to a search has no impact on
any other recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Even if a probationer withhold consent
to a search, he is still subject to search under any of the other recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Second, even without consent a probationer still enjoys a reduced expectation of
privacy, and thus is subject to searches by or at the direction of the Board of Corrections. Third,
allowing a probationer to withdraw consent to a search has absolutely no impact on the State's ability
to obtain judicial approval for a search with a search warrant. Finally, a probationer's refusal to
consent to a search would in all likelihood be a probation violation, and nothing prohibits a probation
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officer from arresting a defendant and starting such proceedings. In sum, recognizing that any citizen
is always free to grant or withhold consent does not put such person in some special legal bubble of
protection, making him immune to any search, seizure or other legal proceedings; the only thing it
does is prohibit the State from conducting a warrantless search under this one exception to the
warrant requirement.
For the above reasons, Defendant respectfully requests this Court find that the warrantless
search of his vehicle cannot be justified by the consent exception. If the Court agrees with
Defendant on this point, then it need not reach Defendant's final argument that this condition of
probation is unconstitutional.

III.

Unconstitutional Condition of Probation

If the Court finds this search to be valid pursuant to Mr. Hansen's acceptance or consent to
probation, Defendant would argue that his conditions of probation that he waive all Fourth
Amendment rights is unconstitutional under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Such a
condition of probation (a full and complete waiver of all Fourth Amendment rights and consent to
search by any police officer), is unconstitutional, is not reasonably related to the goals of probation,
is overbroad and vague, and cannot have been validly consented to by Mr. Hansen. Defendant will
first discuss some relevant legal principles and then present argument on this point.

A.

Separation of powers.

The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others,
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
Idaho Constitution Article II, § 1.
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority."
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State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642,643,228 P. 796, 797 (1924) (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise
On the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the
American Union, p. 137 (6 th Ed. 1890)). "Where the sovereign power of the State, meaning the
people, have located certain authority it must remain." Id., at p. 137.
Such powers as are specifically conferred by the constitution upon the governor,
or upon any other specified officer, the legislature cannot require or authorize to
be performed by any other officer or authority; and from those duties which the
constitution requires of him he cannot be excused by law.

Id., at p. 133.
Idaho Court have applied this basic principle embodied in Article 2, § 1 to find that the
Legislature cannot delegate its power to create laws to any other department, Purcell, 39 Idaho 642,
228 P. 796, and to find that the power of our Courts to adjudicate cases "can never be, delegated to
executive agencies." In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246,260,912 P.2d 614,628 (1995).
This principle is generally known as the nondelegation doctrine. See e.g., State v. Armstrong, 158
Idaho 364, 369, 347 P.3d 1025, 1030 (Ct. App. 2015). The nondelegation doctrine is implicated
when "constitutionally entrusted decision-making authority is delegated to another branch of
government." Id. Our Supreme Court has said that it "always must be watchful, as it has been in the
past, that no one of the three separate departments of the government encroach upon the powers
properly belonging to another." State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236,241,486 P.2d 247,252 (1971).

B.

The Board of Corrections.

Article 10, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution originally provided that a board of state
prison commissioners consisting of the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General,
would control, direct and manage the state prisons.
In 1940, a prison committee submitted a report to then Governor Bottolfsen. Report of

Prison Committee, Appointed January 5, 1940. The committee was appointed to "investigate
and report on the needs of the State Penitentiary and the Probation and Parole laws ... " Id., at
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p.1. The committee found that Idaho's current probation and parole system was woefully
inadequate, and commented that its "unsatisfactory operation is based upon the fact that there is a
complete dirth of qualified administration officers, therefore, it can be truthfully said that we
have no system of parole and probation of a scientific type whatsoever." Id., at p.6. The
committee made a series ofrecommendations, including that "[t]he supervision of the paroled
offender should be exercised by qualified persons trained and experienced in the task of guiding
social readjustment." Id., at p.7.
The Legislature responded to this report by amending Article 10, Section 5 in 1941; and
the people of Idaho ratified this Constitutional provision in 1942. This section of our
Constitution now provides:
The state legislature shall establish a nonpartisan board to be known as the state
board of correction, and to consist of three members appointed by the governor. ..
This board shall have the control, direction and management of the penitentiaries
of the state, their employees and properties, and of adult felony probation and
parole, with such compensation, powers, and duties as may be prescribed by law.
ID. Const. Art. X, § 5. In 1947, the Legislature passed enabling statutes establishing the State
Board of Corrections. 1947 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 53, §§ 1-47.
The Board's power to supervise probationers and parolees is "constitutionally anchored,"
with "[t]he Board ultimately deriv[ing] its powers from article 10, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution."

Mellinger v. Idaho Dept. of Corrections, 114 Idaho 494,499, 757 P.2d 1213, 1218 (Ct. App.
1988). "The Board's duties are supervisory in the main with ancillary duties of investigation and
reporting." Id, at 500, 757 P.2d at 1219.
The history of this Constitutional provision shows the people of Idaho desired a
professionalized system of probation and parole, with the Board of Corrections and its employees
charged with the duty to control, direct and manage probationers and parolees.
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C.

Terms and conditions of probation.

When fashioning a sentence, the District Court may suspend the execution of the
judgment and "place the defendant on probation under such terms and conditions as it deems
necessary and appropriate." Idaho Code§ 19-2601(2).
However, this statute does not give the District Court unbridled discretion to impose
arbitrary, unreasonable or overbroad conditions. State v. Wakefield, 145 Idaho 270,273, 178
P.3d 635, 638 (Ct. App. 2007). The very purpose of probation is to give a defendant the chance
for rehabilitation through proper control and supervision. Id. "Thus, a condition of probation
must be reasonably related to the purpose of probation, which is rehabilitation." Id., (citing State

v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 860-861, 452 P.2d 350, 357-358 (1969)).
"The court may even restrict constitutional rights if the restriction bears a reasonable
relation to the defendant's criminal activity; however the court may not impose conditions which
are vindictive, vague or overbroad." State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 515,518, 835 P.2d 1326, 1329
(Ct.App.1991).
Parole is designed to "help individuals reintegrate into society ... " and "parole officers are
part of the administrative system designed to assist parolees and to offer them guidance."

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
The conditions of parole serve a dual purpose; they prohibit, either absolutely or
conditionally, behavior that is deemed dangerous to the restoration of the
individual into normal society. And through the requirement of reporting to the
parole officer and seeking guidance and permission before doing many things, the
officer is provided with information about the parolee and an opportunity to
advise him. The combination puts the parole officer into the position in which he
can try to guide the parolee into constructive development.

Id., at 478.
Rehabilitation is the central objective of the Federal Parole system. US. v. Consuelo-

Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975). "Permissible conditions must 'have a reasonable
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relationship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public."' Id., at 264. The
purpose and goals of probation in Idaho are essentially the same as those in the federal system;
"[p]arole conditions must be reasonable and have an acceptable aim towards rehabilitation."
Mellinger, at 501, 757 P.2d at 1220.

Probationers and probation officers occupy a unique, middle ground in our judicial
system. "Although a probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police
officer who normally conducts searches against the ordinary citizen ... while assuredly charged
with protecting the public interest, [a probation officer] is also supposed to have in mind the
welfare of the probationer." Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987). "Because of the
special relationship between the probation officer and the probationer, the law relating to
probation searches cannot be strictly governed by automatic reference to ordinary search and
seizure law." State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227,233,657 P.2d 1095, 1101 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting
State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365,368 (Minn. 1980)). This special middle ground type status

has also caused our Courts to "perceive[] a distinction between searches of probationers
conducted by a supervising probation officer and those conducted by the police." Id., at 234, 657
P .2d at 1102.

As a condition of granting probation, society has the right to impose stringent limitations
on a probationer's behavior, including "restrictions on important liberties such as the right to
travel, to change jobs or residence, or even to marry." Pinson, at 231,657 P.2d at 1099.
However, "[i]mplicit in the system's concern with parole violations is the notion that the parolee
is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he substantially abides by the conditions of his parole."
Brewer, at 479.

[I]t is necessary to recognize that when fundamental rights are curbed it must be
done sensitively and with a keen appreciation that the infringement must serve the
broad purposes of the Probation Act. This burden cannot be avoided by
asserting either that the probationer has voluntarily waived his rights by not
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objecting in a proper manner to the conditions imposed upon him or that he
must accept any condition the court deems best as a consequence of being in
custody.

Consuelo-Gonzalez, at 265 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
Idaho Court have, without doubt, recognized that searches conducted without a warrant
by probation officers serve important goals related to probation and are permissible. "[T]he
probation department needs to be able to assure compliance with probation in an expedited
fashion without the necessity of probable cause." Klingler, at 497, 148 P.3d at 1243. "For
probation authorities to evaluate a probationer's progress in reintegrating into society, the
probation officer must have a thorough understanding of the probationer's environment and
personal habits." Pinson, at 231, 657 P.2d at 1099. For these reasons, "the ability of a parole
officer to conduct warrantless searches of persons under his supervision may be 'necessary to
effective operation of the parole system."' Id. (quoting Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246,250
(9th Cir. 1975)).
Whether the terms and conditions of a defendant's probation are reasonably related to the
goals of probation is a legal question over which our Appellate Courts exercise free review. State
v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315,318,847 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Ct.App.1993).
D.

The unconstitutional conditions doctrine.

As discussed above and in previous briefing, consent is one exception to the warrant
requirement.
In order to meet its burden on the consent exception, the State must show that "consent
was voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied." State v. Jaborra,
143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481,484 (Ct. App. 2006). "A voluntary decision is one that is 'the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker."' Id., at 97, 13 7 P .3d at 484
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). "The consent must be
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'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given."' United States v. Page, 302 F.2d
81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1962) (citation omitted).
The "unconstitutional conditions doctrine" "limits the government's ability to exact waivers
of rights as a condition of benefits, even when those benefits are fully discretionary." US. v. Scott,
450 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir.2006) (footnote omitted); see also, Dolan v. City a/Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994); Nollan v. California Costa! Comm 'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958). This doctrine is specifically targeted at and relevant to issues relating to citizens purportedly
granting consent to the government. "[T]he government may not require a person to give up a
constitutional right ... in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government ... " Dolan,
at 385.
In the Scott case, a defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance. The
defendant plead not guilty, and as a condition of his released signed a form stating he agreed to
random drug testing. Scott, 450 F .3d at 865. The Court was faced with the question of "whether the
government can induce [defendant] to waive his Fourth Amendment rights by conditioning pretrial
release on such a waiver." Id., at FN 4. The Court found that the "unconstitutional conditions
doctrine" was relevant to the issue of whether or not the defendant truly gave his consent to this drug
testing condition. Id., at 866.
The Scott Court noted that while "[i]t may be tempting to say that such transactions - where
a citizen waives certain rights in exchange for a valuable benefit the government is under no duty to
grant ... should be encouraged ... our constitutional law has not adopted this philosophy wholesale."

Id., at 866. "The right to keep someone in jail does not in any way imply the right to release that
person subject to unconstitutional conditions - such as chopping off a finger or giving up one's firstborn." Id., FN5. The Scott Court ultimately found that because of the governments unequal
bargaining power, coupled with the defendant's constitutional rights and the unconstitutional
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conditions doctrine, the warrantless search could not be upheld based purely on a consent theory.
Id., at 868.

In Nollan, homeowners applied for a building permit and the California Coastal Commission
conditionally granted their application. 483 U.S. at 828. However, the Commission required the
homeowners to grant an easement across the property as a condition to the building permit. Id. The
homeowners filed suit, alleging the condition constituted a taking by the government without
compensation. The homeowners also used the building permit to construct their new home. The
Supreme Court found the condition to be an unlawful taking, despite the fact the Commission had
the power to simply deny the building permit altogether, and despite the fact that the homeowners
had already used the permit to construct the building. Id., at 836.
Case law shows that even if governmental benefits may be withheld or bestowed at the
government's discretion, the government does not thereby have the automatic power to condition the
granting of the benefit on the defendant's waiver of important constitutional rights; and that a
defendant's acceptance of such conditions may still be found to not be "voluntary" in the legal sense.
E.

Argument

First, Defendant argues his conditions of probation that he waive all Fourth Amendment
rights and be subject to any search or seizure by any police officer violates separation of powers and
the nondelegation doctrine. The Idaho Constitution explicitly entrusts the management and oversight
of probation and probationers to the Board of Corrections. Police officers are not members of the
Board of Corrections, but are a separate entity.
Idaho has recognized that probation searches are a necessary and integral part of the
probation process, and thus fall within the Board's constitutionally prescribed powers. "[T]he
probation department needs to be able to assure compliance with probation in an expedited fashion
without the necessity of probable cause." Klingler, at 497, 148 P.3d at 1243. "[T]he ability of a
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parole officer to conduct warrantless searches of persons under his supervision may be 'necessary to
effective operation of the parole system."' Pinson, at 231, 657 P .2d at 1099 (quoting Latta, at 250).
"[P]arole authorities have a special and unique interest in invading the privacy of parolees under
their supervision." Consuelo-Gonzalez, at 265-266 (quoting Latta, at 249).
Idaho and Federal Courts have also recognized a clear distinction between probation officers
and police officers when it comes to monitoring and enforcing the terms of probation. "Although a
probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police officer who normally
conducts searches against the ordinary citizen ... while assuredly charged with protecting the public
interest, [a probation officer] is also supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer."

Griffin, at 876. The Pinson Court "perceived a distinction between searches of probationers
conducted by a supervising probation officer and those conducted by the police." At 234, 657 P.2d
at 1102.
"The police officers had no authority to engage in the general supervision of [Defendant] or
his parole; the police officers could not determine whether the terms of parole were being complied
with, file a report of parole violation, impose discretionary jail time, or enforce the terms of parole."

State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 369, 347 P.3d 1025, 1030 (Ct. App. 2015). Despite not
sanctioning police officers to act purely on their own in conduction parole special needs searches,
Idaho does allowed parole officers to "enlist the aid of the police when conducting a justified
search." Peters, at 962, 950 P.2d at 1301.
Lastly, Idaho has recognized that these special conditions which make warrantless searches
acceptable for probation officers, does not extend to police officers in general. "The 'special and
unique' interest which probation authorities have in invading the privacy of probationers 'does not
extend to law enforcement officers generally.'" Pinson, at 233,657 P.2d at 1101 (quoting Consuelo-

Gonzalez, at 266). Searches of probations by law enforcement officers "may not be done for the
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prime purpose of circumventing the ordinary constitutional process for the convenience of law
enforcement officers in the course of their investigation." Vega, at 688, 718 P.2d at 601 (quoting
Lafave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment§ 10.10, at 449 (1978)). "It is
impermissible for the police to use parole officers in lieu of a warrant to search, when conducting a
criminal investigation."

Vega, at 688, 718 P.2d at 601. "[U]nder no circumstances should

cooperation between law enforcement officers and probation officers be permitted to make the
probation system 'a subterfuge for criminal investigations."' Consuelo-Gonzalez, at 267 (quoting

Latta, at 249).
Because probation searches are an integral part of the probation system, and because the
authority to administer probation is constitutionally entrusted to the Board of Corrections, Defendant
argues it would be an improper delegation of constitutional duties to give police officers in general
the authority to administer probation conditions by conducting warrantless searches at their own
whim.
Second, a condition such as the one imposed on Mr. Hansen is not reasonably related to the
goals of probation, and is overbroad.
In this case, the Court appeared to give no special consideration to Mr. Hansen's terms and
conditions of probation at the time of sentencing on June 6, 2018. The Court, at the outset of the
hearings that afternoon, advised all defendants in Court that if they were placed on probation these
would be the terms they would be subject too. Exhibit A. When Mr. Hansen's case was called, the
Court simply asked him ifhe had gone over the terms of probation, had heard the Court announce
the terms of probation, and if he agreed to be bound by them. Exhibit B. Counsel has attached
recordings of this proceeding for the Courts review. In the alternative, Counsel would ask the Court
to take judicial notice of its own proceedings on June 6, 2018.
"Parole conditions must be reasonable and have an acceptable aim towards rehabilitation."
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Mellinger, at 501, 757 P.2d at 1220. "While approving the search in this case, we note that
intrusions upon a probationer's privacy which do not relate to proper administration of probation are
invalid." Pinson, at 233, 657 P.2d at 1101. "[S]earches intended merely to harass or intimidate
probationers or parolees cannot be tolerated." Id. (quoting State v. Simms, 516 P.2d 1088, 1096, 10
Wn. App. 75, 83 (Wa. Ct. App.1973)).
In this case, there does not appear to be any indication that the Court found a full and
complete waiver of Mr. Hansen's Fourth Amendment rights was specifically necessary to
accomplish the goals of probation in his case. Rather, it appears the Court imposed this condition as
a standard term that it gave to every single defendant in court that day. While Defendant recognizes
there are certainly standard terms of probation that will logically be included in every probation case
(submit truthful reports to your probation officer, not violate the law, etc ... ), and that judicial
economy often requires the giving of standard terms and conditions to all defendants, Defendant
disputes that a full and complete waiver of all Fourth Amendment rights could be characterized as
one of those standard terms and conditions that can simply be imposed on every single probationer
without special consideration to their case. Without any explanation by the Court as to why a full
and complete Fourth Amendment waiver was necessary to serve the goals of probation in Mr.
Hansen's case specifically, Defendant argues this term was not imposed with an acceptable aim
towards rehabilitation.
This condition is also extremely overbroad in that it allows for searches and seizures which
are unreasonable, arbitrary or vindictive and which could serve no possible goal of probation. In
Idaho, "[C]ourts may not impose [probation] conditions which are vindictive, vague or overbroad."

Russell, at 518, 835 P.2d at 1329. Defendant cannot stress enough how extreme a condition a full
Fourth Amendment waiver is. As officer Sproat testified, police officers are now being trained that
any defendant placed on probation after 2016 will no longer have Fourth Amendment rights. The
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officer testified that according to his training there are now no limitations on law enforcement's
ability to conduct searches or seizure of probationers. This raises an interesting aside, who is telling
police officers in Kootenai County that every judge in the county will now be ordering a complete
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights in every probation case from now on?

It is worthwhile to take a look at some of the searches and seizures the Court has allowed by
placing this condition on Defendant. Under this condition, any police officer may go to Mr.
Hansen's home at 3:00 a.m., pick the lock to his front door, and rummage around inside his home
while Mr. Hansen sleeps. Any police officer who sees Mr. Hansen walking down the street and
wants to talk to him could run up to him, grab him, put him in handcuffs, and tell him he isn't going
anywhere until the officer gets the information he wants out of him. Since Mr. Hansen also has no
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, that same officer could presumably arrest
Mr. Hansen and hold him in jail indefinitely until Mr. Hansen is willing to talk to the officer. A
police officer, who has some personal grudge against Mr. Hansen or his family, could pull Mr.
Hansen's vehicle over every time he sees Mr. Hansen driving just for the purpose of harassing Mr.
Hansen. Any police officer can forcibly require Mr. Hansen to submit to a blood draw, or any other
invasion of his body, without the need for any level of suspicion of any kind. If a police officer
wanted to know what Mr. Hansen ate for lunch, this condition of probation allows that officer to
order that Mr. Hansen's stomach be pumped. And according to the State, Mr. Hansen would be
powerless to stop his stomach from being pumped because he doesn't even have the right to
withdraw consent to such a search.
While Defense counsel concedes the absurdity of these factual scenarios, the fact remains that
Mr. Hansen's conditions of probation literally allow for each of these searches to occur. The fact
that all of these are allowed under his terms of probation should be sufficient to demonstrate that the
term itself is severely overbroad. It is also shows that this term runs contrary to the Pinsen Court's

REPLY

Page 16

Page 153

prohibition against "searches intended merely to harass or intimidate probationers" At 233, 657 P.2d
at 1101.
Defendant request the Court find this term of probation is not designed to further the goals of
probation, and is unconstitutionally overbroad.
Third, Defendant argues he could not have given free, voluntary and knowing consent to such
a condition based upon the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
In order to show that legally valid consent has been given, the State bears the burden of
showing that "the consent was voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or
implied." Jaborra, at 97, 13 7 P .3d at 484. "A voluntary decision is one that is 'the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker."' Id., at 97, 137 P.3d at 484 (quoting

Schneckloth, at 225). "The consent must be 'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently
given."' Page, at 83-84 (citation omitted).
In this case, Mr. Hansen found himself in a position where he had no bargaining power and
was faced with an untenable decision. He could ask the Court to send him to prison, or, he could
accept probation subject to completely waiving his Fourth Amendment rights. As the Court knows
there is more to the consent analysis then simply asking, did the defendant say yes to it. The Court
must still engage in an analysis of the parties bargaining position, the nature and quality of the
Constitutional rights the defendant was asked to abandon, and whether such choice was truly made
"freely," "intelligently," and "voluntarily." Just as a defendant who chooses to cut off her pinky
finger rather than go to prison cannot be said to have truly consented to such choice; Defendant asks
this Court to find that he could not have truly consented to waive all of his right to personal
autonomy, privacy and security that are embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant respectfully requests the Court apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and
find that he did not legally consent to this condition of his probation.

REPLY

Page 17

Page 154

CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, Defendant respectfully requests the Court grant his Motion to
Suppress Evidence.

DA TED this ]2__ day of January, 2019.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

V.

CASE NUMBER CR28-18-0015354
FM
REPLY BRIEF

CODY L HANSEN
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above named defendant by and through his attorney, Benjamin M.
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits this Reply to the State's Memorandum in
Opposition. Attached to and in support of this Brief are Defendant's Exhibits A and B, copies of
audio from Defendant's Retained Jurisdiction Review hearing on June 6, 2018.

I.

Unlawful Prolonging

The State argues that officer Sproat did not unlawfully prolong the seizure in this case
because he was always pursuing some legitimate purpose of the traffic stop. The video in this case
and the officer's testimony belie that contention.
Officer Sproat testified that by approximately 6:35 a.m., he had gotten returns on both
Defendant and the front seat passenger and decided he would issue them citations for not wearing a
seat-belt. We know from the video that it took officer Sproat approximately ten minutes to prepare
these two citations. However, the search in this case did not take place until approximately 7:06.
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During this time, officer Sproat did many things that were not related to the purpose of the stop and
not geared towards issuing those citations. The officer attempted several times to contact the
probation office. The officer questioned each person in the vehicle individually about drugs and
possessions in the car. Case law is clear that absent reasonable suspicion, questions concerning drug
possession that prolong the length of the stop are not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop.
See e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 13 7 Idaho 64 7, 51 P .3d 461 (Ct. App. 2002). The officer searched each
individual in the vehicle. The officer engaged in small talk with officer Hodle. And the officer spent
at least six minutes after the completion of the citations just speaking with officer Hodle about the
law and procedure surrounding probation searches.
Case law establishes that the purposes of a traffic stop include issuing citations, "checking the
driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants, and inspecting the automobile's
registration and proof of insurance." State v. Burgess, Docket No. 45317 (Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2018)
(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015)). Thus, "[a] traffic stop's purpose does
not encompass 'on-scene investigation into other crimes.'" Id. In Burgess, our Court of Appeals
found that an officer's investigation into the probation status of a passenger did not qualify as a
purpose of a traffic stop. Defendant would ask this Court to hold likewise in this case concerning the
officer's numerous inquiries and discussions with other officer's about Mr. Hansen's probation
status.
Defendant respectfully requests the Court find the stop in this case was unlawfully prolonged
beyond the time reasonably necessary to complete the purpose of the stop, the issuance of citations.

II.

Consent to Search

The State has only argued and raised the issue that the search in this case was justified by
consent. While the State concedes that Mr. Hansen told the officer on scene he would not consent to
the search; the State argues that Mr. Hansen lacked the ability to withdraw his previously given
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consent.
Defendant would first point out that the State's argument lacks the support of case law.
Defendant has been unable to find any Idaho case, aside from Diaz and its progeny, which holds
there is any such thing as irrevocable consent. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P .3d 739 (2007)
(overruled by State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575 (2014)). In Diaz, our Court held that
consent to a blood draw, which was given by every driver in Idaho, could not be unilaterally revoked
at roadside once an officer established probable cause to believe the driver was under the influence.
However, the Diaz holding that consent was irrevocable could not withstand later constitutional
scrutiny. Following the Supreme Court's decisions in both Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552
(2013) and Aviles v. Texas, 134 S. Ct. 902 (2014), our own Supreme Court overruled Diaz's
irrevocable consent doctrine. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575. Aside from the Diaz case,
counsel for Defendant has not found any Idaho case holding that any form of consent to a search,
given by any citizen, is irrevocable.
Defendant has, however, found numerous Idaho cases holding that consent, once given, can
be revoked or limited by the person who granted the consent. See e.g., State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho
556, 560, 716 P.2d 1328, 1332 (Ct. App. 1986) ("Even if consent has been given, expressly or
impliedly, it may be revoked, thereby terminating the authority of the police to continue a warrantless
search."); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 696-697, 978 P.2d 881, 884-885 (Ct. App. 1999) (same);

State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 106 P.3d 477 (Ct. App. 2005) (same); State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho
643, 646, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014) ("Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the
right of the person to withdraw that consent."); State v. Greub, 162 Idaho 581,401 P.3d 581 (Ct.
App. 2017) (same).
The theory of irrevocable consent has also been the subject of much scholarly criticism:
Moreover, to say, in effect, that such "implied consent" is irrevocable, so that it
has continuing effect notwithstanding the defendant's subsequent express refusal
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to give consent, is unsound, as such a "irrevocable consent doctrine conflicts with
both the knowing waiver doctrine and the voluntariness test."
4 Search & Seizure, Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise On The Fourth Amendment,
§ 8.2(1) (5th ed.) (citation omitted).
The cases cited by the State are not to the contrary. In Turek, Jaskowski, and Ellis, all cited
by the State in support of its argument that consent is irrevocable, the probationer never revoked or
attempted to revoke any previously given consent.
The State's argument would require this Court to take the extraordinary step of creating a
new per se exception to the warrant requirement that has never before been recognized in Idaho and
runs contrary to current Idaho precedent.

Defendant would point out that under the State's

interpretation, the McNeely and Wulff decisions would apparently have no effect on probationers. If
a probationer has waived her Fourth Amendment rights, then any police officer would have the right
to forcibly draw her blood, against her will and over her objection, without any suspicion of criminal
activity at all.
Finally, Defendant disagrees with the State's stated concerns that recognizing a probationer's
right to withdraw previously granted consent somehow gives the probationer immunity or a free pass
to violate the law without recourse. These alleged concerns are laughable. First, recognizing that a
probationer, like any citizen, has the right to grant or withhold consent to a search has no impact on
any other recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Even if a probationer withhold consent
to a search, he is still subject to search under any of the other recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Second, even without consent a probationer still enjoys a reduced expectation of
privacy, and thus is subject to searches by or at the direction of the Board of Corrections. Third,
allowing a probationer to withdraw consent to a search has absolutely no impact on the State's ability
to obtain judicial approval for a search with a search warrant. Finally, a probationer's refusal to
consent to a search would in all likelihood be a probation violation, and nothing prohibits a probation
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officer from arresting a defendant and starting such proceedings. In sum, recognizing that any citizen
is always free to grant or withhold consent does not put such person in some special legal bubble of
protection, making him immune to any search, seizure or other legal proceedings; the only thing it
does is prohibit the State from conducting a warrantless search under this one exception to the
warrant requirement.
For the above reasons, Defendant respectfully requests this Court find that the warrantless
search of his vehicle cannot be justified by the consent exception. If the Court agrees with
Defendant on this point, then it need not reach Defendant's final argument that this condition of
probation is unconstitutional.

Ill.

Unconstitutional Condition of Probation

If the Court finds this search to be valid pursuant to Mr. Hansen's acceptance or consent to
probation, Defendant would argue that his conditions of probation that he waive all Fourth
Amendment rights is unconstitutional under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Such a
condition of probation (a full and complete waiver of all Fourth Amendment rights and consent to
search by any police officer), is unconstitutional, is not reasonably related to the goals of probation,
is overbroad and vague, and cannot have been validly consented to by Mr. Hansen. Defendant will
first discuss some relevant legal principles and then present argument on this point.

A.

Separation of powers.

The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others,
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
Idaho Constitution Article II, § 1.
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority."
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State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642, 643, 228 P. 796, 797 (1924) (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise
On the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the
American Union, p. 137 (6 th Ed. 1890)). "Where the sovereign power of the State, meaning the

people, have located certain authority it must remain." Id., at p. 137.
Such powers as are specifically conferred by the constitution upon the governor,
or upon any other specified officer, the legislature cannot require or authorize to
be performed by any other officer or authority; and from those duties which the
constitution requires of him he cannot be excused by law.
Id., at p. 133.

Idaho Court have applied this basic principle embodied in Article 2, § 1 to find that the
Legislature cannot delegate its power to create laws to any other department, Purcell, 39 Idaho 642,
228 P. 796, and to find that the power of our Courts to adjudicate cases "can never be, delegated to
executive agencies." In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246,260,912 P.2d 614,628 (1995).
This principle is generally known as the nondelegation doctrine. See e.g., State v. Armstrong, 158
Idaho 364, 369, 347 P.3d 1025, 1030 (Ct. App. 2015). The nondelegation doctrine is implicated
when "constitutionally entrusted decision-making authority is delegated to another branch of
government." Id. Our Supreme Court has said that it "always must be watchful, as it has been in the
past, that no one of the three separate departments of the government encroach upon the powers
properly belonging to another." State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236,241,486 P.2d 247,252 (1971).
B.

The Board of Corrections.

Article 10, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution originally provided that a board of state
prison commissioners consisting of the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General,
would control, direct and manage the state prisons.
In 1940, a prison committee submitted a report to then Governor Bottolfsen. Report of
Prison Committee, Appointed January 5, 1940. The committee was appointed to "investigate

and report on the needs of the State Penitentiary and the Probation and Parole laws ... " Id., at
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p.1. The committee found that Idaho's current probation and parole system was woefully
inadequate, and commented that its "unsatisfactory operation is based upon the fact that there is a
complete dirth of qualified administration officers, therefore, it can be truthfully said that we
have no system of parole and probation of a scientific type whatsoever." Id., at p.6. The
committee made a series ofrecommendations, including that "[t]he supervision of the paroled
offender should be exercised by qualified persons trained and experienced in the task of guiding
social readjustment." Id., at p.7.
The Legislature responded to this report by amending Article 10, Section 5 in 1941; and
the people ofldaho ratified this Constitutional provision in 1942. This section of our
Constitution now provides:
The state legislature shall establish a nonpartisan board to be known as the state
board of correction, and to consist of three members appointed by the governor ...
This board shall have the control, direction and management of the penitentiaries
of the state, their employees and properties, and of adult felony probation and
parole, with such compensation, powers, and duties as may be prescribed by law.
ID. Const. Art. X, § 5. In 1947, the Legislature passed enabling statutes establishing the State
Board of Corrections. 1947 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 53, §§ 1-47.
The Board's power to supervise probationers and parolees is "constitutionally anchored,"
with "[t]he Board ultimately deriv[ing] its powers from article 10, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution."
Mellinger v. Idaho Dept. oJCorrections, 114 Idaho 494,499, 757 P.2d 1213, 1218 (Ct. App.
1988). "The Board's duties are supervisory in the main with ancillary duties of investigation and
reporting." Id, at 500, 757 P.2d at 1219.
The history of this Constitutional provision shows the people of Idaho desired a
professionalized system of probation and parole, with the Board of Corrections and its employees
charged with the duty to control, direct and manage probationers and parolees.
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C.

Terms and conditions of probation.

When fashioning a sentence, the District Court may suspend the execution of the
judgment and "place the defendant on probation under such terms and conditions as it deems
necessary and appropriate." Idaho Code § 19-2601 (2).
However, this statute does not give the District Court unbridled discretion to impose
arbitrary, unreasonable or overbroad conditions. State v. Wakefield, 145 Idaho 270,273, 178
P.3d 635, 638 (Ct. App. 2007). The very purpose of probation is to give a defendant the chance
for rehabilitation through proper control and supervision. Id. "Thus, a condition of probation
must be reasonably related to the purpose of probation, which is rehabilitation." Id., (citing State

v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 860-861, 452 P.2d 350, 357-358 (1969)).
"The court may even restrict constitutional rights if the restriction bears a reasonable
relation to the defendant's criminal activity; however the court may not impose conditions which
are vindictive, vague or overbroad." State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 515,518,835 P.2d 1326, 1329
(Ct. App. 1991).
Parole is designed to "help individuals reintegrate into society ... " and "parole officers are
part of the administrative system designed to assist parolees and to offer them guidance."

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
The conditions of parole serve a dual purpose; they prohibit, either absolutely or
conditionally, behavior that is deemed dangerous to the restoration of the
individual into normal society. And through the requirement of reporting to the
parole officer and seeking guidance and permission before doing many things, the
officer is provided with information about the parolee and an opportunity to
advise him. The combination puts the parole officer into the position in which he
can try to guide the parolee into constructive development.

Id., at 478.
Rehabilitation is the central objective of the Federal Parole system. US. v. Consuelo-

Gonzalez, 521 F .2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975). "Permissible conditions must 'have a reasonable
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relationship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public."' Id., at 264. The
purpose and goals of probation in Idaho are essentially the same as those in the federal system;
"[p ]arole conditions must be reasonable and have an acceptable aim towards rehabilitation."
Mellinger, at 501, 757 P.2d at 1220.
Probationers and probation officers occupy a unique, middle ground in our judicial
system. "Although a probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police
officer who normally conducts searches against the ordinary citizen ... while assuredly charged
with protecting the public interest, [a probation officer] is also supposed to have in mind the
welfare of the probationer." Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,876 (1987). "Because of the
special relationship between the probation officer and the probationer, the law relating to
probation searches cannot be strictly governed by automatic reference to ordinary search and
seizure law." State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227,233,657 P.2d 1095, 1101 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting
State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365,368 (Minn. 1980)). This special middle ground type status
has also caused our Courts to "perceive[] a distinction between searches of probationers
conducted by a supervising probation officer and those conducted by the police." Id., at 234,657
P.2d at 1102.
As a condition of granting probation, society has the right to impose stringent limitations
on a probationer's behavior, including "restrictions on important liberties such as the right to
travel, to change jobs or residence, or even to marry." Pinson, at 231, 657 P.2d at 1099.
However, "[i]mplicit in the system's concern with parole violations is the notion that the parolee
is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he substantially abides by the conditions of his parole."
Brewer, at 479.
[I]t is necessary to recognize that when fundamental rights are curbed it must be
done sensitively and with a keen appreciation that the infringement must serve the
broad purposes of the Probation Act. This burden cannot be avoided by
asserting either that the probationer has voluntarily waived his rights by not
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objecting in a proper manner to the conditions imposed upon him or that he
must accept any condition the court deems best as a consequence of being in
custody.

Consuelo-Gonzalez, at 265 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
Idaho Court have, without doubt, recognized that searches conducted without a warrant
by probation officers serve important goals related to probation and are permissible. "[T]he
probation department needs to be able to assure compliance with probation in an expedited
fashion without the necessity of probable cause." Klingler, at 497, 148 P.3d at 1243. "For
probation authorities to evaluate a probationer's progress in reintegrating into society, the
probation officer must have a thorough understanding of the probationer's environment and
personal habits." Pinson, at 231, 657 P.2d at 1099. For these reasons, "the ability of a parole
officer to conduct warrantless searches of persons under his supervision may be 'necessary to
effective operation of the parole system."' Id. (quoting Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F .2d 246, 250
(9th Cir. 1975)).
Whether the terms and conditions of a defendant's probation are reasonably related to the
goals of probation is a legal question over which our Appellate Courts exercise free review. State

v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315,318,847 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Ct.App.1993).
D.

The unconstitutional conditions doctrine.

As discussed above and in previous briefing, consent is one exception to the warrant
requirement.
In order to meet its burden on the consent exception, the State must show that "consent
was voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied." State v. Jaborra,
143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006). "A voluntary decision is one that is 'the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker."' Id., at 97, 137 P.3d at 484
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,225 (1973)). "The consent must be
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'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given."' United States v. Page, 302 F.2d
81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1962) (citation omitted).
The "unconstitutional conditions doctrine" "limits the government's ability to exact waivers
of rights as a condition of benefits, even when those benefits are fully discretionary." US. v. Scott,
450 F.3d 863,866 (9th Cir.2006) (footnote omitted); see also, Dolan v. City a/Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994); Nollan v. California Costa! Comm 'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958). This doctrine is specifically targeted at and relevant to issues relating to citizens purportedly
granting consent to the government. "[T]he government may not require a person to give up a
constitutional right. .. in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government. .. " Dolan,
at 385.
In the Scott case, a defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance. The
defendant plead not guilty, and as a condition of his released signed a form stating he agreed to
random drug testing. Scott, 450 F.3d at 865. The Court was faced with the question of"whetherthe
government can induce [defendant] to waive his Fourth Amendment rights by conditioning pretrial
release on such a waiver." Id., at FN 4. The Court found that the "unconstitutional conditions
doctrine" was relevant to the issue of whether or not the defendant truly gave his consent to this drug
testing condition. Id., at 866.
The Scott Court noted that while "[i]t may be tempting to say that such transactions - where
a citizen waives certain rights in exchange for a valuable benefit the government is under no duty to
grant. .. should be encouraged ... our constitutional law has not adopted this philosophy wholesale."
Id., at 866. "The right to keep someone in jail does not in any way imply the right to release that
person subject to unconstitutional conditions- such as chopping off a finger or giving up one's firstborn." Id., FN5. The Scott Court ultimately found that because of the governments unequal
bargaining power, coupled with the defendant's constitutional rights and the unconstitutional
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conditions doctrine, the warrantless search could not be upheld based purely on a consent theory.

Id., at 868.
In Nollan, homeowners applied for a building permit and the California Coastal Commission
conditionally granted their application. 483 U.S. at 828. However, the Commission required the
homeowners to grant an easement across the property as a condition to the building permit. Id. The
homeowners filed suit, alleging the condition constituted a taking by the government without
compensation. The homeowners also used the building permit to construct their new home. The
Supreme Court found the condition to be an unlawful taking, despite the fact the Commission had
the power to simply deny the building permit altogether, and despite the fact that the homeowners
had already used the permit to construct the building. Id., at 836.
Case law shows that even if governmental benefits may be withheld or bestowed at the
government's discretion, the government does not thereby have the automatic power to condition the
granting of the benefit on the defendant's waiver of important constitutional rights; and that a
defendant's acceptance of such conditions may still be found to not be "voluntary" in the legal sense.

E.

Argument

First, Defendant argues his conditions of probation that he waive all Fourth Amendment
rights and be subject to any search or seizure by any police officer violates separation of powers and
the nondelegation doctrine. The Idaho Constitution explicitly entrusts the management and oversight
of probation and probationers to the Board of Corrections. Police officers are not members of the
Board of Corrections, but are a separate entity.
Idaho has recognized that probation searches are a necessary and integral part of the
probation process, and thus fall within the Board's constitutionally prescribed powers. "[T]he
probation department needs to be able to assure compliance with probation in an expedited fashion
without the necessity of probable cause." Klingler, at 497, 148 P.3d at 1243. "[T]he ability of a
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parole officer to conduct warrantless searches of persons under his supervision may be 'necessary to
effective operation of the parole system.'" Pinson, at 231,657 P.2d at 1099 (quoting Latta, at 250).
"[P]arole authorities have a special and unique interest in invading the privacy of parolees under
their supervision." Consuelo-Gonzalez, at 265-266 (quoting Latta, at 249).
Idaho and Federal Courts have also recognized a clear distinction between probation officers
and police officers when it comes to monitoring and enforcing the terms of probation. "Although a
probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police officer who normally
conducts searches against the ordinary citizen ... while assuredly charged with protecting the public
interest, [a probation officer] is also supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer."

Griffin, at 876. The Pinson Court "perceived a distinction between searches of probationers
conducted by a supervising probation officer and those conducted by the police." At 234,657 P.2d
at 1102.
"The police officers had no authority to engage in the general supervision of [Defendant] or
his parole; the police officers could not determine whether the terms of parole were being complied
with, file a report of parole violation, impose discretionary jail time, or enforce the terms of parole."

State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 369, 347 P.3d 1025, 1030 (Ct. App. 2015). Despite not
sanctioning police officers to act purely on their own in conduction parole special needs searches,
Idaho does allowed parole officers to "enlist the aid of the police when conducting a justified
search." Peters, at 962, 950 P.2d at 1301.
Lastly, Idaho has recognized that these special conditions which make warrantless searches
acceptable for probation officers, does not extend to police officers in general. "The 'special and
unique' interest which probation authorities have in invading the privacy of probationers 'does not
extend to law enforcement officers generally.'" Pinson, at 233, 657 P.2d at 1101 (quoting Consuelo-

Gonzalez, at 266). Searches of probations by law enforcement officers "may not be done for the
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prime purpose of circumventing the ordinary constitutional process for the convenience of law
enforcement officers in the course of their investigation." Vega, at 688, 718 P .2d at 601 (quoting
Lafave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 10.10, at 449 (1978)). "It is
impermissible for the police to use parole officers in lieu of a warrant to search, when conducting a
criminal investigation."

Vega, at 688, 718 P .2d at 601. "[U]nder no circumstances should

cooperation between law enforcement officers and probation officers be permitted to make the
probation system 'a subterfuge for criminal investigations."' Consuelo-Gonzalez, at 267 (quoting

Latta, at 249).
Because probation searches are an integral part of the probation system, and because the
authority to administer probation is constitutionally entrusted to the Board of Corrections, Defendant
argues it would be an improper delegation of constitutional duties to give police officers in general
the authority to administer probation conditions by conducting warrantless searches at their own
whim.
Second, a condition such as the one imposed on Mr. Hansen is not reasonably related to the
goals of probation, and is overbroad.
In this case, the Court appeared to give no special consideration to Mr. Hansen's terms and
conditions of probation at the time of sentencing on June 6, 2018. The Court, at the outset of the
hearings that afternoon, advised all defendants in Court that if they were placed on probation these
would be the terms they would be subject too. Exhibit A. When Mr. Hansen's case was called, the
Court simply asked him if he had gone over the terms of probation, had heard the Court announce
the terms of probation, and if he agreed to be bound by them. Exhibit B. Counsel has attached
recordings of this proceeding for the Courts review. In the alternative, Counsel would ask the Court
to take judicial notice of its own proceedings on June 6, 2018.
"Parole conditions must be reasonable and have an acceptable aim towards rehabilitation."
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Mellinger, at 501, 757 P.2d at 1220. "While approving the search in this case, we note that
intrusions upon a probationer's privacy which do not relate to proper administration of probation are
invalid." Pinson, at 233, 657 P.2d at 1101. "[S]earches intended merely to harass or intimidate
probationers or parolees cannot be tolerated." Id. (quoting State v. Simms, 516 P.2d 1088, 1096, 10
Wn. App. 75, 83 (Wa. Ct. App.1973)).
In this case, there does not appear to be any indication that the Court found a full and
complete waiver of Mr. Hansen's Fourth Amendment rights was specifically necessary to
accomplish the goals of probation in his case. Rather, it appears the Court imposed this condition as
a standard term that it gave to every single defendant in court that day. While Defendant recognizes
there are certainly standard terms of probation that will logically be included in every probation case
(submit truthful reports to your probation officer, not violate the law, etc ... ), and that judicial
economy often requires the giving of standard terms and conditions to all defendants, Defendant
disputes that a full and complete waiver of all Fourth Amendment rights could be characterized as
one of those standard terms and conditions that can simply be imposed on every single probationer
without special consideration to their case. Without any explanation by the Court as to why a full
and complete Fourth Amendment waiver was necessary to serve the goals of probation in Mr.
Hansen's case specifically, Defendant argues this term was not imposed with an acceptable aim
towards rehabilitation.
This condition is also extremely overbroad in that it allows for searches and seizures which
are unreasonable, arbitrary or vindictive and which could serve no possible goal of probation. In
Idaho, "[C]ourts may not impose [probation] conditions which are vindictive, vague or overbroad."
Russell, at 518, 835 P.2d at 1329. Defendant cannot stress enough how extreme a condition a full
Fourth Amendment waiver is. As officer Sproat testified, police officers are now being trained that
any defendant placed on probation after 2016 will no longer have Fourth Amendment rights. The
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officer testified that according to his training there are now no limitations on law enforcement's
ability to conduct searches or seizure of probationers. This raises an interesting aside, who is telling
police officers in Kootenai County that every judge in the county will now be ordering a complete
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights in every probation case from now on?
It is worthwhile to take a look at some of the searches and seizures the Court has allowed by

placing this condition on Defendant. Under this condition, any police officer may go to Mr.
Hansen's home at 3:00 a.m., pick the lock to his front door, and rummage around inside his home
while Mr. Hansen sleeps. Any police officer who sees Mr. Hansen walking down the street and
wants to talk to him could run up to him, grab him, put him in handcuffs, and tell him he isn't going
anywhere until the officer gets the information he wants out of him. Since Mr. Hansen also has no
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, that same officer could presumably arrest
Mr. Hansen and hold him in jail indefinitely until Mr. Hansen is willing to talk to the officer. A
police officer, who has some personal grudge against Mr. Hansen or his family, could pull Mr.
Hansen's vehicle over every time he sees Mr. Hansen driving just for the purpose of harassing Mr.
Hansen. Any police officer can forcibly require Mr. Hansen to submit to a blood draw, or any other
invasion of his body, without the need for any level of suspicion of any kind. If a police officer
wanted to know what Mr. Hansen ate for lunch, this condition of probation allows that officer to
order that Mr. Hansen's stomach be pumped. And according to the State, Mr. Hansen would be
powerless to stop his stomach from being pumped because he doesn't even have the right to
withdraw consent to such a search.
While Defense counsel concedes the absurdity of these factual scenarios, the fact remains that
Mr. Hansen's conditions of probation literally allow for each of these searches to occur. The fact
that all of these are allowed under his terms of probation should be sufficient to demonstrate that the
term itself is severely overbroad. It is also shows that this term runs contrary to the Pinsen Court's
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prohibition against "searches intended merely to harass or intimidate probationers" At 233, 657 P.2d
at 1101.
Defendant request the Court find this term of probation is not designed to further the goals of
probation, and is unconstitutionally overbroad.
Third, Defendant argues he could not have given free, voluntary and knowing consent to such
a condition based upon the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
In order to show that legally valid consent has been given, the State bears the burden of
showing that "the consent was voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or
implied." Jaborra, at 97, 137 P.3d at 484. "A voluntary decision is one that is 'the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker."' Id., at 97, 137 P.3d at 484 (quoting
Schneckloth, at 225). "The consent must be 'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently
given."' Page, at 83-84 (citation omitted).
In this case, Mr. Hansen found himself in a position where he had no bargaining power and
was faced with an untenable decision. He could ask the Court to send him to prison, or, he could
accept probation subject to completely waiving his Fourth Amendment rights. As the Court knows
there is more to the consent analysis then simply asking, did the defendant say yes to it. The Court
must still engage in an analysis of the parties bargaining position, the nature and quality of the
Constitutional rights the defendant was asked to abandon, and whether such choice was truly made
"freely," "intelligently," and "voluntarily." Just as a defendant who chooses to cut off her pinky
finger rather than go to prison cannot be said to have truly consented to such choice; Defendant asks
this Court to find that he could not have truly consented to waive all of his right to personal
autonomy, privacy and security that are embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant respectfully requests the Court apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and
find that he did not legally consent to this condition of his probation.
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CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, Defendant respectfully requests the Court grant his Motion to
Suppress Evidence.

DATED this J.2_,day of January, 2019.

KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:
BENJAMIN M ONOSKO
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing
1,2,.day of January, 2019.
a copy of the same as indicated below on this
Kootenai County Prosecutor
Via Fax: (208) 446-2168
Via Interoffice Mail
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Filed: 01/31/2019 08:13:17
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

Case No. CR 28-18-15354

vs.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

CODY L. HANSEN,

Defendant.

Defendant Cody Leigh Hansen filed a Motion to Suppress on December 4, 2018.
Defendant's motion came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer on
January 16, 2019. Defendant was present and represented by Deputy Public Defender Benjamin
N. Onosko. The State was represented by Deputy Prosecutor Stanley Mortensen. Defendant's
Motion to Suppress is granted because Defendant revoked his consent to search and the
warrantless search was not otherwise reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2018, at around 6:30 a.m., Sergeant Curt Sproat was driving eastbound
on Interstate 90 when he observed Defendant's vehicle slowly drift from the left lane into the
right lane without using a turn signal. Defendant's car straddled the dividing line between the
lanes for a few seconds before moving completely back into the left lane. Defendant's lane of
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travel was not obstructed by any objects that would have required him to change lanes. Sgt.
Sproat initiated a traffic stop based on his observations.
When Sgt. Sproat approached the vehicle from the passenger side, he noticed the
backseat passenger was making "furtive movements" and the Defendant driver and his front seat
passenger were not wearing seat belts. Sgt. Sproat asked Defendant for his license and
registration, as well as identification from the passengers. Defendant informed Sgt. Sproat that he
was on felony probation. At the time of the stop, Defendant had not yet registered the vehicle
and did not know his home address.
Sgt. Sproat became suspicious of Defendant when Defendant "looked down" and "broke
eye contact" with him after Sgt. Sproat asked Defendant if there was anything inside the vehicle
he should know about. Testimony of Sgt. Curt Sproat. Sgt. Sproat asked Defendant to exit the
vehicle so that he could obtain consent to search Defendant's vehicle and to "figure out how he's
doing on probation." Id. The following conversation took place:
Q:

So, with you being on felony probation, okay? FourthFourth Amendment waiver, ok? So, you said you own this
vehicle, right?

A:

Yeah, well I just haven't registered it yet. I made a down
payment of$450 and he wants $1000 total.

Q:

Okay. Now, when did you get put on probation?

A:

June 6th , when I got released from my rider.

Q:

Okay. With that when you're driving the vehicle, okay? So,
you gave law enforcement officers permission to search the
vehicle, correct?

Plaintiffs Ex. 2.
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Sgt. Sproat spoke with Defendant for approximately fifteen to sixteen minutes regarding
his probation status. During their conversation, Sgt. Sproat asked Defendant for consent to search
the vehicle more than four times:
Q:

So, do you give me consent to search the vehicle?

A:

Uh, I don't really feel comfortable getting searched, but I
don't - I thought you could just search it, you know.

Q:

Well, yeah, I know but-

A:

Yeah, I mean, yeah, but if you have to, yeah.

(Defendant consents to pat down)
Q:

You're giving me consent to search the vehicle?

A:

· Well, like I said I don't feel comfortable but if you have to-

Q:

Like we talked about before, you're on felony probation,
okay? Did you sign something that says - did you sign a
Fourth Amendment waiver?

A:

Yeah. I'm pretty sure, yeah.
(discussing probation packet)

Q:

Yeah. That's why I'm asking for consent, okay?

(following conversation with Defendant about Probation Officer)
Q:

So, you give me consent? I just want to clarify.

A:

Well, I mean I'm not ---

Q:

Well that's what we just talked about.

A:

Well, I mean then, no, I don't.

Q:

You don't have to give me consent. But if you sign a
Fourth Amendment waiver-

A:

That is consent.

Q:

What's that?
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A:

Then isn't that consent?

Q:

That's not consent, okay? What I'm asking for is consent,
based on what I'm seeing here.

Plaintiffs Ex. 2.

At the motion to suppress hearing, Sgt. Sproat testified that he initially decided to search
Defendant's vehicle based on Defendant's consent to search and Defendant's Fourth
Amendment waiver signed as a condition of his probation. When Defendant ultimately denied
consent to search the vehicle, Sgt. Sproat testified that he proceeded to search the vehicle based
on the consent given pursuant to Defendant's conditions of probation.
Throughout his conversation with Defendant, Sgt. Sproat did not have an address for
Defendant and thus did not have all the information he believed he needed to issue Defendant a
citation. Following his conversation with Defendant, Sgt. Sproat had the passengers exit the
vehicle and join the Defendant down the road from the vehicle. Sgt. Sproat then attempted to
contact Defendant's probation officer to obtain Defendant's address and to inform the probation
officer of Defendant's level of cooperation. When Defendant's probation officer was not
available, Sgt. Sproat attempted to contact an on-call probation officer. When that was
unsuccessful, Sgt. Sproat began to draft a citation without Defendant's address.
Sgt. Sproat subsequently conducted a warrantless search of Defendant's vehicle which
resulted in the discovery of contraband. Sgt. Sproat issued Defendant a citation for failure to
wear a seat belt and arrested him based on the contraband.
On October 3, 2018, Defendant was indicted by a grand jury on Count I of Possession
with Intent to Deliver in violation ofldaho Code§ 37-2732(a)(l)(A).
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On December 4, 2018, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained as a
result of Sgt. Sproat's search of his vehicle. On January 15, 2019, the State filed a Memorandum
in Opposition to the Motion to Suppress.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Defendant's probation officer testified
regarding the conditions of Defendant's probation in a different criminal case. Defendant's
conditions of probation included a Fourth Amendment waiver:
I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal
property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by
me, or for which I am the controlling authority conducted by any
agent of IDOC or a law enforcement officer. I hereby waive my
rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution
concerning searches.
Plaintiff's Ex. 1. Defendant's probation agreement also contained the following statement:
I have read or have read to me the above agreement and have been
provided with a copy of the Idaho Response Matrix. I understand
and accept these conditions of supervision. I agree to abide by and
conform to them and understand that my failure to do so may result
in the submission of a report of violation to my sentencing/paroling
authority.

Id. Defendant's probation officer testified that she discussed the conditions of probation with
Defendant before Defendant signed the waiver. The probation officer also testified that
Defendant did not ask to revoke or modify the conditions of his probation after he signed the
probation agreement.
On January 22, 2018, Defendant filed a Reply Brief. The Court took this matter under
advisement on January 16, 2019.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The standard of review on a motion to suppress is bifurcated." State v. Roe, 140 Idaho
176, 179, 90 P.3d 926, 929 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916
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P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996)). The reviewing court accepts the trial court's findings of fact
which are supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews the trial court's application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. Id "At a suppression hearing, the power to assess
the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court." Id (citing State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106,
897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App.
1999)).
ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of his
vehicle should be suppressed for several reasons: (1) the initial stop was not justified by
reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant was driving his vehicle contrary to traffic laws;
(2) Defendant revoked his consent to search the vehicle; (3) Sgt. Sproat abandoned the original
purpose of the traffic stop when he decided to search Defendant's vehicle; (4) Sgt. Sproat
impennissibly extended the scope and duration of the stop without reasonable articulable
suspicion; and (5) if the Court upholds the search of Defendant's vehicle based on the consent
given under Defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver, that Defendant's conditions of probation
were unconstitutional. The State argues the evidence obtained during the warrantless search of
Defendant's vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment because (1) Sgt. Sproat's initial stop
of the vehicle was justified by Sgt. Sproat's observation of a traffic violation; and (2) Defendant
previously consented to the search of his vehicle as a condition of probation. The State also
argues that Defendant did not have the right to revoke his consent to search absent a court
hearing to modify the terms of his probation.
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I.

The initial stop of the vehicle was supported by reasonable articulable
suspicion under Morris.

"A traffic stop by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's
occupants which implicates the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Atkinson,
128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648,653 (1979)). "The stop must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws or that either the vehicle or the occupant is subject
to detention in connection with a violation of other laws." State v. Flowers, 648, 208 (citations
omitted). "The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the stop," and "requires less than probable cause, but more than
mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." Id. (citations omitted). Generally,
"[s]uspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell 'within
the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior."' Atkinson, 129 Idaho at
561, 916 P.2d at 1286.
Idaho Code § 49-808(2) states that "[a] signal of intention to turn or move right or left
when required shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than
five (5) seconds and, in all other circumstances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet
traveled by the vehicle before turning." I.C. § 49-808. Idaho Code§ 49-637 states:
Whenever any highway has been divided into two (2) or more
clearly marked lanes for traffic the following, in addition to all
else, shall apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely
within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until
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the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made
with safety.
LC. § 49-637.
The Idaho Court of Appeals held a traffic stop was justified when the officer observed the
defendant's vehicle cross over a white dividing line into a bicycle lane or parking area "for two
or three seconds" when there was not "a circumstance that would have required the vehicle to
cross the line." State v. Morris, 159 Idaho 651, 653, 365 P.3d 407, 409 (Ct. App. 2015). In
Morris, the officer followed the vehicle and did not observe any additional traffic violations

before initiating a traffic stop. The Morris court explained that under Idaho Code § 49-63 7
''where circumstances make it no longer feasible to drive in one's lane (e.g., a large boulder in
the driver's lane), the driver is permitted to temporarily leave the driver's lane, where it is safe to
do so, until it is feasible to drive in the driver's original lane." Id at 655, 365 P.3d at 411. The
Morris court held the defendant clearly violated Idaho Code § 49-673 because his vehicle "left

its lane," and "at the time the vehicle's tires crossed the line, neither the officer nor Morris
perceived a circumstance that would have required the vehicle to cross the line." Id at 656, 365
P.3d at 412.
Sgt. Sproat testified that Defendant's vehicle crossed the dividing line between the left
and right lane of travel and straddled the line for several seconds before Defendant's vehicle
returned to the left lane. During this time, Sgt. Sproat did not observe Defendant use a turn signal
to signal a lane change as is required by Idaho statute. Further, the evidence in the record does
not show that Defendant's lane of travel was blocked or that it was impracticable for Defendant
to remain within his lane of travel. Thus, Sgt. Sproat possessed reasonable articulable suspicion
to initiate a traffic stop of the Defendant under Morris because he observed driver conduct that
could have been in violation ofldaho Code§ 49-637(1).
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Defendant argues that the Court should find that the Defendant's momentarily straddling
the dividing line between the left and right lanes to be within the "broad range" of "normal
driving behavior." Defendant cites to Neal and Fuller in support. Both cases are easily
distinguishable from the present case. In Neal, the officer saw the defendant's truck move "onto,
but not across, the line at the edge of the roadway (the 'fog line')," twice. State v. Neal, 159
Idaho 439,441, 362 P.3d 514, 516 (2015). In Fuller, another case cited by Defendant, an officer
observed the defendant's front passenger-side tire drive onto and temporarily cross the fog line.
State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585, 587, 416 P.3d 957, 959 (2018). The officer pulled the defendant

over "due to [her] failure to maintain her lane of travel under section 49-637(1) when her tire
crossed the fog line," and arrested her for other code violations. Id The Fuller court explained
that ''the fog line is not a lane barrier." Id. at 589, 416 P.3d at 961. The Fuller court held that "an
isolated incident of temporarily crossing the fog line likewise does not violate section 49637 (1 ). " Id at 590, 416 P.3d at 692. Thus, the Fuller court held that the traffic stop of the
defendant was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. Id Both Neal and Fuller are
inapplicable to the present case because Defendant crossed the dividing line separating the left
lane and right lane of travel not the fog line.
II.

Sgt. Sproat could not rely on Defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver after
Defendant revoked his consent to search.

"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable." State v. Weaver, 288, 290, 900
P.2d 196, 198 (1995) (citation omitted). "The burden of proof rests with the State to demonstrate
that the search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was
otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." Id. "A search conducted with consent that was
freely given is such an exception." State v. Marshall, 149 Idaho 725, 726, 239 P.3d 1286, 1287
(Ct. App. 2008). "This exception encompasses consents given as a condition of probation or
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parole." Id (citations omitted). "The State has the burden of demonstrating consent by a
preponderance of the evidence." State v. Greub, 162 Idaho 581, 585, 401 P.3d 581, 585 (Ct.
App. 2017) (citations omitted).
"[W]hen the basis for a search is consent, the state must conform its search to the
limitations placed upon the right granted by the consent." State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 749,
250 P.3d 796, 800 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted). "Idaho appellate courts have long
recognized that parolees and probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy." State v.
Hedgecock, 147 Idaho 580,584,212 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Ct. App. 2009). "However, we must keep

in mind that probationers' expectation of privacy is merely diminished, not obliterated." State v.
Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 752, 250 P.3d 796, 803 (Ct. App. 2011). "Ultimately, the standard set

forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." State v. Stewart, 152 Idaho 868, 869-70, 276
P.3d 740, 741--42 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973)).
"[C]ourts evaluating the scope of the Fourth Amendment waiver must look to the language used
in the condition of probation in order to determine whether the search was objectively
reasonable." State v. Jaskowski, 163 Idaho 257, 261, 409 P.3d 837, 841 (2018). "Under this
approach, 'the court will give force and effect to the words of the contract . . . . [T]he law
presumes that the parties understood the import of their contract and that they had the intention
which its terms manifest." Id. (quoting J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d
748, 751 (2006)).
Defendant signed a Fourth Amendment waiver which stated the following:
I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal
property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by
me, or for which I am the controlling authority conducted by any
agent of IDOC or a law enforcement officer. I hereby waive my
rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution
concerning searches.
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Plaintiff's Ex. 1. The consent granted under the waiver included searches of Defendant's vehicle
by "a law enforcement officer." Id. The waiver clearly states that Defendant waived his "rights
under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution concerning searches." Id. It appears to
the Court that Sgt. Sproat's search of the vehicle would fall within the scope of Defendant's
Fourth Amendment waiver.
However, "consent once given may also be revoked for 'inherent in the requirement that
consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that consent."' State v. Greub, 162
Idaho 581, 586, 401 P.3d 581, 586 (Ct. App. 2017) (quoting State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643,
646, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014)). "Thus, after a defendant has revoked consent, officers no longer
may act pursuant to that initial voluntary consent." Id. (citation omitted). Idaho courts have
suggested that if the probationer "found the consent to search condition of probation to be too
onerous, he had the right at any time to decline probation and instead serve the suspended
portion of the sentence." State v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 119, 122, 867 P.2d 993, 996 (Ct. App.
1993) (Josephson II).
The Court notes that the parties did not provide Idaho case law that speaks directly to this
issue. In the past, the United States Supreme Court declined to address whether a waiver given
as a condition of probation or parole constitutes a complete waiver of a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights because the Court upheld the searches on other bases under the Fourth
Amendment. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (holding search was
supported by reasonable suspicion); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 852 n. 3 (2006) (declining to
address consent argument because suspicion-less search was otherwise reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.). The Idaho case located by the Court that raised this issue took a similar
tack and upheld the search based on reasonable suspicion under Pinson. See State v. Molina, 113
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Idaho 449,452, 745 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Ct. App. 1987). Further, the State has cited to no authority
that indicates the consent provided by Defendant as a condition of his probation could not later
be revoked. The evidence in the record shows that Defendant ultimately did not give consent for
Sgt. Sproat to conduct a warrantless search of his vehicle. Following the reasoning in Greub, it
was not reasonable for Sgt. Sproat to rely on Defendant's advance consent given pursuant to a
waiver when Defendant subsequently revoked his consent to search the vehicle.
Defendant argues that the Court should uphold the search of Defendant's vehicle based
on Defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver under Gawron. In Gawron, the Idaho Supreme Court
upheld the warrantless search of a probationer's apartment pursuant to the probationer's Fourth
Amendment waiver. The probationer in Gawron was not present during the search of his
residence. The Fourth Amendment waiver at issue in Gawron stated: "That probationer does
hereby agree and consent to the search of his person, automobile, real property, and any other
property at any time and at any place by any law enforcement officer, peace officer, or probation
officer, and does waive his constitutional right to be free from such searches." State v. Gawron,
112 Idaho 841, 842, 736 P.2d 1295, 1296 (1987). The Gawron court upheld the warrantless
search and the admission of evidence obtained during the search based on Defendant's waiver
even though the search did not otherwise satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The
Gawron court explained that probationers "have a reduced expectation of privacy, thereby

rendering intrusions by government authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise would be
unreasonable or invalid under traditional constitutional concepts." Id. at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297.
Gawron is distinguishable because Defendant was present during the search and he

expressly revoked his consent to search. Even if the waiver at issue in this case is substantially
similar to the waiver in Gawron, the defendant in Gawron was not present during the search.
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Further, in a subsequent Idaho Court of Appeals case, the court stated it is ''unconvinced that
Gawron . . . stand[s] for the proposition that the type of probation condition at issue here

constitutes a complete waiver of all Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the actual language
in the condition." State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 749, 250 P.3d 796, 800 (Ct. App. 2011).
Further, the State has pointed to no authority that indicates that consent to search given under a
Fourth Amendment waiver is irrevocable.
Further, the State's argument that a probationer cannot revoke consent to search absent a
court hearing is unavailing in this case. The State cites to State v. Ellis in support. State v. Ellis,
155 Idaho 584, 314 P.3d 639 (Ct. App. 2013). The State argues that Ellis stands for the
proposition that a probationer cannot unilaterally revoke a condition of probation, such as
consent to searches, absent a formal hearing. It appears to the Court that this is a broad reading of
Ellis, and that Ellis is not applicable to the facts of this case. In Ellis, a parolee's residence was

searched following his arrest in an unrelated case. The defendant in Ellis argued that the
evidence obtained as a result of the search warranted suppression because his parole was
terminated as soon as he was arrested and in custody for the unrelated charge. The Ellis court
held that the defendant was still subject to the terms of his parole agreement even after arrest
because a court had yet to formally revoke his parole. The Ellis court explained that were it to
determine that the defendant's parole had terminated at arrest, there was the potential for
parolees to ''unilaterally suspend" their agreements "by committing a wrongful act, and then
would be able to commit further ... violations with impunity." Id. at 589, 314 P.3d at 644.
Further, the Ellis court also held that the search of the parolee's residence was supported by
"reasonable suspicion" that the parolee was engaged in criminal activity, which would also
render the evidence admissible. Id. at 591, 314 P.3d at 646.
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In contrast to Ellis, Defendant was not arrested at the time Sgt. Sproat conducted a search
of his vehicle. At the time of the stop, there was no evidence that Defendant had committed a
probation violation. Defendant did not raise the argument that he was no longer subject to the
terms of his probation agreement once he was stopped by Sgt. Sproat. Further, Sgt. Sproat did
not possess reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity which would
justify the search of a probationer under Ellis. In fact, the only reason given by Sgt. Sproat for
the search of the vehicle was Defendant's status as a probationer and his consent to search and
Fourth Amendment waiver given as a condition of probation.

III.

Sgt. Sproat's search of the vehicle does not fall within any other exception to
the warrant requirement.

"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable." State v. Weaver, 288, 290, 900
P.2d 196, 198 (1995) (citation omitted). "The burden of proof rests with the State to demonstrate
that the search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was
otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." Id
In the present case, the State presented no evidence that Sgt. Sproat's warrantless search
of Defendant's vehicle fell within another exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, the
evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of the vehicle warrants suppression.
Because the Court concludes that Sgt. Sproat's search of Defendant's vehicle was not
supported by consent or any other exception to the Fourth Amendment, the Court does not reach
Defendant's arguments regarding an impermissible extension of the stop or the constitutionality
of the terms of Defendant's probation.
CONCLUSION

Sgt. Sproat's initial stop of Defendant's vehicle was justified under the totality of the
circumstances because Sgt. Sproat directly observed Defendant commit what appeared to be one
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or more traffic violations. However, Sgt. Sproat's search of Defendant's vehicle was unlawful
despite Defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver because Defendant expressly revoked his
consent to search the vehicle. Sgt. Sproat's search of the vehicle did not fall within any other
exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, the evidence obtained as a result of Defendant's
vehicle warrants suppression in this case.
Dated this 31 st day of January, 2019.
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day of January, 2019, the Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer presiding. A copy of the judgment or
order being appealed is attached to this notice.
2.

The State of Idaho has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
Rule 11 (c)(7), I.A.R.
3.

Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district court erred

when it concluded that the search of a probationer's car was constitutionally unreasonable
because the probationer, who had previously consented to searches and waived his search and
seizure rights as part of his probation, refused to affirmatively grant the officer consent to search.
4.

To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record has been sealed.

5.

The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's

transcript:
Hearing on the motion to suppress held January 16, 2019 (court reporter Diane Bolan).
6.

Appellant requests the normal clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28, I.A.R.

7.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
DIANE BOLAN
dbolan@kcgov.us
(b)

That arrangements have been made with the Kootenai County Prosecuting

Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript;
(c)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the

preparation of the record because the State ofldaho is the appellant (Idaho Code § 31-3212);
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(d)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal

case (I.A.R. 23(a)(8));
(e)

That service is being made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this 21st day of February, 2019.

Deputy Attorney Gene
Attorney for the Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 3
Page 191

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of February, 2019, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the individuals listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
THE HONORABLE CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER
Kootenai County District Court
cmeyer@kcgov.us
BARRY McHUGH
STAN MORTENSEN
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
kcpaicourts@kcgov.us
BENJAMIN M. ONOSKO
Kootenai County Public Defender's Office
pdfax@kcgov.us
DIANE BOLAN
dbolan@kcgov.us

COPY TO:
KAREL A. LEHRMAN
CLERK OF THE COURT
IDAHO SUPREME COURT
supremecourtdocuments@idcourts.net

Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd

NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 4
Page 192

Filed:01/31/2019 08:13:17
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR 28-18-15354

vs.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

CODY L. HANSEN,
Defendant.

Defendant Cody Leigh Hansen filed a Motion to Suppress on December 4, 2018.
Defendant's motion came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer on
January 16, 2019. Defendant was present and represented by Deputy Public Defender Benjamin
N. Onosko. The State was represented by Deputy Prosecutor Stanley Mortensen. Defendant's
Motion to Suppress is granted because Defendant revoked his consent to search and the
warrantless search was not otherwise reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 11, 2018, at around 6:30 a.m., Sergeant Curt Sproat was driving eastbound
on Interstate 90 when he observed Defendant's vehicle slowly drift from the left lane into the
right lane without using a turn signal. Defendant's car straddled the dividing line between the
lanes for a few seconds before moving completely back into the left lane. Defendant's lane of
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travel was not obstructed by any objects that would have required him to change lanes. Sgt.
Sproat initiated a traffic stop based on his observations.
When Sgt. Sproat approached the vehicle from the passenger side, he noticed the
backseat passenger was making "furtive movements" and the Defendant driver and his front seat
passenger were not wearing seat belts. Sgt. Sproat asked Defendant for his license and
registration, as well as identification from the passengers. Defendant informed Sgt. Sproat that he
was on felony probation. At the time of the stop, Defendant had not yet registered the vehicle
and did not know his home address.
Sgt. Sproat became suspicious of Defendant when Defendant "looked down" and "broke
eye contact" with him after Sgt. Sproat asked Defendant if there was anything inside the vehicle
he should know about. Testimony of Sgt. Curt Sproat. Sgt. Sproat asked Defendant to exit the
vehicle so that he could obtain consent to search Defendant's vehicle and to "figure out how he's
doing on probation." Id. The following conversation took place:
Q:

. So, with you being on felony probation, okay? FourthFourth Amendment waiver, ok? So, you said you own this
vehicle, right?

A:

Yeah, well I just haven't registered it yet. I made a down
payment of$450 and he wants $1000 total.

Q:

Okay. Now, when did you get put on probation?

A:

June 6th, when I got released from my rider.

Q:

Okay. With that when you're driving the vehicle, okay? So,
you gave law enforcement officers permission to search the
vehicle, correct?

Plaintiffs Ex. 2.
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Sgt. Sproat spoke with Defendant for approximately fifteen to sixteen minutes regarding
his probation status. During their conversation, Sgt. Sproat asked Defendant for consent to search
the vehicle more than four times:
Q:

So, do you give me consent to search the vehicle?

A:

Uh, I don't really feel comfortable getting searched, but I
don't-I thought you could just search it, you know.

Q:

Well, yeah, I knowbut-

A:

Yeah, I mean, yeah, but if you have to, yeah.

(Defendant consents to pat down)
Q:

You're giving me consent to search the vehicle?

A:

- Well, like I said I don't feel comfortable but if you have to-

Q:

Like we talked about before, you're on felony probation,
okay? Did you sign something that says - did you sign a
Fourth Amendment waiver?

A:

Yeah. I'm pretty sure, yeah.
(discussing probation packet)

Q:

Yeah. That's why I'm asking for consent, okay?

(following conversation with Defendant about Probation Officer)
Q:

So, you give me consent? I just want to clarify.

A:

Well, I mean I'm not ---

Q:

Well that's what we just talked about.

A:

Well, I mean then, no, I don't.

Q:

You don't have to give me consent. But if you sign a
Fourth Amendment waiver-

A:

That is consent.

Q:

What's that?
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A:

Then isn't that consent?

Q:

That's not consent, okay? What I'm asking for is consent,
based on what I'm seeing here.

Plaintiff's Ex. 2.

At the motion to suppress hearing, Sgt. Sproat testified that he initially decided to search
Defendant's vehicle based on Defendant's consent to search and Defendant's Fourth
Amendment waiver signed as a condition of his probation. When Defendant ultimately denied
consent to search the vehicle, Sgt. Sproat testified that he proceeded to search the vehicle based
on the consent given pursuant to Defendant's conditions of probation.
Throughout his conversation with Defendant, Sgt. Sproat did not have an address for
Defendant and thus did not have all the information he believed he needed to issue Defendant a
citation. Following his conversation with Defendant, Sgt. Sproat had the passengers exit the
vehicle and join the Defendant down the road from the vehicle. Sgt. Sproat then attempted to
contact Defendant's probation officer to obtain Defendant's address and to inform the probation
officer of Defendant's level of cooperation. When Defendant's probation officer was not
available, Sgt. Sproat attempted to contact an on-call probation officer. When that was
unsuccessful, Sgt. Sproat began to draft a citation without Defendant's address.
Sgt. Sproat subsequently conducted a warrantless search of Defendant's vehicle which
resulted in the discovery of contraband. Sgt. Sproat issued Defendant a citation for failure to
wear a seat belt and arrested him based on the contraband.
On October 3, 2018, Defendant was indicted by a grand jury on Count I of Possession
with Intent to Deliver in violation ofldaho Code§ 37-2732(a)(l)(A).
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On December 4, 2018, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained as a
result of Sgt. Sproat's search of his vehicle. On January 15, 2019, the State filed a Memorandum
in Opposition to the Motion to Suppress.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Defendant's probation officer testified
regarding the conditions of Defendant's probation in a different criminal case. Defendant's
conditions of probation included a Fourth Amendment waiver:
I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal
property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by
me, or for which I am the controlling authority conducted by any
agent of !DOC or a law enforcement officer. I hereby waive my
rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution
concerning searches.
Plaintiff's Ex. 1. Defendant's probation agreement also contained the following statement:
I have read or have read to me the above agreement and have been
provided with a copy of the Idaho Response Matrix. I understand
and accept these conditions of supervision. I agree to abide by and
conform to them and understand that my failure to do so may result
in the submission of a report of violation to my sentencing/paroling
authority.

Id. Defendant's probation officer testified that she discussed the conditions of probation with
Defendant before Defendant signed the waiver. The probation officer also testified that
Defendant did not ask to revoke or modify the conditions of his probation after he signed the
probation agreement.
On January 22, 2018, Defendant filed a Reply Brief. The Court took this matter under
advisement on January 16, 2019.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The standard of review on a motion to suppress is bifurcated." State v. Roe, 140 Idaho
176, 179, 90 P.3d 926,929 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561,916
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P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996)). The reviewing court accepts the trial court's findings of fact
which are supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews the trial court's application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. Id "At a suppression hearing, the power to assess
the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court." Id (citing State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106,
897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App.
1999)).

ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of his
vehicle should be sµppressed for several reasons: (1) the initial stop was not justified by
reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant was driving his vehicle contrary to traffic laws;
(2) Defendant revoked his consent to search the vehicle; (3) Sgt. Sproat abandoned the original
purpose of the traffic stop when he decided to search Defendant's vehicle; (4) Sgt. Sproat
impermissibly extended the scope and duration of the stop without reasonable articulable
suspicion; and (5) if the Court upholds the search of Defendant's vehicle based on the consent
given under Defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver, that Defendant's conditions of probation
were unconstitutional. The State argues the evidence obtained during the warrantless search of
Defendant's vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment because (1) Sgt. Sproat's initial stop
of the vehicle was justified by Sgt. Sproat's observation of a traffic violation; and (2) Defendant
previously consented to the search of his vehicle as a condition of probation. The State also
argues that Defendant did not have the right to revoke his consent to search absent a court
hearing to modify the terms of his probation.
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I.

The initial stop of the vehicle was supported by reasonable articulable
suspicion under Morris.

"A traffic stop by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's
occupants which implicates the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Atkinson,
128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653 (1979)). "The stop must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws or that either the vehicle or the occupant is subject
to detention in connection with a violation of other laws." State v. Flowers, 648, 208 (citations
omitted). "The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the stop," and "requires less than probable cause, but more than
mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." Id (citations omitted). Generally,
"[s]uspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell 'within
the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior."' Atkinson, 129 Idaho at
561, 916 P.2d at 1286.
Idaho Code § 49-808(2) states that "[a] signal of intention to turn or move right or left
when required shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than
five (5) seconds and, in all other circumstances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet
traveled by the vehicle before turning." LC.§ 49-808. Idaho Code§ 49-637 states:
Whenever any highway has been divided into two (2) or more
clearly marked lanes for traffic the following, in addition to all
else, shall apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely
within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until
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the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made
with safety.
LC. § 49-637.
The Idaho Court of Appeals held a traffic stop was justified when the officer observed the
defendant's vehicle cross over a white dividing line into a bicycle lane or parking area "for two
or three seconds" when there was not "a circumstance that would have required the vehicle to
cross the line." State v. Morris, 159 Idaho 651, 653, 365 P.3d 407, 409 (Ct. App. 2015). In

Morris, the officer followed the vehicle and did not observe any additional traffic violations
before initiating a traffic stop. The Morris court explained that under Idaho Code § 49-63 7
''where circumstances make it no longer feasible to drive in one's lane (e.g., a large boulder in
the driver's lane), the driver is permitted to temporarily leave the driver's lane, where it is safe to
do so, until it is feasible to drive in the driver's original lane." Id at 655, 365 P.3d at 411. The

Morris court held the defendant clearly violated Idaho Code § 49-673 because his vehicle "left
its lane," and "at the time the vehicle's tires crossed the line, neither the officer nor Morris
perceived a circumstance that would have required the vehicle to cross the line." Id. at 656, 365
P.3d at 412.
Sgt. Sproat testified that Defendant's vehicle crossed the dividing line between the left
and right lane of travel and straddled the line for several seconds before Defendant's vehicle
returned to the left lane. During this time, Sgt. Sproat did not observe Defendant use a turn signal
to signal a lane change as is required by Idaho statute. Further, the evidence in the record does
not show that Defendant's lane of travel was blocked or that it was impracticable for Defendant
to remain within his lane of travel. Thus, Sgt. Sproat possessed reasonable articulable suspicion
to initiate a traffic stop of the Defendant under Morris because he observed driver conduct that
could have been in violation ofidaho Code§ 49-637(1).
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Defendant argues that the Court should find that the Defendant's momentarily straddling
the dividing line between the left and right lanes to be within the "broad range" of "normal
driving behavior." Defendant cites to Neal and Fuller in support. Both cases are easily
distinguishable from the present case. In Neal, the officer saw the defendant's truck move "onto,
but not across, the line at the edge of the roadway (the 'fog line')," twice. State v. Neal, 159
Idaho 439, 441, 362 P.3d 514, 516 (2015). In Fuller, another case cited by Defendant, an officer
observed the defendant's front passenger-side tire drive onto and temporarily cross the fog line.

State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585, 587, 416 P.3d 957, 959 (2018). The officer pulled the defendant
over "due to [her] failure to maintain her lane of travel under section 49-637(1) when her tire
crossed the fog line," and arrested her for other code violations. Id. The Fuller court explained
that ''the fog line is not a lane barrier." Id. at 589, 416 P.3d at 961. The Fuller court held that "an
isolated incident of temporarily crossing the fog line likewise does not violate section 49637(1 )." Id at 590, 416 P.3d at 692. Thus, the Fuller court held that the traffic stop of the
defendant was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. Id Both Neal and Fuller are
inapplicable to the present case because Defendant crossed the dividing line separating the left
lane and right lane of travel not the fog line.

II.

Sgt. Sproat could not rely on Defendant,s Fourth Amendment waiver after
Defendant revoked his consent to search.

"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable." State v. Weaver, 288, 290, 900
P.2d 196, 198 (1995) (citation omitted). "The burden of proof rests with the State to demonstrate
that the search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was
otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." Id. "A search conducted with consent that was
freely given is such an exception." State v. Marshall, 149 Idaho 725, 726, 239 P.3d 1286, 1287
(Ct. App. 2008). "This exception encompasses consents given as a condition of probation or
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parole." Id (citations omitted). "The State has the burden of demonstrating consent by a
preponderance of the evidence." State v. Greub, 162 Idaho 581, 585, 401 P.3d 581, 585 (Ct.
App. 2017) (citations omitted).
"[W]hen the basis for a search is consent, the state must conform its search to the
limitations placed upon the right granted by the consent." State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 749,
250 P.3d 796, 800 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted). "Idaho appellate courts have long
recognized that parolees and probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy." State v.
Hedgecock, 147 Idaho 580,584,212 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Ct. App. 2009). "However, we must keep

in mind that probationers' expectation of privacy is merely diminished, not obliterated." State v.
Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 752, 250 P.3d 796, 803 (Ct. App. 2011). "Ultimately, the standard set

forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." State v. Stewart, 152 Idaho 868, 869-70, 276
P.3d 740, 741-42 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973)).
"[C]ourts evaluating the scope of the Fourth Amendment waiver must look to the language used
in the condition of probation in order to determine whether the search was objectively
reasonable." State v. Jaskowski, 163 Idaho 257, 261, 409 P.3d 837, 841 (2018). "Under this
approach, 'the court will give force and effect to the words of the contract . . . . [T]he law
presumes that the parties understood the import of their contract and that they had the intention
which its terms manifest." Id. (quoting J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d
748, 751 (2006)).
Defendant signed a Fourth Amendment waiver which stated the following:
I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal
property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by
me, or for which I am the controlling authority conducted by any
agent of IDOC or a law enforcement officer. I hereby waive my
rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution
concerning searches.
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Plaintiff's Ex. 1. The consent granted under the waiver included searches of Defendant's vehicle
by "a law enforcement officer." Id. The waiver clearly states that Defendant waived his "rights
under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution concerning searches." Id. It appears to
the Court that Sgt. Sproat's search of the vehicle would fall within the scope of Defendant's
Fourth Amendment waiver.
However, "consent once given may also be revoked for 'inherent in the requirement that
consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that consent."' State v. Greub, 162
Idaho 581, 586, 401 P.3d 581, 586 (Ct. App. 2017) (quoting State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643,
646, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014)). "Thus, after a defendant has revoked consent, officers no longer
may act pursuant to that initial voluntary consent." Id. (citation omitted). Idaho courts have
suggested that if the probationer "found the consent to search condition of probation to be too
onerous, he had the right at any time to decline probation and instead serve the suspended
portion of the sentence." State v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 119, 122, 867 P.2d 993, 996 (Ct. App.
1993) (Josephson II).
The Court notes that the parties did not provide Idaho case law that speaks directly to this
issue. In the past, the United States Supreme Court declined to address whether a waiver given
as a condition of probation or parole constitutes a complete waiver of a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights because the Court upheld the searches on other bases under the Fourth
Amendment. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (holding search was
supported by reasonable suspicion); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 852 n. 3 (2006) (declining to
address consent argument because suspicion-less search was otherwise reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.). The Idaho case located by the Court that raised this issue took a similar
tack and upheld the search based on reasonable suspicion under Pinson. See State v. Molina, 113
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Idaho 449, 452, 745 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Ct. App. 1987). Further, the State has cited to no authority
that indicates the consent provided by Defendant as a condition of his probation could not later
be revoked. The evidence in the record shows that Defendant ultimately did not give consent for
Sgt. Sproat to conduct a warrantless search of his vehicle. Following the reasoning in Greub, it
was not reasonable for Sgt. Sproat to rely on Defendant's advance consent given pursuant to a
waiver when Defendant subsequently revoked his consent to search the vehicle.
Defendant argues that the Court should uphold the search of Defendant's vehicle based
on Defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver under Gawron. In Gawron, the Idaho Supreme Court
upheld the warrantless search of a probationer's apartment pursuant to the probationer's Fourth
Amendment waiver. The probationer in Gawron was not present during the search of his
residence. The Fourth Amendment waiver at issue in Gawron stated: "That probationer does
hereby agree and consent to the search of his person, automobile, real property, and any other
property at any time and at any place by any law enforcement officer, peace officer, or probation
officer, and does waive his constitutional right to be free from such searches." State v. Gawron,
112 Idaho 841, 842, 736 P.2d 1295, 1296 (1987). The Gawron court upheld the warrantless
search and the admission of evidence obtained during the search based on Defendant's waiver
even though the search did not otherwise satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The

Gawron court explained that probationers "have a reduced expectation of privacy, thereby
rendering intrusions by government authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise would be
unreasonable or invalid under traditional constitutional concepts." Id. at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297.

Gawron is distinguishable because Defendant was present during the search and he
expressly revoked his consent to search. Even if the waiver at issue in this case is substantially
similar to the waiver in Gawron, the defendant in Gawron was not present during the search.
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Further, in a subsequent Idaho Court of Appeals case, the court stated it is ''unconvinced that

Gawron ... stand[s] for the proposition that the type of probation condition at issue here
constitutes a complete waiver of all Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the actual language
in the condition." State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 749, 250 P.3d 796, 800 (Ct. App. 2011).
Further, the State has pointed to no authority that indicates that consent to search given under a
Fourth Amendment waiver is irrevocable.
Further, the State's argument that a probationer cannot revoke consent to search absent a
court hearing is unavailing in this case. The State cites to State v. Ellis in support. State v. Ellis,
155 Idaho 584, 314 P.3d 639 (Ct. App. 2013). The State argues that Ellis stands for the
proposition that a probationer cannot unilaterally revoke a condition of probation, such as
consent to searches, absent a formal hearing. It appears to the Court that this is a broad reading of

Ellis, and that Ellis is not applicable to the facts of this case. In Ellis, a parolee's residence was
searched following ~s arrest in an unrelated case. The defendant in Ellis argued that the
evidence obtained as a result of the search warranted suppression because his parole was
terminated as soon as he was arrested and in custody for the unrelated charge. The Ellis court
held that the defendant was still subject to the terms of his parole agreement even after arrest
because a court had yet to formally revoke his parole. The Ellis court explained that were it to
determine that the defendant's parole had terminated at arrest, there was the potential for
parolees to ''unilaterally suspend" their agreements "by committing a wrongful act, and then
would be able to commit further ... violations with impunity." Id at 589, 314 P.3d at 644.
Further, the Ellis court also held that the search of the parolee's residence was supported by
"reasonable suspicion" that the parolee was engaged in criminal activity, which would also
render the evidence admissible. Id. at 591, 314 P .3d at 646.
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In contrast to Ellis, Defendant was not arrested at the time Sgt. Sproat conducted a search
of his vehicle. At the time of the stop, there was no evidence that Defendant had committed a
probation violation. Defendant did not raise the argument that he was no longer subject to the
terms of his probation agreement once he was stopped by Sgt. Sproat. Further, Sgt. Sproat did
not possess reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity which would
justify the search of a probationer under Ellis. In fact, the only reason given by Sgt. Sproat for
the search of the vehicle was Defendant's status as a probationer and his consent to search and
Fourth Amendment waiver given as a condition of probation.

III.

Sgt. Sproat's search of the vehicle does not fall within any other exception to
the warrant requirement.

"Warrantless ·searches are presumptively unreasonable." State v. Weaver, 288, 290, 900
P.2d 196, 198 (1995) (citation omitted). "The burden of proof rests with the State to demonstrate
that the search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was
otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." Id
In the present case, the State presented no evidence that Sgt. Sproat's warrantless search
of Defendant's vehicle fell within another exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, the
evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of the vehicle warrants suppression.
Because the Court concludes that Sgt. Sproat's search of Defendant's vehicle was not
supported by consent or any other exception to the Fourth Amendment, the Court does not reach
Defendant's arguments regarding an impermissible extension of the stop or the constitutionality
of the terms of Defendant's probation.

CONCLUSION
Sgt. Sproat's initial stop of Defendant's vehicle was justified under the totality of the
circumstances because Sgt. Sproat directly observed Defendant commit what appeared to be one
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or more traffic violations. However, Sgt. Sproat's search of Defendant's vehicle was unlawful
despite Defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver because Defendant expressly revoked his
consent to search the vehicle. Sgt. Sproat's search of the vehicle did not fall within any other
exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, the evidence obtained as a result of Defendant's
vehicle warrants suppression in this case.
Dated this 31 st day of January, 2019.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent to the
following in the manner indicated on the __ day of January, 2019.
Signed: 1/31/2019 08:13 AM

Stan Mortensen
Benjamin Onosko

via iCourt: kcpaicourts@kcgov.us
via iCourt: PDF AX@kcgov.us
JIM BRANNON
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

~
Deputy Clerk
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Description CR 28-18-15354 Hansen, Cody 20190221 Pretrial Conference
CR 2017-13212 Hansen, Cody 20190221 Status
Judge Meyer
No Court Reporter
Clerk Tiffany Burton
Location lKCRT9

Date 2/21/2019 1
I

I

Time
04: 13:22

I

PM
04: 13:43

I

PM

I Speaker
Judge
Meyer

Calls case; def present in custody w/ DA Mr. Onosko; PA Mr.
Mortensen

~

I granted the motion to suppress, but believe the status is different case.

~ r
~ r~

04: 19:27
PM
I
04:21 :37
PM
I
04:22:25
I

PM
04:23:30

PM

04:24:30
I

PM
04:26:09
PM

PA

Attorney Generals office has advised they will file an appeal. That will
stay the proceedings. Believe Def is also in custody on a PV matter.
Regarding this matter, pending the appeal don't object to his release.

DA

Withdraw motion for OR. We want to see what happens with the PV
and stops getting credit on this case. Ready to proceed on the probation
matter today.

~

F

rF
J

04:27:07
PM
I
I 04:27: 11

Note

F

11

Reviews rights.
Move to amend allegation 1; remove that language. Add "did not abide
by condition 5 of the agreement of supervision. "
Object to the state amending the language. We don't' have a sworn
affidavit by a PO. Completely different allegation.
Court knows what the conditions of probation are. He was asked to
submit to a search, he denied the officer consent. To delay it just to
have the PO file what we know is already in evidence. Completely
unnecessary, ask the court to accept the amended language.
Won't get into the merits, even the new allegation raises the same
concerns. Practical reasons to not do it. We tried to negotiate this.
I recall at the motion to suppress hearing, the argument from def is that
he can revoke his consent to a search, and that would constitute a
violation of probation. Those words came from you. Consider that a
judicial admission made in court on behalf of Def. I am going to accept
the state's amended of Allegation # 1. Will ask Def again.
I deny the allegation.
Denial is entered.
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I

PM

04:27: 17
PM
I
04:27:30
PM
I
04:28: 10
PM
I
04:28:19
PM

I

~
~
~
PA

04:29:12
PM
I
04:29:31
PM
I
04:30: 11
PM

F

~

I admit allegation #2.
At the suppression hearing, court heard evidence it was a condition of
his probation, and he refused consent. you heard Defs admission. To
have the state present the state's evidence again is a complete waste of
time. Believe court can take judicial notice. Ask the court to find he
has violated what is alleged.
Agree it could be resolved with argument.
Will set it out in any event, also for disposition.

DA

PA

Officer did not pull him over without a reason, he asked for consent.
Def returned from a rider, court went over the conditions probation. He
accepted the terms of probation. Can't allow probations to play games
about agreeing to probation. He violated his terms, he is saying he will
not abide by the conditions or probation. Ask to find in violation and
revoke.

J

Reviews conditions of probation. Exhibit # 1 was the actual agreement
that was initial and signed by Def. Case law does not indicate
reasonable suspicion is necessary for search of a probationer. Case law
does indicate probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy.
Condition is to consent to searches, he refused that consent. Apparent
from that video.

04:38:12
PM

04:44:33
PM
I

With respect to allegation #2.

With regards to language of#5; reviews. Argument. Nothing in
condition #5 that Def would have violated. When he was asked to
submit to an unreasonable search with no reasonable suspicion, he
elected to withdraw that consent. Argue condition #5 is Court could
agree this condition should be read lowering Defs 4th amendment
rights.

04:35:59
PM

I 04:~49

If court could take judicial notice hearing.

I

Find you are in violation of your probation with respect to allegations
#1 as amended. Not going to take up the issue of disposition today.
Will set this out for March 5, 2019 at 3:00 PM.

~
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Description CR28-18-15354 Hansen, Cody Leigh 20190305 Status Conference
CR 2017-13212 Hansen, Cody Leigh 20190305 Probation Violation
Judge Meyer
Clerk Denice Larsen
Court Reporter Diane Bolan
.--1--D
- a_t_e 13/5/2019

I

Time

I

Speaker

I

Location 1KCRT9

Note

03:25:26
PM
I
03:26:25
PM

Judge
Meyer

03:28:16
PM
I
03:28:55
PM

Stanley
I think we have to ensure the probation conditions have teeth. If not
Mortensen we will send a horrible message that this will be tolerated.

03:30:10
PM

Ask to impose sentence. Reviews case. He agreed to supervision, one
of those is for searches. Within a few months he was stopped by law
Stanley
enforcement and tried to revoke the searches and seizures agreement.
Mortensen
He should not be in the community. Reviews jurisdictional review
hearing.

Ben
Onosko

He is
This is his only prior criminal conviction. He had a
very poor upbringing, with his parents using drugs. He struggled with
substance abuse and addiction for some time. He understands it and is
something he is striving to improve in his life. At this point he has not
been successful, but it does not mean he is done trying.

Ben
Onosko

Reviews GAIN. He was on probation for a short period of time, but he
was open and honest with his PO. He admitted to using. Prior to being
sentenced on this case he was homeless and jobless. When on
probation he secured a job and housing.

Ben
Onosko

I understand the state's argument, I just think it is ill conceived. That
argument applies to any condition of probation. Yes, he violated his
probation and they were willful, but I don't think that leads to the
conclusion that he will never follow the rules. His PO recommended a
rider. While this case was still pending, he received offers from the
state to a new felony charge and they would recommend a rider. What
changed. His PO thinks a rider is appropriate. He is 28 and has no
prior criminal history. This case screams out for a rider.

Ben
Onosko

He has not been in custody for about six months. Hopefully ifhe takes
the rider seriously he can go back out on probation

r

I apologize. I know I didn't do perfect out there, but I did better than I
had in years. I think a second rider could help me. I sat and thought a
lot about this. I wasn't trying to spit in the court's face, I was just

03:31:21
PM

03:34:04
PM
I

Calls case. Def present in custody. Ben Onosko for def. Stanley
Mortensen for state.

Def
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II

overwhelmed. I can go back to my job, I have a car and a license. I
was proud of myself. I even admitted to my dirty u/a's which I lied
about in the past. My missed u/a's was just me trying to catch up.

03:36: 11
PM
I
03:36:27
PM

~

I think I could try again and do better, as long as I do progress.

Judge
Meyer

There is a lot going on in these cases. One of the issues, even though I
suppressed the evidence, you were found to be in possession of a
controlled substance. I think this case is different from the run of the
mill probation violation. Probation can be violated in many ways.

Judge
Meyer

We try to be understanding when people who are addicts have a
relapse and are using again, just struggle with those addictions. It is
another thing altogether to say there are aspects of the agreement of
supervision that I will no longer be bound by. That is what you did
and that is what makes it different. It is not the same as using. It is
saying I am not going to be bound by this agreement.

Judge
Meyer

I do think you have potential and you were doing better and learning a
lot. But at the same time you are 28 and regardless of how poorly you
were brought up, it is time for you to take responsibility for your
choices.

Judge
Meyer

In this case you were originally charged with trafficking. You knew
what you had to do. Probation is a privilege, not a right. I don't like the
position that you found yourself in last September. I don't like what
happened with that stop and how it played out. But at the same time,
you were in possession of controlled substances. If you had been in
compliance with the law it wouldn't have been an issue.

M

Judge
Meyer

You wouldn't have felt compelled to say no I will not give you consent
to search the car. The only reasonable solution is to impose your
sentence. It is the appropriate resolution.

M

Judge
Meyer

Revoke probation, credit for time served. Impose sentence. I wish you
the very best. You are still young and have all the potential to be born
with. You can tum things around if that is what you want to do.

03:45:05
PM
I
03:45:22
PM
I

Judge
Meyer

Remind me on CR28-18-15354.

03:47:28
PM
I
03:48:04
PM
I

Judge
Meyer

03:37:54
PM

03:39:29
PM

03:40: 14
PM

~
~

Stanley
The state is filing an appeal.
Mortensen
He is still being held on CR28-18-15354. No change.

~
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
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Supreme Court No. 46805-2019
District Court No. CR28-18-15354
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vs.
Cody Leigh Hansen
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I, Gayle Sanchez, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify:

That the following exhibit list is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being forwarded to
the Supreme Court on Appeal
in electronic format
in hard copy format (dvd mailed).
Exhibit Number
PL #1
PL #2

Exhibit Description
Document – Motion to Suppress 01/16/2019
Electronic Media – Motion to Suppress 01/16/2019

It should be noted, that all original exhibits will be retained at the district court clerk’s office and
will be made available for viewing upon request.
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the following documents will be submitted as CONFIDENTIAL
EXHIBITS to the Record:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Grand Jury PL Exhibit 1/Document – 10/03/2018
Order Sealing Grand Jury Minutes/voting Record – 10/03/2018
Court Minutes – Grand Jury – 10/03/2018
Grand Jury Voting Record – Ct I – 10/03/2018
Grand Jury 10/03/2018 Transcript – Filed 11/26/2018

IN WITNESS, I have set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court on this the 20th day of
March, 2019.
JIM BRANNON
Clerk of the Court
By: Gayle Sanchez
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
_______________________________________________________
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/
Counterdefendant,
vs.
CODY LEIGH HANSEN,
Defendant/
Counterclaimant.

)
)
)
) Case No. CR28-18-15354
)
) S.C. No: 46805-2019
)
)
)
)
)

_______________________________________________________
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Please be advised that the transcript of
the Motion to Suppress hearing held January 16, 2019,
totaling 126 pages, in the above-entitled matter has
been prepared and filed with the Clerk of the Kootenai
County District Court.

____________________________ Date: 3-19-19
Diane Bolan
Official Court Reporter
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I, Gayle Sanchez, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District, of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record
in the above entitled cause was electronically compiled at my direction, and is a true, full and
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties.
I further certify that I have caused to be served the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript,
along with copies of

all Exhibits offered or admitted and

Confidential Exhibits to each of

the Attorneys of Record or Parties in this case as follows:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date, I served a copy of the attached to:
Lawrence Wasden – Attorney General
ecf@ag.idaho.gov

X By E-mail X By mail
□

Benjamin Martin Onosko
pdfax@kcgov.us

X By E-mail X ByInteroffice
Mail
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fax (number)
□ By
By overnight delivery/Fed Ex
□ By personal delivery
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□ By
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□ By
By personal delivery
□

Jim Brannon
Clerk of the Court
Dated: 03/20/2019

By:
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